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COUNT S. Y. WITTE.

# PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY

## The Russo-Japanese Problem

*Treaty signed at Portsmouth, U.S.A.*

1905

## DIARY OF J. J. KOROSTOVETZ


*Late Minister of Russia in China and Persia ;  
Secretary to Count Witte at the Peace  
Conference at Portsmouth, U.S.A.*

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## *Preface.*

I HAVE been privileged to read in manuscript the deeply interesting account which Mr. Korostovetz has written of the Portsmouth Conference, at which he was present as the Secretary of M. de Witte. In that capacity he was, of course, in a position to know not only what transpired at the formal proceedings of the Conference, but also the various undercurrents, which, invariably in the course of such proceedings, affect the issues at stake.

His narrative will, therefore, be read with special interest, both on account of the subject matter, and because the author, owing to his official connection with the Conference and with M. de Witte personally, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to compile an accurate history of the Conference.

The results are, of course, common property, and something is already known of the course which the negotiations took, but the presentation of these in the form of a bare statement of fact often proves misleading to subsequent generations, as is evinced from time to time by historical research.

In view of the vast importance of the Conference in shaping the destinies of the world, it is of the highest importance that there should be a record which gives not merely the cold facts, but the surrounding colour which enables the present generation and posterity properly to interpret them.

The notes which Mr. Korostovetz made of all the proceedings at the Conference, both in the Conference Chamber itself, and at the Councils of the Russian Plenipotentiaries constitute the materials for such a record, and Mr. Korostovetz, being himself a by no means undistinguished Member of the Corps Diplomatique, has been enabled to bring to bear upon his narrative the craftsmanship of a man well-versed in his subject.

THE EDITOR,  
“*The Russian Outlook.*”



## *Introductory.*

BY THE AUTHOR.

WHEN we were starting for America S. Y. Witte requested me to keep a diary of our travels. His idea was that I should make notes, in chronological order, on all the more or less important facts and events of our visit to the United States. He presumably wanted me to do so in order to obtain material for his own account of our mission. As far as I know, however, he was never able, owing to lack of the necessary leisure, to carry out this projected work. After his return to Russia there followed events which drew the attention of Count Witte away from the Portsmouth Conference.\* He was appointed Prime Minister, and devoted all his time to the reforms which were made public by the October Manifesto of 1905. Later on, when we spoke about the Diary, Count Witte intended to go through it, together with other material in his possession pertaining to the Conference, but he continually put it off, stating that the time for publication had not yet arrived and that there were still some obstacles in his way.

The last time I saw Count Witte was in December 1913, before my departure for Teheran on my appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to Persia. He then remarked that when I returned he would go through the Diary with me. But his death, which occurred during my absence from Russia, made this impossible.

Although I had known S. Y. Witte previously, in Odessa, where he spent the early years of his life, this acquaintance was rather superficial, and it was during our voyage to America together that I got to understand and appreciate this eminent man more fully. I will not attempt to describe his activities as a statesman, as they are well known. I will only mention here some outstanding traits of his character which accounted largely for the success of his diplomatic mission to America. We, his assistants, were astonished to observe how easily he, who had no professional training in diplomacy, managed to assume the rôle of a diplomat, bringing to the fulfilment of his high office presence of mind, proficiency and adaptability to conditions which were more or less foreign to him.

Before the beginning of the negotiations he often told us that he did not consider it necessary to pay a meticulous regard to the rules

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\* He had received the title of Count on his return from the United States.



## INTRODUCTORY.

of International Law, or to antiquated diplomatic precedents and customs (this considerably shocked Professor Martens), but that he was resolved to be guided by the prevailing circumstances and the dictates of common sense in furthering the interests of Russia.

From the very beginning he tried to gain the sympathies and support of American public opinion, drawing attention to the common interests of the white races and to the ancient sympathy between the United States and Russia. His outward manner and bearing were always very simple, he avoided diplomatic mysteriousness, and did not give himself important airs. On the whole he was deprived of any snobbishness, which often, and especially among the diplomatic caste, takes the place of real intelligence. This attracted to him the majority of the Americans, who appreciated his sincerity and frankness. I often heard the following opinion voiced by Americans about him: "How simple he is, not in the least like a Representative of Autocratic Russia, but more like a leader of democracy."

Witte gained the sympathies of the Americans not only by his intellect and personal charm, but also by the great and entirely sincere interest he took in their ways of living and thinking, and in their national customs. It is true that his ignorance of the language somewhat embarrassed him, but Baron Rosen, our Ambassador at Washington, formerly Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan, and Dr. E. Dillon, a well-known professor and author, helped him very much during his stay in America.

Witte, although greatly appreciating the noble sentiments and peace-loving mediation of President Roosevelt, from the very beginning made it understood that Russia was not beaten and did not intend to enter into any compromise derogatory to her Sovereignty. With regard to the Japanese, he was very reserved and firm, but did not show false self-conceit, and frankly expressed his appreciation for their patriotism and military valour.

Owing to his tactfulness and sincerity, the cold distrust of the Japanese Delegates soon disappeared, and our opponents began to manifest that spirit of obliging courtesy which is customary with the Japanese. This certainly made the negotiations easier. His popularity amongst the representatives of the Press can be explained by the same traits of his character, viz., his accessibility and his way of speaking out frankly, with a sincerity not generally customary among diplomats. He avoided saying things which could be interpreted in two different ways, and tried to appeal to the sense of impartiality and justice of the person he was talking to.

## INTRODUCTORY.

When speaking about Russia, Witte did not conceal her defects and the negative side of her home politics, for instance, on the Jewish Question. In this way he undoubtedly weakened the existing anti-Russian feeling, and produced a marked change in our favour.

Summing up Witte's activities in America, one may say that he not only showed himself an excellent diplomat, but also a Russian patriot in the highest sense of the word, and, notwithstanding the more or less unfavourable conditions in which Russia was then placed, he succeeded in obtaining the best possible results.

J. J. KOROSTOVETZ.

*Petrograd, December, 1917.*

# PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY.

## THE RUSSO-JAPANESE PROBLEM.

*Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis.*

The appointment of S. Y. Witte, as Chief Plenipotentiary, to conduct the peace negotiations with Japan was not, as is known, in accordance with the Tzar's original intention. On the first report of Count Lamsdorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposing to send Witte to America, the Tzar wrote: "Only not Witte." Our Ambassador in Paris, Nelidoff, whose name was then submitted by Count Lamsdorff, declined this mission, excusing himself on account of his age and insufficient knowledge of the English language and the affairs of the Far East. Our Ambassador in Rome, Mouravioff, at first agreed to go, and even came to Petersburg, but, having become acquainted with the situation, he also refused. The reason of his refusal is not known to me. Whether he feared the difficulty of the task, or had decided that the affair had small chances of success, I cannot judge. I think that Mouravioff had great capacity, and with good collaborators would have done very well. However, it must be admitted that Witte was the most suitable candidate. In fact, for the last ten years he had directed our foreign policy, especially in the Far East, and was the creator of our colonial activity, connected with the Russo-Chinese territorial agreements and with the building of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Having appeared an open adversary of the Russian Government's policy in Manchurian affairs, he became a natural centre of opposition to the adventures of Russian Imperialism in the Far East. It was universally thought, even more abroad than in Russia, that Witte was the person to whom the liquidation of the entangled situation, which had been created by our conflict with Japan, ought to be entrusted.

The post of second Plenipotentiary had been confided from the outset to our Ambassador in Washington, Baron Rosen, in conformity with the appointment of Japan's Minister to the United States, Mr. Takahira. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Komura, had been selected as first Plenipotentiary.

The refusal of both Nelidoff and Mouravioff induced the Foreign Office to return again to Witte, and this time the Emperor, though reluctantly, gave his consent. I saw Witte after the first proposal for his nomination had been made, and talked with him about it.

He was pessimistic. I told him that he would be sent to America, as he was the only suitable man, in whom even our enemies trusted. Witte said that it was very doubtful, as the Tzar did not like him, partly on grounds of purely personal character: he would prefer to send any other man, even if completely unfit for the task. He continued:

"The Tzar is spiteful and cannot forget that I warned him against the Korean and Manchurian adventures, against the delaying of the evacuation of Manchuria, and the deleterious system of conducting the negotiations with Japan. We could have easily fixed the boundaries with Japan without drawing the affair to a rupture. And with China also we could have agreed, even after the occupation of Port Arthur, which was a mistake. We undertook to render Manchuria flourishing, to develop trade and to bring culture, but instead we brought the war there. It is not surprising that foreigners do not trust us. And besides we need not have thrust ourselves into Korean affairs. If the Tzar had only listened to me, we should have avoided a disgraceful war and the loss of our political prestige, not only in the Far East but also in Europe. But he took the advice of irresponsible people and of ambitious admirals and generals, who were concocting foolish plans of conquest against common sense, which brought us inevitably to a collapse. Now nobody trusts us, and it is easy to understand after our perfidious politics in Manchuria and Korea." Taking up the question of the coming Peace Conference, Witte said: "Peace for Russia is indispensable, as the continuation of war in case of further retreat threatens the occupation by the enemy not only of Harbin but also of our Pacific coast, not to speak of the internal disorganisation of Russia and the disorder of the money market, which might lead to national bankruptcy. Our rights in Manchuria and even more in Korea were established on a very weak juridical foundation, and the war has shown how difficult it is to retain possessions connected with Russia only by a railway line. We must re-establish good relations with Japan, and try to regain the confidence of the world by a sound policy."

Speaking of China, he continued: "I have nothing against the so-called 'open door policy,' about which the Americans make such a fuss. I even think that competition would help us and would incite Russian tradesmen to show more energy and independence."

Then Witte told me that, in the event of his appointment as Plenipotentiary, he should take me with him as private secretary.

Count Lamsdorff's report, proposing Witte's appointment, was made with the latter's agreement. It is notorious that

the two Ministers were on excellent terms. Count Lamsdorff, despite all his incapability, acknowledged the intellectual superiority of Witte, and constantly found himself under his influence. This circumstance had its reflection on the direction of our foreign policy, especially in the affairs of the Far East, the Minister of Finance (Witte) being omnipotent in our Foreign Office. If the latter displayed any attempts at independence in fostering its own views, it was more out of departmental rivalry and bureaucratic self-love than out of differences of opinion in the appreciation of Governmental interests. In regard to the affairs of the Far East, to my observation not one really serious question was decided without the participation of the Ministry of Finance, and always according to its views. Witte's influence certainly weakened after his disgrace, but Count Lamsdorff continued from ancient habit to apply for advice to Witte after the appointment of the latter to the more honorary than active post of President of the Council of Ministers.

I was casually a witness to a conversation between the two Ministers, which took place several months before the Russo-Japanese War—in October, 1903, if I am not mistaken. I met Witte at a dinner party at Count Lamsdorff's house, at which were present the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Obolensky, the Chief of the Eastern Department, Hartwig, our Minister in Peking, Mr. Lessar, and the Chief of the Chancery, Mr. Savinsky. Witte read a detailed memorandum on our policy in Korea and Manchuria in connection with the work of the well-known Forestry Company on the river Yalu. He was of the opinion that this Company, directed from Petersburg by a newly-founded Committee on the affairs of the Far East, pursued political objects. It had no commercial importance. To his knowledge the preliminary expenses and administration had swallowed up several millions already, the greater part of which was expended on maintaining a defensive guard for the Company, enrolled from pirates and robbers. The money had been given by the Tzar nominally out of his personal fortune, but in reality it had been taken out of the Government treasury.

"Emperor Alexander III," remarked Witte, "was economical, and did not throw money away, but Nicholas II does not know how to count."

The Agents of the Company behaved in a provoking manner with regard to Japan, and ignored our official Representatives, creating difficulties and hindering the normal course of the Russo-Japanese negotiations. The people who stood at the head of the Committee, Bezobrasoff, Admiral Abaza, Matiunine, and General



Wogack, pursued their own policies, finding, unfortunately, support from the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, who had ambitious aims.

"They try," said Witte, "to discredit the Foreign Office and you, Count, in the eyes of the Tzar, perverting facts, and presenting a false picture of our position in the Far East. I am afraid that they will entirely spoil our relations with Japan and bring about a rupture. We are not ready for war, and may lose even our old possessions. In one word, this undertaking on the Yalu is a perilous adventure, and you, Count, cannot remain passive: you must protest, and warn the Emperor against the danger of such a double-faced policy. If the Company makes a mess of it, the responsibility will be laid upon you."

"But what can I do," answered Count Lamsdorff in a rather helpless tone. "I told the Emperor that our enterprise on the Yalu would cause a quarrel with Japan, but he listens only to Bezobrasoff, and says that the latter knows better as he has been in Manchuria, and is well acquainted with local conditions. Bezobrasoff has persuaded the Tzar of the necessity for a strategic screen on the river Yalu, and wants us to show resolution and firmness."

Count Lamsdorff's explanation produced the impression that he had not himself a clear idea of the situation: Bezobrasoff inspired in him a somewhat superstitious fear and awe, principally in consequence of the influence he had acquired so quickly at Court.

It was noticed generally that Count Lamsdorff was not much interested in the affairs of the Far East. It is known that the written reports were all composed by Hartwig, and that Count Lamsdorff, who presented them to the Tzar, limited himself to the part of a transmitter, often being quite ignorant of what he was reporting.

The conversation on that theme went on all the evening, Witte persisting that the Foreign Office must endeavour to remove the Viceroy and Bezobrasoff from the negotiations with Japan, and must show more resolution and initiative.

After this preamble let us pass on to the actual facts concerning our journey to the United States and the Peace negotiations.

M. Witte, with his family and the members of the Russian delegation, left Paris for Cherbourg on July 13/26, 1905. Among his fellow-travellers were Professor Martens, General Yermoloff,\* Shipoff,† Chief of the Russian State Treasury Department, accompanied by Mr. Batcheff and Colonel Samoiloff. Mr. Raffalovitch, our Financial Agent in Paris, also joined our party. At the Gare

\* Lt.-General N. Yermoloff, K.C.B., Russian Military Attaché in London.

† Mr. Shipoff, subsequently Minister of Finance. Now with General Denikin in the South of Russia.

St. Lazare we found a large number of people assembled to see us off, among others, our Ambassador in France, Nelidoff, Count Cassini, our Ambassador in Spain, General Wogack, Baron Gabriel de Gunzburg, a most popular figure in Parisian high-life clubs and drawing-rooms. At Cherbourg, where the train arrived about 4 p.m., we were met by our Vice-Consul, the Agent for the German-Lloyd, and by the French Railway Officials, who invited Witte and his family to the local casino by the sea. A band was playing there, and people were bathing, strolling about, and taking refreshments on the terrace, while waiting for the arrival of the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse," which had been delayed by fog. M. Witte, his wife, M. Naryshkin, his son-in-law, and Madame Naryshkin, occupied a table and called for tea. The fog grew thicker, and a notice was posted up announcing that the steamer would not be in before evening. Witte invited all the members of his suite to dinner. Meanwhile the fog kept increasing.

About 9 p.m. the "Deutschland" arrived from New York, but there was no news of the "Kaiser Wilhelm" having left Plymouth. It became clear that we should have to pass the night at Cherbourg. The passengers who had come with us, as well as the comers on the "Deutschland," who had missed the night train for Paris, began looking out for rooms in the casino and at the local hotels, receiving billets from Lloyd's Agent. Witte and his family decided to remain in the casino; the other members of our delegation had to seek night-quarters in the town.

The next day, July 14/27, about noon, we embarked on a tender which took us over to the steamer. Witte's family accompanied him up to the moment of our departure, and absorbed all his attention. He took leave of his wife with great affection, evidently being most attached to her.

We soon weighed anchor and put out to sea with fairly good weather. On the "Kaiser Wilhelm" we found two officials of our Ministry—C. Nabokoff\* and de Plançon—and an employée of the Russo-Chinese Bank, M. Berg, Shipoff's assistant. They had come on board at Bremen. There were also several newspaper men, among them Sir Mackenzie Wallace, the well-known author of an excellent book on Russia, Dr. E. Dillon, Professor of Kharkoff University and correspondent of the "Daily News," Hedeman, correspondent of the "Matin," and Richard, of the "Petit Parisien." There were also the English correspondent, Long, two Russians—A. Brianchaninoff, of the "Slovo," and B. Souvorine, of the "Novoye Vremya." The American Associated Press was

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\* Subsequently Russian *Charge d'Affaires* in London.

represented by Mr. Cortesi, from Rome, who had been appointed when it was proposed to send our Ambassador in Italy, to carry on the negotiations.

JULY 15—28.

*The Atlantic.*—The weather is fair and there is scarcely any motion. By noon to-day we had made 477 miles from Cherbourg. The newspaper men have been enquiring as to the staff of our delegation and the duties of each of its members. Witte seems to be somewhat sceptical as to the outcome of the future negotiations. Though we have scarcely begun our journey, he has already commissioned me to make enquiries about the steamers leaving America in the near future, "as we shall probably not remain there long: the negotiations will probably come to nothing." At dinner, which is served us apart from the other passengers, in a saloon called the "Moltke Saal," the conversation turned on the Chinese and the Japanese and their characteristics. Witte argued that the latter have a perfectly independent civilisation of their own, and that in character and spiritual type there is a marked distinction between them and the Chinese. I remarked that the whole civilisation of Japan was borrowed from China, but Witte continued to insist on the complete independence of the two races. Speaking of our relations towards the Chinese, he said that no other people would have borne one half of the abuses and injustice to which the Russians had subjected the Chinese during the years following the occupation of Port Arthur. He referred very disparagingly to the action of the Viceroy of Manchuria, Admiral Alexeieff, whom he blamed for the errors of the campaign, and for opposing General Kouropatkin. The deficiency of the latter, according to Witte, lay in his excessive opportunism, indecision, and weakness. The conversation then turned on the negotiations with Japan, and Witte remarked that after the publication of our "Crimson Book" the less said about the treachery and insincerity of the Japanese the better.\* General Yermoloff thought that we were not to be blamed as an understanding with a yellow race was a great difficulty.

In the evening Shipoff showed me an article in the Berlin newspaper, "Zukunft," about the mission entrusted to Witte. The gist of the article was that Witte's appointment had been

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\* A collection of diplomatic documents issued during the war by Admiral Abaza and State Secretary Bezobrasoff, Matiunine, and others implicated in our politics in the Far East, to justify their activity in Manchuria.

made by his enemies in the hope of undermining his reputation, as, should a peace be concluded, it would be a disgraceful one, and the whole blame for the disgrace would fall upon Witte.

JULY 16—29.

By noon we had made 532 miles. It grew rough at night and continued so all day. In spite of this, all of us turned up at meals. After lunch, Witte played shuffle-board on the upper deck, where there was a so-called "Wiener Café." The game consists in pushing flat wooden discs along the deck by means of a kind of shovel, directing them to chalked squares of different values, according to the figures inscribed in them. He played with Martens, Shipoff, and Plançon. The passengers watched the game, and some amateur photographers took snapshots of the players. Mr. Long, the correspondent of the "New York Journal," expressed his surprise at Witte's simple ways and sociability. Other correspondents had also spoken to me of this. I have forgotten to mention Mr. Smoley, of the "Times," and Mr. McCulloch, of the "New York Herald,"<sup>2</sup> who are travelling with us as well. Mr. Smoley seems to have become well acquainted with Witte—they have been talking together a good deal. To-day, when I was strolling with Witte, he stopped near the lower deck and looked at the crowds of third-class passengers, mostly Polish emigrants, and listened to their talk. "There must be many of our Jews among them," he said. "I pity these poor wretches who are driven away from Russia because their life in our country has become impossible."

At dinner, General Yermoloff, discussing modern warfare, said that in spite of the exemplary military organisation of the British and the Americans, they had both been altogether unprepared for war, the former with the Boers and the latter with Spain. Our General had been attached to the American Staff during the Cuban campaign. Witte replied that it was not quite so, as both of them had attained the end they had set before them, the English, notwithstanding their hard and prolonged struggle, having exhibited remarkable patriotism and unitedness, and that, in view of our breakdown in the war, it would be better for us Russians not to talk of organisation and order.

"If Russia has been defeated," he said, "it has been by her own disorder only, but the Russian army has exhibited unexampled bravery, endurance and self-sacrifice. Everything was done in a stupid and ruinous way. To begin with, take the appointment of Admiral Alexeieff and General Kouropatkin to common command\* When Kouropatkin was preparing to start for Manchuria, he called

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\* General Kouropatkin, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.



on me and asked for my advice. Though I answered that it would be useless as all the same he would not follow it, he insisted, saying that he attached great importance to my opinion. I then advised him, on his arrival in Manchuria, to arrest the Viceroy Alexeieff and send him to Petersburg, and only then to commence military operations. Of course, Kouropatkin laughed at my advice, but later events showed how far I was right. Instead of carrying out Kouropatkin's plan, which lay in drawing the Japanese on by retreating, say as far as Harbin, we thrust forward, doing all this under direct pressure from Alexeieff and thanks to the weakness and subservience of Kouropatkin. I consider him a brave and capable general, but he showed a want of moral courage; he kept trying to take his tone from Alexeieff and from St. Petersburg."

Plançon\* made an attempt to defend the policy of Alexeieff, saying that he had not interfered in military operations and that Kouropatkin had acted quite independently. This called forth fresh and caustic remarks from Witte, who said that he had in his possession letters from Kouropatkin in which the latter complained of Alexeieff and wrote that he feared neither Marshal Oyama nor his generals, but only Alexeieff.

"What rouses especial indignation," said Witte, "is that Alexeieff received the Military Cross of St. George while so many tens of thousands of nameless heroes received nothing at all."

Witte then began criticising our army, noting the poverty of organisation in all things, and referring to documents which he had seen.

"I know of cases where the wounded were brought as far as Cheliabinsk without having their linen changed.† By Plehve's‡ orders a colonel of the Gendarmerie was sent to Manchuria to search out and arrest all who were politically unreliable among the officials and the medical staff, and it was only owing to General Wogack's insistence that this colonel was at last removed."

JULY 17—30.

To-day at lunch the conversation turned on our coming visit to Oyster Bay, where we were to be presented to the President. According to information received from Baron Rosen before our departure from Petersburg we were to be taken to Oyster Bay in a

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\* Formerly Chief of the Diplomatic Chancery of Admiral Alexeieff at Port Arthur.

† A town near the Ural mountains on the Russo-Siberian border.

‡ Minister of the Interior or Home Department.



yacht, proceeding thence to Portsmouth, a voyage of at least twenty hours, while the railway journey from New York to Portsmouth was only six hours. Witte remarked several times that he saw no reason for going by sea when we could reach our destination by land. At dinner we talked again about the coming negotiations. Witte said he thought the general trend of matters would show itself at the first meetings. As to a definite decision this would only be possible after the arrival of Captain Roussin, who was coming from the seat of war and possessed the most accurate information about the Army. The talk next turned on the Dogger Bank incident. General Yermoloff affirmed that there was evidence of the intention of the Japanese to damage our fleet, and that among the fishermen there were Japanese agents laying mines. Witte disagreed with him, remarking that "the whole of the business had been a disgraceful one for us and that Admiral Rojdestvensky had been to blame."\* Long before the departure of the fleet he had been so alarmed at the supposed machinations of the Japanese that he had demanded the closing of Russian ports to all foreign vessels (which were to be admitted only after a preliminary inspection). This senseless proposal was discussed by the Committee of Ministers and was rejected only thanks to the support of Count Solsky and other more reasonable members."

To-day I got into conversation with Mr. McCulloch, correspondent of the "New York Herald," who is among the passengers. He was war correspondent with our troops in Manchuria. At Mukden he was made prisoner by the Japanese who took him to General Kuroki. The latter asked him whether the Russian troops knew what was happening in Russia and that the war was not popular there. Then McCulloch was taken off to Dalny and later to Hiroshima. Finally he was liberated, on condition of not returning to the Russian army. Speaking of the impressions he had carried away from Japan, McCulloch said the Japanese army did not seem to be tired of the war; at any rate, all the wounded were longing to get back to it. He showed me some interesting photographs taken during the campaign, and asked me to present him to Witte. As this Englishman spoke Russian, Witte spent a considerable time with him on deck looking over his photographs.

### JULY 18—31.

During the last twenty-four hours we have made 535 miles. It was fairly rough all the time. In the evening the homeward-bound

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\* When the fleet of Admiral Rojdestvensky passing the North Sea encountered some British fishing boats and cannonaded them, having taken them for Japanese torpedo boats.

steamer "Campania" informed us by a wireless message that there was nothing new from the seat of war and that the first meeting of the Plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth was proposed for August 5.

In the evening Witte sometimes visits the smoking room, where we generally gather, sits down at our table and drinks tea. Most of us drink beer, of which Colonel Samoiloff is very fond, thereby eliciting constant teasing from Witte. Samoiloff is full of jokes. He has observed all the peculiarities of his colleagues, and never misses an opportunity of quizzing at the gravity of one, or at the exaggerated deference of another. His humour does not spare even Witte, who, it seems to me, suspects that not all see in him only the great man. Besides, Witte himself is not devoid of a sense of humour and occasionally mocks at his collaborators. Martens is somewhat dogmatic; he takes a great pleasure in reminiscences and anecdotes about the many conferences and congresses at which he has been present. It is said that he was the promoter of the first Hague conference of Peace. General Yermoloff is a thorough gentleman and a good military expert, but rather indifferent. Nabokoff is impulsive and spontaneous. I have spoken but little with him. He shares a cabin with Plançon: they came on together from Hamburg, but it seems do not agree very much.

### JULY 19—AUGUST 1.

It had been very rough of late but it grew calmer towards dinner-time and the customary celebration of the last day at sea was fairly successful. We dined in the large saloon and this time in dinner jackets. The table was decorated with the German and Russian coat-of-arms and with flags of all countries, the American flag predominating. Towards the end of dinner an illumination of electric lights, suspended in garlands, was turned on and the stewards marched in procession between the tables, carrying flags and illuminated dishes of ice-cream. The band played stately marches and the American, German and Russian anthems, while the diners applauded. Some of them donned paper caps out of crackers and joined the procession. The evening wound up with a dance on the upper deck, which was decorated with flags.

Witte gave me the "Times" of July 20 to translate. In it is an article about his appointment. The writer presumes that Witte is to call at Paris on his way to discuss with the French statesmen and financiers different possibilities which may arise in conjunction with the settlement of the war, and the probable participation of China in the negotiations. As is known, Japan has answered in the negative the note that China has addressed to her on this subject.

Russia, on the other hand, has declared that, though the negotiations must be conducted by the Plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, she was ready to admit that some of the questions to be discussed represent certain interest to China, and, first of all, the question of the future of Manchuria. The "Times" refers to an article in the Russian newspaper, "The Novosti," supposed to be of semi-official origin. It foresees that the questions of Manchuria and Korea will give rise to great complications. These countries, says the Russian newspaper, have not been conquered either by Russia or by Japan, and therefore neither of these Powers has the right to dispose of them. The "Times" regrets that such considerations are brought forward by Russia now, when she is expelled from Korea and from Southern Manchuria.

Having read the article, Witte remarked that the "Times" goes too far with its suspicions, ascribing to us exaggeratedly complicated plans, of which nobody even thought. According to the "Times," our diplomacy is the most treacherous and insidious. "Let us hope," he added, "that the current of English opinion will not follow such suggestions."

#### JULY 20—AUGUST 2.

At 11 a.m. we sighted Sandy Hook, the most prominent Cape on the American Continent. The weather was beautiful and the rocking had ceased altogether. The passengers were getting their things ready and paying their bills. Many came up to Witte asking for his autograph. Our Chief satisfied them most graciously.

Before the "Kaiser Wilhelm" entered the river, she was approached by the small steamer "Emigrant," flying the Russian and the American flags, and bringing members of the Slavonic colony in New York. For some time the "Emigrant" kept by our side, the Slavs shouting "Hurrah! jivio Witte!" and singing national songs. Afterwards they came on board the ship and presented themselves to Witte. They were followed by the Customs officials and a number of journalists. Some of them soon found out Witte, who was strolling about the deck, and welcomed him in flowery language, then began questioning him about the coming negotiations. Witte explained that, as he did not know English he would ask his colleague, M. Martens, to speak for him. As I approached I saw Witte surrounded by a crowd of journalists, and squeezed against the wall of the deck saloon, while Martens was making an eloquent speech of greeting to the American Nation. This speech had been composed by Witte with the assistance of

Dr. Dillon. It began with an address to the great American Press, which had done so much to forward Witte's journey to America. Then the hope was expressed that the two chivalrous nations of Russia and Japan would come to know each other better and draw nearer to one another. First, however, the terms of peace must be discussed, and only if they proved acceptable would Russia begin formal negotiations. I quote the text of the speech :

" As you are aware, it has hitherto been customary in such cases to settle preliminaries before the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, whose task it is to come to an agreement on the questions under discussion.

" Now, the fact that His Majesty the Emperor has agreed to dispense with this traditional diplomatic custom and to appoint delegates to learn the terms offered by a brave antagonist, is an eloquent proof of the friendly feelings which he and his subjects continue to bear towards the people of the United States.

" I say, continue to bear, for in all periods of our history our traditional relations with the great Republic have been friendly ones. And now I would say and prove to your people, who live not so much in the past as in the present and the future, that it is the sincere desire of the Sovereign and people of Russia to strengthen in the future the bonds of friendship which have hitherto existed between the two nations. It is owing to this sincere desire that His Majesty, the Tzar, setting aside all other considerations, has unhesitatingly accepted the frank invitation of your first citizen and gifted leader.

" Should my mission prove in certain respects unproductive, and should the attempt to find a common basis for peace negotiations at the present moment end in failure, yet this evident proof of friendly feeling, given by His Majesty the Tzar and by the Russian people, will still remain a memorable event, pregnant, I trust, with beneficent consequences for the great nations of the West and of the East."

The reading of the speech was met with general applause. At this moment, one of the journalists, holding up a newspaper, said to Witte : " A report is printed in this paper, transmitted yesterday from the ' Kaiser Wilhelm ' by wireless, of a statement made by Your Excellency to the correspondent of the ' New York Herald,' now on board. You are said to have stated that you anticipate that the negotiations with Japan will be broken off in a week's time, as the Japanese terms cannot be accepted and will not even be discussed. Is it true that you made this statement ? "



Witte seemed rather puzzled and then replied that he had not said so and, wishing to avoid further questions, made for the bridge. Just then our fellow passenger, McCulloch, rushed up, and turning to Witte, declared in a trembling voice that what was printed in the paper had really been said and asked Witte to confirm his statement, as otherwise he, McCulloch, would appear to be a liar and would lose his reputation.

Turning to McCulloch, Witte said in French that, when holding a private conversation with a journalist, he had not supposed that his words would be reproduced by telegraph in the form of a sensational interview, and that however disagreeable it might be for McCulloch, he must declare that he had not made such a categorical statement. Without listening to any further explanations from McCulloch, or the questions put by the other journalists, Witte went on the bridge. McCulloch then turned to me, saying that the statement he had telegraphed had really been made. I replied that I heard of this for the first time, but that it should not have been reported by telegraph. McCulloch indignantly explained that after his conversation with Witte he had spoken with one of our Secretaries, who had confirmed these same words and had approved of the sending of the telegram.

This debate excited the journalists' curiosity who asked to be told the truth. I replied that Witte had already explained everything to them, and that, moreover, he could not have made this statement as neither he nor anyone else knew what the Japanese terms were. They then asked me whether it was true that Witte had not been given actual power to treat and that he had only been sent to learn the terms offered by Japan, as a "Courier." This was reported in a London paper by an article of Dillon. I answered that I had not read the article, but that both Witte and Baron Rosen were supplied with sufficient credentials. Similar questions were put to me later, on our arrival in New York. This want of confidence on the part of the Americans was apparently caused by Japanese propaganda, though it may have simply been a trap to confuse us and discover contradictions in Witte's statements.

The crowd of journalists then went on the bridge and mixed with the passengers, trying to make their way nearer to Witte. Shortly after, another small steamer came alongside, bringing our Consul-General, Ladizhenski, Mr. Hansen, First Secretary of our Embassy, Baron Schlippenbach, our Consul in New York, Colonel Raspopoff, Military Attaché, Mr. Vilenkin, Agent of the Ministry of Finance, and our Consul in Chicago, Prince Yengalitcheff.



While our chief advanced to meet them people crowded around him begging for his autograph. One journalist who presented Witte with a sketch bearing his resemblance asked for his signature. Witte acquiesced and wrote on it "a cela doit ressembler a Monsieur Witte." This sketch met with great success and appeared in the papers next day.

When the steamer arrived at Hoboken we saw the landing place black with spectators, who waved American and Russian flags and welcomed us with loud cheers. The first ones to come on board were our Ambassador, Baron Rosen and his Secretary, Prince Kudasheff.\* The Baron and Witte shook hands and retired into the cabin for a private conversation. Meanwhile a group of journalists assembled near the door, waiting for their chance to come; two audacious Japanese actually offered to shake hands with the Baron.

On the pier a dense crowd made for the Ambassadors and carried us onward, the police trying to come to the rescue. I was keeping close to Witte all the time. Having walked, or rather run, along the wharf, we came at last to a stop next to a deputation of the Slav colony who were waiting to meet us. The rest of our colleagues had been dispersed. The Ambassadors were jammed up against Capek, one of the deputation, carrying bread and salt on a silver dish as a token of welcome. The police were using their fists somewhat indiscriminately, one of them giving me a hard knock on the back. Capek addressed us in English, saying that, though the Slavs were now Americans, they had not lost touch with their native land and were glad to see among them a man of their blood, entrusted with so important and noble a mission. After this, he handed Witte the dish and a complimentary scroll.

"As American citizens," ran the scroll, "we welcome your arrival in our adopted country, and, as heretofore, we shall watch with the deepest attention and sympathy the fortunes of the Russian people with whom we have a common ancestry. The love of peace is the most noble heritage of the Slavonic race. You have come here on a mission of peace. We welcome you, our Russian brothers, and wish you success."

Witte replied with a simple hearty speech in Russian, giving much pleasure by this to our countrymen.

Rooms had been taken for us in the St. Regis Hotel (a large 22 storey building at the corner of 55th Street and Fifth Avenue), but unfortunately on different floors. Witte had his own separate rooms luxuriously furnished.

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\* Actually Russian Minister in China.

At our arrival we found a group of reporters in the vestibule of the hotel. They rushed at me with various questions and wanted to know all about Witte and his intentions. They had been informed that I was "spokesman for the Russians." Most persistent was the "New York Times" reporter, Williams, said to be anti-Russian. I heard that the Japanese were staying at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, in the same street, where a Japanese flag waves above the entrance. Baron Komura has been here for the last week, and was received by the President already. It appears that the Japanese keep in connection with the Press through Sato, Japanese Minister to Mexico, who is a member of the Japanese Delegation.

As this was my third trip to America, I had some knowledge of the country. The first impression of Americans gives you the idea that they are only rapt up in business. But coming more at close quarters you begin to understand their manifold qualities. It is a manly race of striving, progressive people, the true citizens of a free country, though the all-mighty dollar is predominant. My companions, after their first stroll in town, were crushed by the grandiose scale of the surroundings, by the feverish activity and democratic spirit of the Americans, so unlike the Russians in their ideas and customs. But notwithstanding this they found that the difference between the classes, perhaps, was deemed even more marked than in Russia.

We dined at the Union Club at the invitation of Baron Rosen. In every detail this club can beat the best ones in London and in Paris. After dinner we went to the roof garden of the hotel to smoke and get a breath of cool air, as it is fairly close in New York.

By the way, I was told that telegrams could be sent off from the hotel by French and Danish cables. Thus we will be able to avoid the English ones.

A number of letters and telegrams had arrived for Witte, mostly from America. He told me to sort them and, generally speaking, to take charge of this matter. I had also been entrusted with the Press and quartermaster's duties. Most of the letters were requests for Witte's and Rosen's autographs, some of them containing addressed and stamped envelopes. One of the letters was from one Paul Kolbe in Minden, Germany, offering to construct armed balloons for the destruction of the Japanese army. In another letter a certain Louis Dem-

bitz from Louisville advised Witte to learn in America how to rule Russia. There were several original epistles from a Miss Marguerite Andrews of New York. In one of them, addressed to our Emperor, this lady, apparently a clairvoyante, recommended His Majesty to conclude peace and introduce reforms, prophesying terrible calamities for Russia if he did not. This letter was plentifully embellished with texts from the Gospels. In another letter, addressed to the publisher of the "New York American," the same lady gave an account of her visions, spoke of the war and the Yellow Peril, and once more quoted the Gospels.

The publisher of the "American Miner" in Philadelphia sent a telegram expressing the sympathy towards Russia of the inhabitants of the Pacific Coast. "Seven-eighths of the people of the Pacific Coast are with you in refusing Japanese impertinent territorial demands," wrote this partisan of Russia.

### JULY 21—AUGUST 3.

To-day's papers contain Witte's portrait—he, bearing the titles of Count, Prince, or Baron. There are articles, too, discussing the situation and the coming negotiations, and biographical information about our Chief. On the whole the tone of the newspapers is favourable and sympathetic, though with a touch of irony.

Before lunch Witte worked in his study and received several of us, including Dr. Dillon, who has found accommodation in the same hotel and has become like one of the family.

By order of the State Department two detectives have been appointed to watch and guard Witte constantly. While he is in the hotel, one of them is on duty in the corridor near his rooms and the other in the vestibule. When he drives out they follow him in a motor. Witte having gone out for a drive with Vilenkin has aroused the curiosity of the correspondents, who began questioning me about him, one of them asking whether it was true that he had gone to Wall Street to conclude a loan. As it turned out afterwards, Witte had really visited the Stock Exchange, where he was shown the Council Offices. While in the gallery of the principal hall, he was recognised by the public, who greeted him with applause, which he acknowledged by bowing. Several prominent members were presented to him on the spot by Vilenkin. He then

visited Tammany Hall, the highest building in New York (35 storeys) where he went up to the top in a lift and enjoyed a bird's eye view of the city. When passing through the emigrants' quarter of New York Witte stopped the motor-car outside a garden where some children were playing. He got out and talked to the people, most of them Jews, who gave him a grand ovation.

Baron Rosen, with whom I lunched at the Union Club, questioned me as to how Witte and the other members of our mission had been appointed. Of course I told him what I knew about the matter. Shipoff and Pokotiloff had been proposed from the very beginning as specialists in financial questions, with which Mouravioff was unacquainted. Afterwards Witte did not choose to countermand their appointments, the more so as Pokotiloff, our Minister in China, was already on his way from Peking.

The Baron appeared very much pleased at Witte's appointment. "I heaved a sigh of relief," said he, "when I learned that it was not Nelidoff or Mouravioff, but Witte who was coming, as he is the only man with a will, who knows what he wants and who will not sacrifice the interests of Russia through any fear of Petersburg or desire to please it."

I asked the Baron whether he thought they would get on with Witte, as I knew that in Petersburg it was thought, and by some, perhaps, reckoned on, that dissensions would spring up among them and that they would interfere with one another.

"I know it," replied the Baron. "But I think they are mistaken there. As soon as I saw Witte, I told him quite frankly of my view of our position, of what we might and ought to seek, and likewise offered him my full co-operation. He thanked me for my frankness and said he would act independently of all extraneous circumstances. He is a true Russian with a Russian soul, and the matter being in his hands I am at ease as to the result. We shall either attain what can be obtained or shall disperse, but with dignity and without any derogation to the name of Russia."

The Baron also enquired as to the fate of the work on the negotiations with Japan on the Korean question, which he and I had begun by Count Lamsdorff's desire. It had been proposed to issue this publication as a Blue Book, in reply to the Japanese White Book on the causes of the war. I explained that the Count did not like Baron



Rosen's tendency to attribute the failure of the ante-war negotiations to the exigencies of the Japanese, that in his opinion the truth should have been told and the real authors of the war named—Admirals Alexeieff and Abaza, Bezobrasoff, and even the Tzar. The re-writing of the book had been undertaken by Hartwig, who had not yet finished his task. The Baron treated my communication somewhat ironically, saying: "It is now quite equal to me what will be the outcome of the idea, but I have always been against their intention to throw the blame of our fault upon the Emperor."

On Witte's return, Mr. Peirce, Under-Secretary of the Department of State attached to our mission, called to make arrangements about the next day's reception by the President, the meeting with the Japanese, and the journey to Portsmouth. Witte insisted on going by land, leaving Baron Rosen and the others to make the journey in the President's yacht "May Flower." In view of the pre-arranged programme, such a combination did not meet with the approval of the Americans, who evidently feared to miss something of the coveted show. It appears that the Councillor of the Japanese Delegation, Mr. Denison, made the same attempt for a similar reason, but this met with a flat refusal.

Mr. O'Laughlin, correspondent of the "Chicago Tribune," told me that the Japanese were very much pleased with Witte's declaration to the press, in which he pays tribute to their worth and merits. He added that the Japanese regard Witte's mission with distrust, suspecting that he has only come to find out their conditions, and that he will then try to break off negotiations and lay the blame on them, arousing public opinion in Europe and America against them. As regards this, it seems to me the Japanese are not so far from the truth; we were just talking about it with Witte. O'Laughlin also said that the Japanese would demand 750 million dollars indemnity, the Island of Sakhalin, trading privileges in Siberia, and the opening up of the Amur River, and would, in fact, lay down fairly hard conditions. This, however, we ourselves expect. After this O'Laughlin asked Witte to state his views on the condition of affairs in Russia. Witte answered, that though it was not normal, still it could not seriously affect the interior development of the country or the course of negotiations.

The correspondent then inquired about the condition of our working classes and of our home industries: was it true that the latter were kept down. Witte explained that the Government had done and was doing all it could for the amelioration of the situation of the working class, but that the principal difficulty was in the position of the peasantry, as the latter were immeasurably in the majority and wanted the partition of lands, and that the settlement of this question would be a rather difficult achievement.

In the course of the day I was visited by yet another correspondent, a German named Kridman. He questioned me as to Witte's life, character, work and opinions, and asked for a personal interview, but I was obliged to refuse this on the plea of want of time; this, by the way, was true. Kridman is writing Witte's biography for one of the big journals. I was surprised at his knowledge of all our internal problems.

To-day Witte gave a dinner to the members of the Embassy. In addition to ourselves there was a certain Jeremiah Curtin, President of the Smithsonian Institute, historian and student of Slavonic, who had travelled a great deal in Russia. He was invited by Witte, who had known him in the Caucasus in the 'seventies. This American spoke Russian fairly well. The conversation was kept up principally by Baron Rosen and Curtin.

In the evening I looked through the letters addressed to Witte. Besides the ones asking for his autograph, some were rather interesting. A certain James Macintosh of New York welcomed Witte on his arrival, spoke of his sympathies towards Russia and towards the Russian Emperor. His Majesty was spoken of in the following way: "You will observe here the highest regard for Nicholas as man, husband, and father, sympathy akin to pity for him as a ruler, and a laudable desire that a proper measure of fair play be accorded to any man who through no fault of his is Emperor of Russia."

Another letter was from Mr. Herman Bernstein, who put three questions on the Jewish Problem: Is there any hope of the amelioration of the condition of the Jews in Russia in the near future? What are the best means of solving the Jewish Problem? Can it be solved by Zionism? After reading this letter Witte told me that he

would prefer to meet the author and answer his questions verbally. I do not know whether this interview ever took place.

Mr. Stampford White offered to publish articles expressing sympathy with Russia, and, in fact, to carry on a press campaign. This letter was somewhat of a curiosity in respect of its printed heading: "Tribute to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan." Evidently a similar offer had been made to Japan and the author had probably mixed the envelopes.

I looked through the local papers. Nearly all of them mention Witte's mission. "The Evening Mail" reports Witte's opinion about the mutual relations between Russia and Japan, stating that in Witte's opinion Europe and America do not know Russia's capacity of resistance. Russia has had a failure but has not lost her strength and has not become a "quantité négligeable"; Japan on her side has not yet become invincible. Japan prepared herself for the war for nearly ten years, Russia relied on peace. The Japanese fought near their own country, Russia had to transport her troops for 9,000 kilometres by an unfinished railway line. There is no example in history of a greater disproportion of forces, but nevertheless all the military authorities certify the valour of the Russian armies, who retreated only under the pressure of overwhelming forces.

The "New York Evening Post" quotes the opinion of Mr. Sato, member of the Japanese Delegation, about Witte's declaration on the exaggerated pretensions of Japan, which will prevent the success of the negotiations. Sato remarked that he did not understand Witte's declaration, seeing that the Japanese demands were unknown to him. But if Witte's statement is only a "bluff," it is more for the profit of Japan, who knows better than anybody the state of affairs in the Far East.

In a conversation with the correspondent of the "Evening Sun" Mr. Sato said, that Japan will claim an indemnity which will repay with interest the cost of the war. According to his calculations the war cost Japan more than 2,000,000 yens daily, and, as it went on for 500 days, the general expenditure will be more than a milliard yens, or 750,000,000 dollars. Therefore Japan intends to ask three milliard yens.

JULY 22—AUGUST 4.

To-day we all went to the Orthodox Church, it being the name day of the Empress Marie Feodorovna. The Church is a fine building in the Byzantine style at the corner of 97th Street and Fifth Avenue. The service began as soon as Witte and Rosen had arrived. Besides ourselves, the members of the Embassy and of the Consulate, there was a large congregation, principally Slavs, who generally attend our church. The service was conducted by our New York senior priest, Khotovitzky, assisted by other Russian priests. The singing was good, the chants being somewhat peculiar. After the ceremony of kissing the Cross was over, Khotovitzky turned to Witte with a short address, given with great simplicity and sincerity, and bringing tears to the eyes of many of those present. Among other things Khotovitzky said: "A hard and difficult task lies before you. May God help you and grant you wisdom. Just now we all feel lost and do not know what to do or what the future will bring. But I am sure that you, with your Russian soul, understand and know exactly what is necessary for the good of Russia. You will do all that can be done under present circumstances."

After the service we called at Khotovitzky's house to have tea. There we found the priests assembled, the deacon, and some Russian and American ladies.

From the church Witte and Rosen set off straight to the station to go to Oyster Bay for an audience with the President. They only returned in the evening. According to Witte's words, the interview impressed him by its great simplicity. He had a long conversation with Roosevelt, Rosen acting as interpreter. He was struck by the President's personality and good intentions. The following telegram as to the results of the interview was sent that very evening to Count Lamsdorff:

"To-day, Friday, Baron Rosen and I lunched with the President. I gave him a letter from His Majesty the Emperor, which touched him very much. I talked with him in the presence of Rosen for two hours and a half. I unfolded the following state of affairs: 'We are not conquered and can therefore accept no conditions which are not suitable to our position; consequently, first of all, we shall not agree to pay any indemnity. Russia will never



consent to any conditions whatsoever that touch her honour, and this not only because it would lower our prestige abroad, but principally because Russia would lower herself in her own eyes and lose faith in herself. Our interior condition, however serious it may be, cannot compel Russia to be false to herself, but the interior condition is not such as it is thought to be abroad. With these things in view we can now carry on negotiations, taking into account only those successes which the Japanese have already had, but refusing to build conditions on those successes which the Japanese hope for, or to take into account those misfortunes which we are told await us. If the Japanese will not now adopt our point of view we shall carry on a defensive war to the last extremity, and we shall see who will hold out the longest.' At the beginning of the conversation the President was fairly positive in foreseeing all Japan's chances of success in the future; afterwards doubts gradually seemed to creep into his view of the future, and he understood that he had been one-sided in his judgment of our position and still more of our state of feeling. He said that, according to his convictions, it was in the interests of both belligerent parties to put an end to the war; therefore, should it prove impossible to do so without paying an indemnity, then it ought to be paid, but that in view of the same considerations he was strongly advising the Japanese to be moderate in their demands. The military party in Japan wishes the war to continue, the moderate party wants peace, but with an indemnity. Evidently knowing the demands and the mood of the Japanese, and being convinced from his conversation with them that our views differed widely from theirs, at the end of our talk it was clear that the President has very little hope of a peace treaty, and he therefore expresses the opinion that it is necessary in any case to arrange matters in such a manner that, in the future, when either of the parties wishes it, it will be possible to begin negotiations anew without difficulty. I answered that we had instructions to that effect. After this the President and his family parted with us with great warmth. To-morrow will be the official presentation and the meeting with the Japanese. This telegram has been composed by agreement with Baron Rosen."

Mr. Frank Vanderlip, Vice-President of the National City Bank of New York, called on Witte, who knew him

before. He was succeeded by Mr. George Perkins, of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company. It is said in the papers that there has been a talk of placing a Russian loan in America and of what chance it stood. The papers likewise say that all who see Witte carry away the impression that he does not believe in the possibility of peace; should the war continue, he is convinced that the balance will be in favour of Russia, because Japan will keep increasing the distance from her base. On the whole, he counts very little on the compliance of Japan.

While Witte was at the President's I went to Morgan's Bank in Wall Street to cash a cheque. In the bank I met Mr. Morgan himself, sitting behind a counter. He is a dark-looking man of middle height with greyish hair, and is clean-shaven, like all the Americans. I was told that he looks after the affairs of the bank himself, spending the rest of the day on his yacht.

Before dinner I called on Mr. Melville Stone, Director of the Associated Press. He lives in the business quarter of the town, where the office of this powerful organisation is situated. He received me at once and said he had heard of me from his representative at Petersburg, Mr. Thomson. He gives the impression of being a man with tolerant and broad views. He asked me how we intend to deal with the press, promised his co-operation, and insisted on the absolute necessity of conquering public opinion, which everyone in America, not excepting the President, has to take into account. "Speak the truth," added Stone, "and do not think that the press can be bribed. You will gain nothing by bribery."

Some of the papers mention the arrival of Korean delegates, Messrs. Yoong and Syngman Rhee, who have come to put the case of their country before the President and make an appeal to the world. They told the press that they act on behalf of their people, but not in the name of the Government. Their intention is to ask the maintenance of the independence of Korea, which does not need anybody's protectorate and wants to remain free. Their *desiderata* are expressed in a special "memorandum" which they will put before the President. In the treaty of 1882 between the United States and Korea there is a clause stating that each country undertakes the obligation of rendering the other good services if it is threatened by oppression and injustice. Poor Ambassadors, they have a rather vague idea of practical politics

and judge international justice in their own manner. The President declined an audience, but will accept the "memorandum" if it is presented through the Korean Legation.

#### JULY 23—AUGUST 5.

Witte and the Baron set off in a motor for the landing-stage in Twenty-third Street, where a steam cutter from the yacht "May Flower" was awaiting them. I was somewhat delayed at the hotel, paying the bill. A curious item in the bill was thirty-six dollars for the keep of two detectives, Messrs. Downing and Foye, who were appointed by the State Department without regard to Witte's wishes. At the landing-stage on Twenty-third Street we found Mr. Peirce, several policemen, and reporters ready with their cameras. When the cutter with Witte and Rosen on board pushed off, the people on the landing-stage and on the quay gave loud cheers, waving their handkerchiefs. The appearance of General Yermoloff and Colonel Samoiloff in their brilliant uniforms and manifold decorations called forth the approving exclamations of the crowd. The rest of us were in frock coats and top hats. In a few minutes our cutters were alongside the cruiser "Chatanooga" in the middle of East River. It seems that just before this the same ceremony had been gone through with the Japanese, who had left on another cruiser. The flag of the Russian Ambassador was hoisted and a salute of nineteen guns fired. At the ladder Witte and the Baron were met by the Commander of the ship, Captain Sharp, and the officers. The marines, in scarlet uniforms, stood on the quarterdeck and presented arms when the Envoys appeared. In a few minutes we weighed anchor and sailed down East River. All the ships, boats and yachts on our way hoisted their flags by way of salute, the passengers and crews cheering and shouting. The Baron and Witte remained on deck, smoking and chatting. By the way, the servants on board were mostly Japanese. About noon, the Commander invited us all into the saloon, where he proposed a toast for the Russian guests. I forgot to say that Dr. Dillon, our inseparable companion, was with us. After a short voyage we arrived at Oyster Bay, a large and beautiful stretch of water surrounded by wooded slopes. A whole flotilla of ships

stood in the bay, the "May Flower," "Galveston," "Dolphin," "Sylph," and "Tacoma." About them, to and fro, went small steamers, electric cutters, yachts and boats of many shapes and forms, gigs, wherries, and skiffs. The whole aspect of this fleet in a bright sunlight with a clear sky was most imposing.

We had hardly time to cast anchor when a twenty guns salute was fired from the "May Flower" on the arrival of President Roosevelt, and the blue Presidential flag was hoisted. Our orchestra struck up the American National Anthem, continuing with "Hiawatha," the "Star Spangled Banner," and "Yankee Doodle." The boats and cutters, with spectators cheering and waving their handkerchiefs, continued to pass to and fro. Witte remained on deck with the Baron all the time, exchanging bows with the curious. After this, at a given signal, we got into the cutter, which brought us up to the "May Flower." We went on board, and at the same moment the Russian flag was hoisted next to the Japanese one, which was already floating from the main mast. On deck we were met by our friend Mr. Peirce, who took us to the deck cabin, where we made the acquaintance of the Commander, Captain Winslow, and of the officers. From there we were ushered into the saloon to be presented to Roosevelt. When we entered the President was standing at the other end of the saloon, next to him were Admirals Sigsby and Coghlan, Captain Winslow, who is the President's Adjutant, the commanders of the "Tacoma" and the "Dolphin," the Deputy Secretary of State, Major-General Frederick Grant, Mr. Peirce, and a few members of the suite. All of us, except Witte and the Baron, who had come in earlier, went up to the President in turn. He shook hands with each of us, saying a few words such as, "Very glad to see you," or "delighted," Peirce making a muddle of our names. The President is a corpulent, fair-haired man, with a frank, kind face, and winning smile; he wears eyeglasses. The only one to whom he spoke more particularly was Professor Martens, to whom he said that he was well acquainted with his works and reputation.

After we had been presented to the members of the suite, Roosevelt proposed to Witte that we should make the acquaintance of the Japanese Delegates, who, as already said, had arrived earlier and were now in the adjoining saloon. Mr. Peirce opened the door and in



walked Baron Yutaro Komura, Kogoro Takahira, Aimaro Sato, Enjiro Yamaza, Konishi, Adatci, Otchiai, Captain Takeshita, Colonel Tachibana, two Secretaries Honda and Hanihara, Councillor Denison, and a few others, fifteen in all, I think. When the Japanese came in, Roosevelt turned to Baron Komura and said: "Baron Komura, I have the honour to present you to Mr. Witte and Baron Rosen." On which Witte and Komura bowed and shook hands. We also shook hands with the Japanese. After some minutes of rather awkward silence we were taken into the mess-room. In front went the President, Witte, Baron Komura, Baron Rosen, and Takahira. At the door the President again turned to the Envoys, saying: "Mr. Witte, will you come in to lunch with Baron Komura?" In the middle of the room stood a table on which a cold lunch was set out. The commander of the yacht, the chief officer, Mr. Phelps, and other officers of the "May Flower" and of the "Dolphin" began to assist the servants, kindly handing round the eatables, pressing us to wine, and in general making themselves amiable. In assembling round the table we mingled with the Japanese, exchanging meaningless phrases and remarks on the weather. Roosevelt took a seat in the corner of the saloon, placing Witte and Baron Komura one on each side of him. After a few minutes champagne was brought, and Roosevelt stepped forward, raised his glass, and in a loud voice said the following words: "Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there will be no answer and which I ask you to drink in silence, standing"—we were standing as it was, because there were no chairs—"I drink to the welfare and prosperity of the Sovereigns and of the Nations whose Representatives have met one another on this ship. It is my most earnest hope and prayer, in the interest not only of these two great Powers, but of all civilised mankind, that a just and lasting peace may speedily be concluded between them." Uttering each word distinctly, Roosevelt looked Witte straight in the eyes. All drained their glasses in silence. Roosevelt again sat down and renewed his conversation, speaking to our Plenipotentiaries and the Japanese in turn. The contrast between us and the Japanese is noticeable. Especially great is the difference between Witte's towering figure and the small size of Baron Komura. The latter is thin, has a delicate complexion, and looks sickly. Mr. Takahira also seems to be suffering. Roosevelt paid most attention to Witte



Theodore Roosevelt  
Sept 9<sup>th</sup> 1905



and ended his conversation in French, refusing the help of Baron Rosen, who then began to talk with Takahira. I spoke to Baron Komura, reminding him that we had known each other at Peking. I also managed to have a talk with Sato and with Denison—the latter keeps himself in the background and avoids conversation. On the whole the Japanese behaved unassumingly and tactfully. The Americans tried to surround the reception with pomp and publicity, evidently enjoying the part that had fallen to them.

When lunch was finished we all went on deck. A photographer (who, it seems, is in attendance on the President) prepared his camera. Roosevelt asked Witte and Rosen to stand at his right hand and Komura and Takahira at his left. Altogether, Roosevelt very pointedly kept giving Witte the first place and was particularly amiable with him. The photographs being taken, the strains of "Hail Columbia" floated through the air. The President took leave of the Envoys and got into the cutter to the sound of a salute of twenty-one guns. A few minutes after Roosevelt's departure the Japanese took leave and went on board the "Dolphin," accompanied by the same ceremony. When, after this, the flag of the Russian Envoy was hoisted on the "May Flower," Captain Winslow came up to Witte and announced that now he was master of the yacht. The function was ended and we all gave a sigh of relief after the physical and moral strain we had undergone. At last we could cease bowing, smiling, saying "Thank you," and we were no longer the objects of idle curiosity. We all hastened below to exchange our frock coats and top hats for summer apparel.

About 5 p.m. we weighed anchor and sailed east through the channel between Long Island and the mainland. In our wake followed the "Dolphin" flying the Japanese flag, and the "Galveston" acting as convoy. The weather continued fine, the sea was calm, a light breeze tempered the heat. The "May Flower" is a handsome yacht of two thousand tons, bought from a private individual by the Government for military purposes during the war with Spain. The cruiser "Dolphin" is considerably smaller, a fact that was, by the way, pointed out to me by the Japanese. Witte and Rosen had two staterooms. Separate cabins had also been given to some of our company. With us came Vilenkin



who will land to-morrow at Newport with Witte and will proceed with him by rail to Boston and Portsmouth, which he must reach before us so as to come on board and then land together for the official reception. We dined to the strains of a fairly good band. In the course of the voyage we became better acquainted with the officers. They are all gentlemen. Two of them took part in the Spanish war. By their account the naval battle off Cuba was simply a matter of sinking the Spanish ships, worse than our Tsushima, as the Spaniards did not know how to make an effective resistance.\*

In the evening, a fog came on, and the Captain decided to cast anchor. We remained there till morning, exchanging hoots of the siren and marconigrams with the "Dolphin" and the "Galveston." In the same cabin which I shared with Dr. Dillon we discussed the situation. He thought that the sympathy of America for Japan and the estrangement from Russia could be attributed in a considerable degree to the skilful agitation of the local press. Russia was represented as the country of dark absolutism and reaction; on the other hand, liberal and constitutional Japan stood for oppressed China and crushed Korea, and protected the principles of civilisation and liberty. But evidently such an opinion was not held by all, and judicious voices were heard warning against this exaggerated enthusiasm for Japan. For instance, the "Newspaper People's Tribune," Union Town, quoted the opinion of the well-known connoisseur of Chino-Japanese affairs, Thomas Millard. According to him the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been the precursor of the Russo-Japanese war. When England saw in her alliance with Japan the means of hindering Russia's ambition on the Pacific, in the English, and in the American press began a propaganda in order to create an impression favourable to the alliance. To facilitate the objects of this propaganda special bureaux were opened in the principal centres of Europe and America; they commenced to cultivate public opinion to serve their purpose. By degrees the impression prevailed that Japan was a model state, pursuing exclusively humanitarian and altruistic ideals, and fighting in the interests of mankind a war unjustly imposed upon her. Russia was in that respect placed at a disadvantage, as she had not

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\* Naval battle of Tsushima, where the Russian fleet was defeated by the Japanese in 1905.

at her disposal such means of influencing the public mind and the press. In fact, the Japanese oligarchy rules Japan just as the Russian rules Russia: the Japanese people in reality has no voice in the management of the country, and if there is less manifestation of discontent in Japan it is only due to the greater indifference of the people and to the better administration. The Japanese statesmen prepared for the war and tried to attract the public mind on their side. As to the military party, it had always propagated the war and had been ready for it long ago. Japan knew how to convince the world of her disinterestedness, assuring everybody that she intended to respect the integrity of China. Finally it was understood that Port Arthur ought to be annexed by Japan as it had been taken from her by Russia in 1895. The author explained that the territory, with Port Arthur and Dalny, over which the Japanese claims extended, did not constitute the small extension called Kwang-Tung rented by Russia, but was called Liao-Tung that is to the east of the River Liao, and included a territory of 120,000 square miles. This will be the beginning of the annexation of the whole of South Manchuria. According to the author, the Japanese appetite extends further, and Japan even now has in view the annexation of Sakhalin and the sea coast province. The author concluded with the advice not to trust the Japanese assurances but to support the old friend of America, Russia.

#### JULY 24—AUGUST 6.

In the morning the fog lifts a little and we steam on at half speed. Time drags. Witte walks about the deck, goes up on the bridge, and is evidently out of temper. Rosen, on the contrary, is pleased with the sail, with everything on board the yacht, with the absence of journalists and even with the fog. According to the programme, we ought to have arrived in Newport this morning. It seems that Witte was invited to lunch at the captain's house, whose family lives at Newport, which is considered the most fashionable summer seaside resort in America. The captain's wife was a Miss Vanderbilt. The fog has, however, disarranged this plan. We continue to move forward slowly. At times the silhouettes of the "Dolphin" and "Galveston" are to be seen looming out of the fog. About 4 p.m. the shore line becomes visible and in an hour we come up to Newport. Witte,

Rosen, Vilenkin, the commander and Dillon immediately go on shore. It is probable that our departure will most likely be delayed. This supposition is confirmed by Peirce who comes in at dinner time and tells us that he has just received a marconigram from Winslow with an order to enter the harbour. He adds that the Japanese are very much displeased by this arrangement. The Baron returns from shore late in the evening in the best of humours. He tells us that Witte was met on shore by Admiral Chadwick, who welcomed him in the President's name, and after dining at the Winslow's, had left for Boston, accompanied by Vilenkin and Dillon. This delay at Newport elicits the displeasure of Martens, who has become lately rather bitter and criticises all the doings of the Plenipotentiaries, especially of Baron Rosen. I think he feels that he is not indispensable and objects to playing the second fiddle: he is evidently not reconciled to the idea that we are only humble satellites of the chief sun, Witte.

The last number of the "New York Herald" publishes the sensational news that Russia consents to pay Japan an indemnity and that the discussion is only with regard to Sakhalin, Korea and the disarming of Vladivostok. It is said Witte has already sounded American financiers about a loan, who answered that they were ready to give money for peace but not for war. But the conclusion of a loan is not very probable as there are more than 180 million dollars of Japanese loans on the American money market. The most interested of the Banks, the National City Bank, will certainly decline to place a Russian loan. The same newspaper relates that the British Ambassador, Sir Mortimer Durand, called on the President and discussed with him the terms of the forthcoming peace negotiations. The newspaper doubts if England will influence Japan to be moderate and inclines to the opinion that British diplomacy will give Japan full support in order to obtain from Russia the greatest concessions.

#### JULY 25—AUGUST 7.

In the morning we resumed our journey: the weather being foggy we were obliged to go at half speed, exchanging signals with the Japanese. I passed a tedious day, reading the papers and writing letters.

The "Sun" gives an interesting correspondence from Petersburg as to the public mind of the country. By the way, this newspaper is considered to be pro-Japanese. The correspondent states that the forthcoming peace negotiations meet with great indifference; the impression is that Russia does not want peace. That is a characteristic feature of the Russians, to forget or to ignore disagreeable facts and not to take reality into account. The common people and the peasants want the end of the war, but do not understand the necessity of our paying an indemnity, they consider that Japan should pay and not Russia. If the Tzar rejects the demand for an indemnity the country will uphold him for the first time from the beginning of the war. The anti-Japanese party does not really exist, on the contrary, many sympathise with the idea of an alliance with Japan. Further the correspondent speaks of the recent deliberation in Peterhof under the presidency of the Tzar regarding the internal situation in Russia. Discussing it, Count Ignatieff stood for the satisfaction of the progressive demands and the call of the "Zemsky Sobor" (National Assembly). He exhorted the Emperor to make concessions, as a prolonged refusal might injure the dynasty. Ignatieff belongs to an influential Russian family, and is regarded as a successor to Count Lamsdorff. General Trepoff, Under Secretary of State for the Interior, stood up also for the "Zemsky Sobor." Count Lamsdorff, insisting on the necessity for peace, opposed constitutional concessions, together with Pobiedonoszoff (the Attorney General for the St. Synod), as well as the Minister of Justice, Manuhine. The Minister of Finance, Kokovtsoff,\* the Minister of War, Sakharoff, and the Minister of Public Instruction, General Glasoff, did not express a determinate opinion. The Grand Dukes likewise were in favour of the "Zemsky Sobor." In Petersburg, under the influence of the communications of General Linevitch, the idea begins to gain ground of continuing a defensive campaign in order to exhaust the Japanese. Advocates of the reforms stand for peace, foreseeing that the Tzar, desiring to show his patriotism, will refuse all the conditions offered by Japan. The reformers insist on the hopelessness of further bloodshed and the uselessness of additional expenditure for the sake of a final defeat of Japan. The decision to grant

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\*Subsequently became Count Kokovtsoff and Russian Prime Minister.



a constitution can signify very much or nothing. The question till now is considered only in principle, and will be decided when Japan presents its conditions. Should these conditions be rejected, it would be necessary to consider the competence and the power of a National Assembly. The opinion predominates that the Kaiser advised the Tzar to conclude peace and to grant internal reforms; however, the Tzar is obstinate and it is thought that he will reject every proposition from Japan. But it must not be concluded that the Russians approve the mediation of President Roosevelt. It is hinted that the President rendered Russia a good service, having given her the opportunity of explaining the state of things to the country and allowing the Government to continue the war. That is what they expect from the Conference. Witte is said to have reported to Petersburg that the possibility of a loan in the United States is out of the question till the end of the war.

#### JULY 26—AUGUST 8.

We reached Portsmouth only in the morning. The "May Flower" entered the inner harbour and stopped at the mouth of the swift Piskatagwah. Portsmouth is not visible from the sea. The small town on the shore is Newcastle. It consists of wooden cottages painted in gay colours. The Navy Yard is on the opposite bank of the Piskatagwah, which is spanned at its upper end by a floating bridge. The banks are low, rocky, and wooded. On the whole the landscape reminds one somewhat of the Finnish Coast.

The Chief of the Navy Yard, Admiral Meade, soon appeared with his A.D.C., and was followed a few minutes after by a cutter with Witte, Vilenkin, and Batcheff, who had spent a day in Boston. The local papers relate that, on his arrival in Boston, Witte shook hands with all the personnel on the train, and even kissed the engine driver. According to Vilenkin this story is an invention. The facts are that Witte, who travelled in Pierpont Morgan's special train, on his arrival at Boston, shook the hand of the engine driver, and the newspapers took the opportunity of saying that there had been kisses. I must, however, mention that this legend of the kiss did more to popularise our mission, and Witte in particular, than diplomatic civilities. During his stay in Boston Witte paid a visit to Harvard Univer-

sity. In the President's absence the University was shown him by Secretary Greene, who invited him to lunch at the Colonial Club. According to Vilenkin, the appearance of Witte's motor called forth the liveliest sympathy everywhere. From Boston Witte set off to Magnolia, a summer resort about 30 miles distant, where Baron Rosen lives with his family, and where our Embassy has its summer residence. After spending some time at Magnolia Witte returned to Boston.

I now return to the occasion of the "May Flower's" arrival in Newcastle. As already mentioned Witte came to the yacht almost simultaneously with Admiral Meade. At this moment the ship's orchestra struck up, and all the members of our Delegation, as well as the commander and the officers in full uniform, assembled on deck. Around the yacht appeared boats with spectators, who gave us a cheerful welcome. The "Dolphin" rode at anchor not far from us, but there were hardly any boats round her; the Americans, it was evident, took more interest in us Russians. Witte remained on board, pacing the deck and bowing to the ladies in the boats. Our Chief seemed pleased, especially so when he learned that by leaving the yacht he had escaped the rocking and fog. In answer to my question as to whether he was satisfied with his stay in Boston, and with his reception by the Americans, Witte remarked: "We had a grand welcome, but up till now I have only given work to my digestive organs; it would be interesting to know when my brain will have to act."

About 11 a.m., we got into a cutter with Captain Winslow, and pushed off. Simultaneously the Japanese left the "Dolphin." Our cutter went up the river to the naval dock, and in half an hour, having rounded a sharp cape, on which was a curious gothic building that turned out to be a prison, we came up to a beflagged quay. Here we were met by Admiral Meade, Mr. Peirce, and some of the officials of the Navy Yard. Witte, accompanied by Peirce and his staff, crossed the gangway. The Japanese, who had also landed, walked at some little distance from us. As we were coming up to the principal building a salute was fired from the gun in the yard; it was deafening, as the gun stood only a few paces from us.

In about five minutes' time we came to a fine brick building, and went up to the top. Mr. Peirce took us

into the hall, where our future sittings were going to take place—it is a spacious apartment, with whitewashed walls, adjoining a broad corridor. This corridor, bearing inscriptions in black letters, divides the quarters respectively assigned to the Russian and Japanese envoys. On the opposite side there is a large hall, kept, I think, for drawing designs of ships. The conference table, surrounded by leather-covered armchairs, is most imposing. On the whole the furnishing is simple but comfortable. Electric fans, producing a strong current of air, are fastened to brackets in the wall. Next to the Envoy's room there are smaller rooms for Secretaries and Attachés. The Japanese quarters are similar to ours. Evidently the State Department has tried to do its best. One cannot help admiring the contrast of the American surroundings and ours especially as compared to the poor premises of the Russian Foreign Office.

But in spite of all the conveniences of the premises, it seems to me we ought not to have been exiled to this little out of the way town of New Hampshire, under the plea that here we would not be disturbed by diplomatists and journalists, and that we would thus escape outside influence. In reality, we are completely in the power of the latter, who buzz round us like mosquitoes, from which there is no escape. In the second storey of the Navy Yard buildings there are separate telegraph stations, to enable us to send our messages straight from here.

All of us, led by Mr. Peirce, entered the hall reserved for our sittings. Then Admiral Meade brought in the Japanese, who took up their position not far from us. A moment later there entered Mr. Mac-Lane, Governor of the State of New Hampshire, the members of the Municipal Council, the administrative bodies of the State and town, and the dock officials and officers. Many of them were accompanied by their wives and daughters. The Americans met us in a friendly amiable way, shaking hands all round. The hall, decorated with flags, was soon packed, but a stream of people kept on coming in. The band began to play as we entered, some of us taking ladies in. The latter, dressed in the latest Parisian style, seemed delighted with what they called the "show" that had fallen to their lot. Everybody's attention was, of course, turned on Witte and Komura. For the Portsmouth provincials this was an epoch, at least that was the expression used by charming Miss Bradford, whom I took in to luncheon. From her conversation I learned

that only the upper ten had been invited. After a copious lunch, with plenty of champagne, we returned to the Conference room, but this time only the Japanese and ourselves, the others remaining in the corridor and on the stairs. Shortly afterwards, motor cars for the Envoys, and open carriages for us drove up. Crossing the floating bridge, which spans the river dividing the State of Maine (where the Navy Yard is) from the State of New Hampshire, we drove along the streets of the town of Kitterey. Crowds of people stood watching our progress, and greeted us with cheers, raising their hats and clapping their hands as we proceeded at a gentle trot towards Portsmouth. As we entered the town gorgeously decorated with banners and carpets, the people crowded round the carriages peering at our faces ; some of them waving small flags. In spite of the cordiality of the Americans one had an unpleasant sensation of being looked at like some exotic curiosity. Now and then a hiss was heard ; let us suppose this was a greeting and not a jeer at the vanquished. We stopped in front of the Council House of the State of New Hampshire. The crowd was kept back by the militia in blue uniforms and yellow leggings. Near them the inevitable journalists with their cameras.

When we entered the Council Hall, Governor Mac-Lane, surrounded by the members of the Council, stepped forward and addressed the Envoys, wishing that our Conference might be concluded by the signing of a Peace of Portsmouth, and inviting us to be the guests of the State of New Hampshire. On finishing his speech the Governor asked Witte and Komura whether they would like to say anything in reply. Both having refused, photographers appeared and placed all of us in a semi-circle. In the background stood the Americans, among whom were Colonel Bromwell, Roosevelt's A.D.C., the chief officials of Portsmouth and several Senators and members of Congress. The colours of the State of New Hampshire, gold figures on a dark blue ground, were raised over our heads. At the end of the ceremony we left and resumed our journey. This time the drive was not a long one. In a few minutes we were on the high road. The motors with the Envoys had long ago disappeared from our sight ; our driver likewise whipped up his horses, and we drove swiftly along a pretty wooded road. Having crossed the last bridge over a small stream, and dashed up an incline, we stopped smartly in front of the Wentworth Hotel, attracting the attention of all the guests on the verandah.



The hotel consists of three large wooden barrack-like buildings joined by roofed-in passages, situated on the shore of a bay which is left dry at low tide. The country is flat and wooded. Attached to the grounds there are tennis courts, golf courses, and a pond for bathing. The rooms taken for us (we are to be the guests of the State Department) turned out to be in different storeys, mixed up with the other guests. The Japanese have their rooms in the main building. The ceilings are low, the furnishing of the simplest; the windows are protected by wire mosquito netting; this seems to be a plague over here. The attendance consists of American maids, mulattos, and bell boys, who never come when rung for, and who invariably give unintelligible answers.

The hotel is full, there are said to be as many as five hundred staying here, and one could well believe it. When going down to dinner and having to cross the whole end of the room to reach our table, we found everyone staring at us with great curiosity. The Japanese were sitting at separate small tables. Dinner passed without anything special occurring. Witte was tired and out of sorts. After dinner we went into the drawing room, where we found our friends the journalists. Cortesi told me that there were many newspaper reporters awaiting us, mostly Americans. This promises well for the future. During the evening arrived our Minister in Peking, Pokotiloff, summoned to come to join the Conference. He was accompanied by his Secretary, Rojdestvensky.

A number of letters for Witte and Rosen have accumulated here. Most of them contain requests for photos and autographs. These requests are mostly from unmarried ladies, as they sign themselves "Miss." Among the letters there is one from a Mr. Alfred Love, of Philadelphia, who sends us a greeting from the Universal Peace Union as its President, and speaks of the good impression produced by Witte in his intercourse with the inhabitants of the United States. A Hebrew gentleman, Mr. Mandelbaum, wishes Witte success in his difficult task, and says that he is afraid of the Yellow Danger, and looks to Russia as the defender of the White Man's civilisation. Mr. George Putnam, of Edwardsville, Illinois, gives his advice not to pay indemnity to the Japanese, and mentions the Yellow Danger as a peril to the States. There is also a laborious letter of greeting from the Slavonians of Cleveland "We American

Slavonians," says the letter, "are bound to the Russian nation by ties of blood, and we cannot look calmly on at the degradation of Russia, which is also our degradation." Further on, the writer speaks of the situation in Russia: "We are bold enough to think that the cause of these failures and also of the unrest in the interior can be set aside by immediately calling together a 'Zemsky Sobor' (National Assembly), the members of which, being chosen by the people and enjoying their full confidence, will sooner and more easily make the war popular than can any State officials." The letter is signed by priests.

There is a pile of telegrams from all different Russian fraternities in the States—Ohio, Pennsylvania, Pittsburg, Washington, Denver, Connecticut (Bridgeport), Ansonia, Donora, Mayfield, Ambridge, etc., with exhortations not to pay an indemnity. One Russian, Paul Repoff, asks Witte to turn his attention to the hardships of the service of Russian soldier servants. A certain A. Palm, of Meadville, Pennsylvania, tells us he has written a book on capital punishment, and on the question of whether capital punishment for crime is an absolute necessity at the present time. Witte, when I told him of this letter, bade me answer that capital punishment does not exist in Russia as a fundamental part of our legislation, and is resorted to only in very rare cases, mostly for political crimes. As to his personal opinion, he is an opponent of capital punishment for any crime whatsoever. A Frenchman, Mr. Gennod, of Boston, manufacturer of American champagne of the Roualet brand, asks us to drink a toast in his champagne when peace is concluded.

#### JULY 28—AUGUST 9.

The weather is rather warm, and this makes the air in the rooms very stuffy. At 10 a.m., Witte, Baron Rosen, and Nabokoff went off to the Navy Yard for a preliminary consultation with the Japanese. In their absence I strolled on to the bathing place, which is near the hotel on the bay. There is mixed bathing, and the bathers behave rather freely. The bathing costumes were not much to my taste, the ladies wore black stockings, and even gloves. While waiting my turn for a bathing cabin I started a conversation with Pokotiloff. The latter said that Witte had met him with a jest, not

understanding why he had come, as he was not at all necessary. "I realise that this is true," remarked Pokotiloff, "but everything was arranged without regard to my wishes. To Nelidoff or Mouravioff I should have been most useful." Then he told me of his journey to Peking, through Urga in Mongolia, and of his meeting with the Dalai Lama of Tibet. He spoke of the Dalai Lama as a clever and shrewd man, but exceedingly suspicious. The latter was not satisfied with Pokotiloff's verbal assurances concerning the alleged promises of the English to us of maintaining the independence of Tibet, but asked for the promise in writing. It is evident that the Dalai Lama is trying in every way to turn to account the hopes of support held out to him by Russia. This promise had been made rather thoughtlessly at one time.

Witte and Rosen returned about midday. I learned from Nabokoff that, at the beginning of the meeting with the Japanese it turned out that we had brought our credentials, and that they had not, Baron Komura announcing that he had forgotten them. Witte, nevertheless, presented a French translation of his papers, and the Japanese promised to bring theirs in the course of the day. It was agreed to meet twice a day—in the morning, and in the afternoon. As regards those who were to take part in the Conference the Plenipotentiaries disagreed. Witte demanded that our Delegates should take part in the Conference. The Japanese explained that they wanted to limit the number of those present to the Envoys, with the assistance of Secretaries and Interpreters. In spite of our Envoy's insistence, Baron Komura kept to his point, maintaining that when the Conference was called the question of Delegates had not been raised. After some haggling, not wishing to be disobliging from the very beginning, Witte agreed that the Delegates should only be summoned to the sittings when special questions were under discussion. Nabokoff told me that on our side the Secretaries would be he, Plançon, and I, and on the Japanese side, Sato, Otchiai, and Adatci. The first sitting is appointed for to-morrow at 9.30 a.m. As concerns the language to be used, it will be English for the Japanese, and French for us. In case a treaty is concluded, it will be written in the two languages, likewise the protocols of the meetings, and in the case of divergencies, the text to be followed will be French. The complete secrecy of the sittings was determined on.

In the afternoon I went with Vilenkin and an American journalist, Mr. Williams, to call on Mrs. Peirce. They live in a small villa near the hotel. Mr. Peirce was formerly Secretary to the American Embassy in Petersburg, and is supposed to know the Russians, that is why he has been attached by the President to our Conference. I heard that we owe to Mr. Peirce the choice of Portsmouth for the Conference. The President had proposed Newport, Albany, Magnolia, and some other places, but the Japanese refused them all, fearing intrigues of other foreign diplomats there. As for Washington, it was alleged that it was unsuitable on account of the heat.

Mrs. Peirce was not at home, and an old negro invited us to rest on the terrace, and brought us tea and whisky. Shortly after our hostess appeared; she is a pleasant talkative lady.

The conversation turned on Russia, and she told us that she had spent a happy time there, liking the Russians for their hospitality and their high ideals.

To-day, as I was leaving the dining room some correspondents came up to me asking for news. I told them a few trifles. To my idea the chief thing in dealing with journalists is to be a clever fibber, and still how many disregard this principle. By the way, it has been determined to give the Press only information worked out in common with the Japanese, to avoid discrepancies in the papers.

Our Delegation is increased by the arrival of Captain Roussin. He was formerly on General Kuropatkin's staff, and later attached to General Linevitch. Roussin came straight from Gunjoolin in Manchuria, only stopping in Petersburg for a few days to see the Emperor. Witte, who had a long talk with the captain, was unfavourably impressed by his information of our strategical situation and the chances of victory. I understand that this had a serious influence on Witte's decision as to conducting the negotiations in a conciliatory manner. Our Naval Agent here, Captain Butakoff, came with Roussin from Washington. Altogether our company is growing visibly. There were eighteen at dinner to-day. We dined in a separate room—a decidedly small place, but at least we were alone, no longer objects of idle curiosity for the tourists. A special brigade of French waiters, who have been engaged on



account of Witte's ignorance of the English language, serve us at meals.

In to-day's correspondence there is a pile of telegrams from Slavonian communities requesting not to conclude peace at the price of territory and indemnity. There is also a telegram from a certain Daugherty saying: "May your Emperor listen and make of Russia a United States." The Minister of Christ Church in Kitterey asks Witte to attend Divine Service at his church.

The local papers give the news from Petersburg about the introduction of a constitution in Russia. The publication of a manifesto for the convocation of the Duma or National Assembly is expected. The Tzar and the Grand Dukes seem to consider this question more liberally than some reactionary Ministers. As to the negotiations with Japan, the Russian press seems to turn in favour of peace. Some newspapers even speak of an alliance with Japan.

#### JULY 28—AUGUST 10.

To-day we had the first official sitting of the Conference. We all rose very early. The guests of the hotel and the journalists had assembled on the terrace to see our departure. A big mail coach, drawn by four horses, had been got ready for the Secretaries. Having lost much time, owing to various delays, we were preparing to set off, and I was just climbing to the top of the coach, when Witte's voice was heard from a window calling out to take a motor in case we should be too late. I applied to Peirce who, answered, however, that the motors were taken by the Japs, and proposed to go in the cutter. After all we preferred the coach.

We arrived in time, and found everybody assembled. On entering the Conference Hall, before the Japanese, I noticed that the tables for the Secretaries were placed at such a distance from the Envoys that we would be unable to hear Witte's voice, who speaks rather low. The entrance of the Japanese at that moment interrupted our perplexity. After we had all shaken hands, Komura took the armchair in the middle, placing Takahira and Sato on his right, and the Secretaries on his left. Seeing this, Witte remarked: "Well, gentlemen, you had better sit down at this table also." He then, following the example of the Japanese, seated himself in the middle, placing the Baron to the left, and Nabokoff to the right. Plançon sat next to Nabokoff, and I next to the Baron.

The Conference opened with the signing of the protocols of the previous meeting touching the manner of the proceedings. After that the Envoys handed each other their credentials. Looking at the Japanese documents, Witte said that the English version of the Japanese credentials had no signature vouching for the correctness of the translation, whereas ours bore the signature of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Komura replied that it was not the custom in Japan to certify the correctness of such documents, but that if necessary he and Takahira would do so. Then Witte remarked that that part of the Japanese credentials, where the Emperor of Japan reserves to himself the right, previous to ratification, to subject the treaty to deliberation as to form and substance, seriously diverges from the Russian credentials, where no such condition is found. After some discussion a decision was arrived at. Baron Komura would certify by letter that the Japanese Envoys were prepared to interpret the Russian credentials within the same limits as those given to the Japanese. Komura asked if it was absolutely necessary that to be valid the treaty should be ratified by our Emperor. Witte replied in the affirmative. "In that case," remarked Komura, "the extent of our powers is equal on both sides, up to the moment of ratification."

An ominous silence subsided. The Japanese looking like sphinxes. Baron Komura held a paper which turned out to be the Japanese conditions. Witte wore an air of indifference, so did Baron Rosen. Breaking the silence, Komura announced that in starting negotiations he was inspired with the desire to discuss all questions in full sincerity, not stopping at details nor at questions that did not touch directly on the terms of peace, as this would only act as a drag on the negotiations. He added that the Japanese Government was ready to do all in order to arrive at a peaceable agreement. Witte replied that he was inspired by similar intentions, and would do his utmost to come to an understanding. Then Komura announced that the Japanese conditions were contained in a special note in the form of clauses.

He would like the Russian Envoys to deliberate on these conditions carefully, and to give a written answer to them. Witte agreed to this, and it was decided to consider each clause separately.

Baron Komura handed the conditions over to Witte, who put them nonchalantly on the table, saying he would look at them, and would try to give an answer to-morrow morning or during the day. Then he proposed to make a communication to the press, announcing that the Plenipotentiaries had exchanged credentials, and that the Japanese Envoys had handed in their conditions, which would be looked into by the Russians. An answer would be given by the latter in a short time. Komura agreed to this.

Just before the end Witte told me to go to the hotel at once, and to ask our Delegates to come to the Navy Yard. On my arrival at the Wentworth I was surrounded by journalists, to whom I read the first communication to the press, after which I sought out my colleagues and we all returned together. It was my fate to drive about in motors, for no sooner had we arrived than Witte made me go back again to fetch his instructions, which he had left in his portmanteau. I once more hurried back to the hotel. Duty is duty, I thought, but I do not think Witte wants me to starve. Therefore I decided to have something to eat, and coming into the dining room, sat down at Dillon's table. In so doing I think I roused the envy of the other correspondents, particularly of Mr. Hedeman, of the French "*Matin*," who made up his mind that I was communicating details of what had passed to Dillon, and that altogether I was acting with partiality, of which he later complained to my colleagues. As it happened Dillon did not ask me a single question regarding the proposals of the Japanese.

I returned to the Navy Yard at about half-past two, and found Witte and all the others discussing the Japanese terms. The Japanese, having lunched with our Delegates, had left the Navy Yard just before my return. It was very hot in the hall, in spite of the electric fans, and all were in their shirt sleeves. The Japanese terms had already been read, and the debate was in full swing. The text of the proposals was as follows:—

1. Russia, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests, to engage not to obstruct or interfere with any measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan finds it necessary to take in Korea.

2. Engagement on the part of Russia to completely evacuate Manchuria within a period to be specified, and to relinquish all territorial advantages and all preferential and exclusive concessions and franchises in that region in impairment of Chinese

sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

3. Japan to engage, to restore such parts of Manchuria as are in her occupation to China, subject to the guarantee of reform and improved administration, saving only the regions affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

4. Japan and Russia reciprocally to engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industries in Manchuria.

5. Sakhalin and all Islands appertaining thereto, and all public works and properties to be ceded to Japan.

6. The lease of Port Arthur, Talien, and adjacent territory and territorial waters, together with all rights, privileges, concessions and franchises acquired by Russia from China, in connection with or as a part of such lease, and all public works and properties to be transferred and assigned to Japan.

7. Russia to assign and transfer to Japan, free of all claims and encumbrances, the railway between Harbin and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto, and all coal mines belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

8. Russia to retain and work the Trans-Manchurian Railway, subject to the terms and conditions of the concession under which it was constructed, and subject also to the condition that it is to be employed exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes.

9. Russia to reimburse to Japan the actual expenses of the war. The amount, as well as the time and manner of such reimbursement to be agreed upon.

10. All Russian ships of war, which in consequence of damage received in battle, sought asylum in neutral ports and were there interned, to be surrendered to Japan as lawful prizes.

11. Russia to engage to limit her naval strength in the waters of the Extreme East.

12. Russia to grant to Japanese subjects full fishery rights along the coasts and in the bays, harbours, inlets and rivers of her possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas.

In answer to a question that somebody had evidently put before my return, as to the length of time in which an answer should be given to the Japanese, Witte remarked that it was desirable to give a reply as soon as possible. "If we do not do it," said he, "we shall rouse the opinion of the world against us; it will be said that we are again not ready or are perplexed by the proposals of the Japanese. It is, therefore, necessary without delay to deliberate on the Japanese proposals and to return them to the Japanese, even before we get the decision from Petersburg. If we put off our answer until we receive this decision we may have to wait a fortnight or even more, and in



general the business will drag, owing to all sorts of official delays and consultations of different departments with each other."

As nobody objected to this, the discussion of the proposals was begun clause by clause. They were read out by Nabokoff. As regards Korea, all were of the opinion that it was indispensable to agree to Japan's terms, only putting in a stipulation that no action should be taken which would threaten the safety of the frontier.

Concerning the evacuation of Manchuria and the giving up of the Southern Branch of the Chinese line, Witte said that the Japanese must be told the following: that we are ready to surrender the line but only up to the place where our troops are standing.\* The line is owned by a private company. We are ready to enter into an agreement with it, but we cannot violate the interests of China. For the purpose of making things easier, it will be possible to repurchase before the expiration of the term and hand the road over to China. Pokotiloff remarked that it was necessary to guard the rights of private individuals and of companies, for example, the Manchurian and the Fooshung Mining Companies. Witte replied that in Manchuria there were no private Russian business undertakings in the strict sense of the term, and that such replies and stipulations on our part would give occasion for disputes and for our being accused by the Powers of insincerity, want of compliance and a desire to drag the matter out. "We must," said he, "on the contrary, act as broad-mindedly as possible in questions that are of no material importance, and stand out for those conditions that are really important and show our compliance, so that in case of a rupture the blame should fall on the Japanese."

As to the clause about the ceding of Sakhalin, Witte remarked that our answer to the Japanese must be that we have owned the Island for a long time, but that Russia is ready to acknowledge Japan's economic rights as far as the fisheries were concerned.

The clause about the payment of an indemnity caused much deliberation. Having mentioned several

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\*According to the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1902, Russia had pledged herself to evacuate Manchuria. Her inability to fulfil this pledge provoked the protest of the Powers, chiefly of Japan and the United States.

points touching the impossibility of Russia's accepting this condition or even allowing of its being discussed, Witte said: "I think that on this point we may submit the following arguments: indemnity is paid by a conquered country and we do not consider ourselves as such. Indemnity is paid only when one cannot rid oneself of one's enemy, while at the present moment the enemy is outside Russia; even if we lost the whole of the Ussury province, the state of affairs would not be altered. Money is paid by a country that is poor in productive powers; Russia, on the contrary, is so rich that she can continue the war. Besides, everybody is ready to give us money. History shows us that even when the enemy was on Russian territory they did not find it possible to make such a demand."

Shipoff: "Only one such case in our history can be pointed out, that was the campaign of the Pruth, when Peter the Great was obliged to pay for the purpose of getting rid of the Turks."

Witte: "The war, not to speak of the distress it has caused, has cost Russia no less than it has Japan, and on this account Russia can see no grounds for paying an indemnity. There are, of course, expenses not proceeding directly from the war, but appearing as indirect consequences of it, as for instance the maintenance of the prisoners of war. These expenses Russia is certainly willing to refund."

Then Witte turned to Martens with the request to work out this question and to throw some light on it from the point of view of International Law.

"As regards Japan's demands to give up our battle-ships," said Witte, "it is necessary to remark that such a demand is not in accordance with International Law nor with the general state of affairs. When both sides are speaking of peace, this demand is out of place, as it is an act detrimental to Russia. Besides, these ships are of no great value, comparatively speaking. As to clause II, concerning the limitation of our naval forces, we can announce that Russia has no intention of keeping such a fleet in the Far East as can threaten the interests of Japan, but Russia cannot undertake to bind herself in this way at Japan's demand as this would not be in accordance with her dignity and sovereignty."

Martens: "In view of our desire to keep up friendly relations with Japan this condition is not admissible."

Witte: "As regards clause 12, we can answer that Russia is willing to grant Japan fishery rights on the sea coast, but not along the rivers nor in the inland territory. Altogether, gentlemen, I consider it highly desirable to study the Japanese terms and to work out an answer as soon as possible. I apply to my immediate collaborators, Pokotiloff and Shipoff, to beg them to begin this work at once. When you have finished, it will be necessary to translate our answer into French, in which Mr. Martens will assist you. At the same time it will be necessary to send a telegram to Petersburg approximately as follows: 'To-day I give an answer to the Japanese terms.' In that way we shall create an accomplished fact. If we send our answer up for confirmation, we shall not get a reply soon, as in Petersburg the different departments will begin communicating with each other, there will be consultations and conferences—in a word, the usual haggling process."

Obeying this injunction, Pokotiloff and Shipoff rose and left at once.

Addressing us, Witte continued: "Now, gentlemen, I should like to consult with you so as to make it clear what conditions will guarantee us a lasting peace, and whether it would not be well to avail ourselves of the present circumstances to establish more favourable relations between Russia and Japan. What do you think of this, Mr. Martens?"

Martens: "I consider that our conditions, as we understand them, will bring about a more lasting peace. The acceptance of the Japanese terms will make a lasting peace an absolute impossibility. Russia could not give up the idea of taking Sakhalin back, nor could she consent to limit her naval power or to pay indemnity. According to my opinion, such conditions would only act as a firebrand in future collisions and misunderstandings."

Yermoloff: "But our terms also, if they are accepted by the Japanese, will give rise to collisions."

Witte: "If Japan accepts our conditions and does not receive an indemnity, she will, without doubt, be afraid that Russia will profit by her experience in this war to change her military system, to build a new fleet, and in general to prepare for a new war in some ten years' time. It is evident that to leave Sakhalin and the Manchurian Railway in Russia's hands will simplify this

problem for her. Besides this, Japan will be more exhausted and will not have time to recover, and therefore the advantage will be on the side of Russia."

Martens: "I think that even if we accepted the Japanese terms, our strength would not be paralysed in the future."

Witte: "Yes, but in the immediate future Russia would without doubt be paralysed, and it is on this that the Japanese count."

Martens: "In any case, Russia will aim at freeing herself from those limitations which will be laid on her."

Witte: "According to the general opinion of military authorities we can now only keep those positions which we have occupied, but in no case can we utterly defeat the Japanese. Japan, knowing the insidiousness of our policy, will not trust our promises. We must, therefore, invent such a combination as will allay Japan's fears. If in 1901 we had accepted Marquis Ito's proposal, Japan would not have formed an alliance with England. Now it is, of course, too late to form an alliance, but is it not possible to offer Japan some other kind of arrangement, the more so, as in my instructions the desirability is clearly stated of trying to establish friendly relations with Japan so as to have freedom of action and a chance of attending to home affairs and to matters in the Near East. It seems to me that we must try to find solidarity of interests between ourselves and the Japanese, and to bring about such a state of affairs which, by drawing together the two nations, would reassure the Japanese as to the future. Now we must find a concrete form for the expression of such solidarity."

Rosen: "The difficulty is that Japan is already carrying on negotiations with England for a renewal of the alliance on a firmer and broader base."

Witte: "Our friendly relations with Japan must be desirable to England, who has herself entered into friendly relations with France. In this case Germany alone will be dissatisfied. I need not say that such friendly relations, if they are established, must not exceed certain limits. But our agreement with Japan will hardly clash with England's views. The question is, what form it is to take."

Yermoloff: "Even if we conclude a treaty with Japan it will only be temporary."



Rosen: "Friendly relations with Japan were possible some eight years ago, but not now."

Yermoloff: "Besides, would such friendly relations be popular in Russia? Hardly!"

Witte: "Without any doubt, they would be popular. Now let us come to the other question. If we give up Manchuria to Japan, it would be of great importance to know what China's attitude would be as regards this, and whom we should afterwards have to support—China or Japan? Besides Manchuria, the Chinese Railway would still remain in our hands. And what if the Chinese subsequently have another rising and again begin to destroy the railway. Would it not be more profitable to us if the Japanese were on our side and not against us? Thus in the present question our vital interests are at stake."

Martens: "This is a difficult question, in which it is necessary to distinguish two sides; ideal political combinations and considerations founded on facts. The fact is, that the object of European combinations is China alone. Japan is a kingdom with full sovereign powers. It must be made clear how far friendly relations between Russia and Japan are possible on the base of Chinese policy. If Russia expresses her readiness, not only to acknowledge Japan's rights in Korea, but also to help Japan in her efforts to establish a firm footing in that country, it will without doubt draw the two states together."

Witte: "I consider that solidarity with Japan should be established in such a way that, by giving her assistance, we should make sure of her support."

Martens: "The subjects of such an agreement could be Korea, and afterwards China. Japan has no interests in those Chinese provinces which are on the Russian borders, but she is interested in other parts of China. If Russia will assure Japan's interests in China, it will serve to bring about mutual friendly relations."

Rosen: "If we raise this question, Japan will answer that she has no intentions as regards China and that Korea is already occupied by her."

Yermoloff: "It seems to me that a desire to make a buffer of Manchuria is to be seen in the background

of the Japanese proposals. If we come to terms, there will be no need of a buffer."

Martens: "I can understand making a buffer and in general neutralisation, only as regards such countries which cannot be the arena of conflicting claims. We cannot make such an arena of Manchuria. Besides, in stating that we return Manchuria, it will hardly be suitable for us to insist on its neutralisation."

Rosen: "The Japanese consider that this agreement will secure their interests. As for Korea, they are already in possession there."

Witte: "Let us suppose that a clause is added to the effect that both sides bind themselves to help each other not only diplomatically but by force of arms. This would be a real proof that Russia has no aggressive schemes. Therefore, if we could express the idea that, in coming to an agreement, we are acting not of necessity nor against the grain, but are even ready to bind ourselves to help Japan keep her acquisitions, it would help to reassure the Japanese and all the world, who would see the sincerity of our intentions. If we tell the Japanese that we bind ourselves to defend those of their rights which we have acknowledged, we by this means can make it easier to have our terms accepted. What impression this will produce on the Japanese I do not know, but I think that they themselves are aiming at the same thing. I should be grateful to Mr. Martens if he would formulate my idea in writing."

The consultation lasted till almost 7 p.m. The cutter in which several of us returned to the hotel had hardly stopped at the pier when I was surrounded by the journalists, Cortesi, Thomson, Hedeman, Williams and half-a-dozen others, who plied me with questions as to what had passed. They already knew that the Japanese had handed in their terms, but they were specially interested to know what we had all been doing during our Russian consultation at the Navy Yard. I was obliged to give rather indefinite answers, pleading the fact that an official communication had already been made, and that we were bound by mutual agreement with the Japanese. They evidently were very much disappointed. What is to be gained by such secretiveness? I personally think that we must by all means

get the American Press on our side. And how can this be done if one goes on telling stories? I do not believe in bribes, and besides, Thomson warned me of the risk of such doings. I was told of a paper, the "Sun," which is pro-Japanese. If it could be made pro-Russian! So far we are not very popular.

To-day Witte, Rosen and Martens dined at Peirce's house. Shipoff and Pokotiloff worked at the wording of our answer to the Japanese terms. I joined Samoiloff and we went to the bar. Next to it is the palm garden terrace, always full of people refreshing themselves with a variety of American drinks. When I returned to my room I found Williams and O'Laughlin standing at my door. They wanted to know the Japanese terms. Some of the clauses they knew already. I only told them unimportant details. After them came Thomson with the same request. I gave him more information as he represented the friendly Associated Press.

The heat is suffocating and we are tormented by mosquitoes. Witte's valet has just brought me a pile of letters to be answered. Among them, one from a certain Blacker, of Worcester, Mass., is worthy of notice. The letter holds a medal bearing the inscription: "Millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute." He recalls the fact that these words were spoken in 1796 by the American Ambassador Pinckney to Count Talleyrand, when the latter demanded compensation, and he advises Witte to answer the Japanese in the same way. A certain W. McAdam, attorney and councillor at law of Utica, expresses his sympathy towards Russia, which is closer to America than Japan is, as the latter is without a religion: "There is something repellent in the idea of a country having no religion at all," says the author. "I grant Japan all credit for what she is and what she has done or may do for human amelioration. But I would rather sleep with a Russian than a Japanese; I should somehow feel safer. But I have no prejudices."

JULY 29—AUGUST 11.

To-day's Boston papers gave the text of the Japanese proposals almost quite correctly. The journalists were agitated and kept coming to my room asking when

we were going to give our answer. I explained to them that we must first communicate with Petersburg. They replied that they know that a cable had already been sent to Petersburg.

After breakfast, our Delegates assembled in Witte's room to settle the final wording of our reply, which was also to be in twelve clauses in accordance with the Japanese conditions. This reply, which was going to be handed to the Japanese, was as follows:

1. The first point does not elicit any objections. The Russian Government, recognising that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economic interests, engages neither to obstruct nor to interfere with measures for guidance, protection, and control which Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russia and Russian subjects will enjoy the same rights that belong to other Foreign Powers and to their subjects. It is also understood that the taking of such measures by Japan must not impair the sovereign rights of the Emperor of Korea. As regards special military measures, Japan, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, will abstain from measures which might menace the security of the Russian border territory.

2. The Russian Government is prepared to admit the first part of this clause, and agrees to the evacuation of Manchuria by its troops simultaneously with the Japanese; the details of the evacuation to be settled later. As regards the second part of this clause, the Russian Government is prepared to declare that it has neither claims nor territorial advantages, neither concessions nor exclusive privileges that may, by their character, impair the sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire or be inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity. The Imperial Government is ready to give the necessary guarantees hereon. This fundamental principle being thus established, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia propose to the Plenipotentiaries of Japan to state in a more positive manner the wishes of the Japanese Government concerning this part of clause 2, and declare that the Imperial Government is prepared to exclude everything that may impair the interests of Japan and of other Powers. The only private Russian enterprise in Manchuria that has a public character is the Chinese Eastern Railway; the examination of questions connected with this Railway is provided for in other clauses.

3. The Imperial Government is prepared to accept this point, but it is understood that Russia and Russian subjects will retain in these regions of Manchuria all the rights that belong or will belong there to other Foreign Powers or to their subjects. As regards the territories affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia is prepared to transfer to Japan her rights in the above mentioned territories. However, in consideration of the sovereign rights of China in these territories, and the treaties that have been concluded in this respect with the Chinese Government, such a transfer might take place only by agreement with the latter.



4. Agreeing with the principles expressed in this clause, the Imperial Government declares that if such a provision had not been included in the conditions set out by Japan, Russia would have considered it her duty to include same herself.

5. The ancient rights of Russia in the Island of Sakhalin existed already at a time when Japan had not, or at least did not pretend to have, any rights of ownership in the greatest part of this Island. On the other hand, Sakhalin is the continuation of the Russian possessions in Asia, because the Island is separated from the mainland by a shallow strait only seven versts broad. In view of such considerations Russia cannot agree to the cession of this Island, but is prepared to acknowledge to Japan the right of the most extensive exploitation of fisheries and of other commercial enterprises on this Island. The conditions of such exploitation might be the object of a special agreement.

6. The Imperial Government would not see any objection to this clause, but, considering the sovereign rights of China over these territories, Russia cannot transfer its rights to Japan without a previous understanding with China. It is understood that the rights of private individuals in all the territories affected by the lease concluded between Russia and China must be kept in full force.

7. The Imperial Government agrees in principle to this clause, on condition, however, of the cession of only such portion of the railway line as is in the actual possession of the Japanese troops. The terminal point of the line that is to be ceded on such conditions to be established by mutual agreement. But it is, however, to be taken into consideration that the concession for the building and working of the line has been given by China to a private Company which retains over it its sovereign rights, and that the military occupation will not interfere with the rights of this Company. The Imperial Government is prepared to enter into an arrangement with the Company assigning to the Chinese Government the right of immediate redemption of the above mentioned line. The premium resulting from such a redemption in favour of the Company would be ceded to Japan. According to §. 2 of the Contract of 27th August, 1896, granting to the Russo-Chinese Bank the concession for the building of a Trans-Manchurian railway, this Contract having been confirmed by the Convention of 12/24 June, 1898, as to the building of the South Manchurian branch, the Chinese Government has the right to redeem the line at the expiration of 36 years from the date of its opening for traffic.

8. This clause will not call for objections. The Railway Company, in the question concerning the working of the main line in Manchuria as well as that in South Manchuria which remains in her possession, will act in accordance with the provisions of the Contract for the Concession of 27th August, where §. 8 provides that the troops and war material that will be transported by the railway will not be delayed.

9. Russia cannot agree to this clause. Only vanquished countries reimburse war expenses. Russia, however, is not beaten. No country can admit defeat if its territory has been only partly occupied by a hostile army. Even if Japan had taken possession of the whole province of Primorsk the vital forces of Russia would not have been impaired, and she would have continued the

struggle. Only if victorious Japanese troops had invaded inner Russia would the nation have understood the reason for raising the question of reimbursement of war expenses. The Russian Plenipotentiaries consider it their duty to draw the attention of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries to the fact that, even at the Paris Congress in 1856, which followed the occupation of Sebastopol, the Allies did not find it possible to raise the question of indemnity. The latter is paid only by States which have not the means to continue the war, but Russia is not in such a position. But in refusing to pay a war indemnity the Imperial Government will consider it just to reimburse to Japan all the expenditure she has incurred, not for actual war purposes or for harming Russia, but in connection with the succouring of Russians who have suffered from the fact of the war. Such are expenses for the maintenance of prisoners of war, and for hospital purposes, etc.

10. Russia cannot agree to this claim. In the practice of international relations it is difficult to point out precedents which could be used in support of such a claim. Besides this claim is not in accordance with the pacific intentions which ought to animate the Contracting Parties. The material advantage that Japan might derive from the surrender of the Russian ships interned in neutral harbours would be comparatively small; on the other hand, such a claim would be inconsistent with the dignity of Russia.

11. Russia cannot submit to such an obligation imposed by a Foreign Power because it also is inconsistent with her dignity. The Imperial Government considers it possible, however, to declare that it does not contemplate in the near future the maintaining of any considerable naval forces in the Pacific Ocean.

12. Russia is prepared to conclude an agreement with Japan granting to Japanese subjects fishery rights along the coasts of the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas, such rights, however, will extend only along the sea coasts, excepting bays and rivers. It is understood that the rights in these regions belonging to Russian or to foreign subjects will be maintained.

This draft having been composed by Witte's order it was at once cabled to Petersburg.

As has been pointed out before, the American papers have published almost all the text of the Japanese proposals, and the version is fairly accurate. I cannot understand how they got hold of it. I suspect Witte let out the truth himself, as he sat with Cortesi a long time last night. The Associated Press learning bits from me and bits from Witte, got very near the real thing. Thomson says that the publishing of the conditions aroused great indignation among the Japanese. They assert that the Russians want to make the terms known so as to appeal to the public opinion against them. The foreign (non-American) correspondents are likewise upset that the Americans got to know the terms before them. After dinner a whole crush formed near Witte's room. I noticed Dillon, Cortesi, Richard, Suvorin, Brian-

chaninoff and Morisson of the London "Times."\* They all wanted to see our chief. I told them to go to the Japanese instead, which was greeted with boisterous laughter.

During the last days letters and telegrams kept accumulating. There are letters from purveyors, petitioners, inventors and different quacks; messages of sympathy regarding Witte's difficult task, advising not to give up territory and not to pay indemnity and instructing how to act, so as to get the upper hand of the Japanese. There are many from Slavonian brotherhoods. Some of the epistles are addressed to the Peace Envoys of Russia and Japan, with advice to come to terms as soon as possible. There are several messages from Russian Jews accusing the Russian Government and explaining the course of action of the American Jews. Lampoons are left unheeded, but on the whole my chief desires all these writings to be answered. The most tiresome thing is the writing of autographs. Among to-day's parcels there are cigarettes, a box of tea from the Russian firm Columbia, and some sort of syrup, Sirena Cordial, for the digestion, with the advice to drink it to the health of the Emperor.

Owing to the journalists' amiable interference, I have now two comfortable rooms.

#### JULY 30—AUGUST 12.

The weather is fine but rather sultry. Our company left for the Navy Yard in a cutter, Witte, Rosen and Nabokoff going in a motor. The sitting opened with signing the protocols of the last meeting. Then Witte said that he had studied the Japanese terms with due attention and had composed an answer, which was likewise set forth in clauses. On saying this, he handed the above mentioned terms to Baron Komura. The latter replied that, as they were written in French he would ask for a little time in which to translate them. He would try to give an answer next day.

Witte, in his turn, said he was willing to put off the meeting till to-morrow afternoon, as it was a Sunday and his morning taken up. He added that once this break was made, it would be necessary to give our communication to the press.

Upon this Baron Komura remarked that news of the negotiations, partly true, partly fanciful, had appeared

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\* Correspondent of The "Times," at Peking, has come specially for the Conference

in the papers. He thought these revelations might do harm and cause misunderstanding, and therefore proposed that in future none but official communications should be given to the journalists. Witte answered in French that, in view of the present extraordinary circumstances, it would be difficult to avoid private communications, especially as among the journalists present in Portsmouth there were some with whom he was personally acquainted. Besides which, he pointed out that some of the information came direct from Tokio, therefore the only means of preventing the appearance of false statements would be to make all that went on public. Such a radical measure would, of course, present considerable inconvenience. The other remedy was to give a mutual guarantee not to tell the correspondents anything at all. Of course, this obligation must be observed by both parties. Komura said he preferred the latter solution. But still the question about the chief point remained uncertain. Witte did not want to bind himself, and Baron Komura was too tactful to insist and excite the resentment of the press.

To-day's negotiations were carried on in four languages, and this is evidently what will be done in future. Witte mostly spoke French, though at times when at a loss for a word, or when he wanted to be more convincing, he passed over into Russian. When he spoke French, Adatci, who sits next to Baron Komura, translated what was said into Japanese; when he spoke Russian, Nabokoff translated into English. Baron Komura spoke Japanese and Adatci translated into French for him. Baron Rosen only puts in his word when Witte asks him to explain something, and as a rule steps in when he sees that the translation is not being made correctly. The Envoys smoke, Witte smokes a great deal. We Secretaries, translate and write. It is difficult to take down what is said. Our chief speaks quickly and in a low voice, sometimes he says something in French and then translates it into Russian. If he thinks that Nabokoff or Adatci have not been successful in their translation, he applies to Baron Rosen. Takahira smokes in silence, only exchanging remarks with Komura at intervals. Sato and Otchiai take notes.

When we dispersed the Japanese returned to the hotel. Our Envoys went off for a drive in the motor, while the rest of us busied ourselves in deciphering telegrams. The last of them turned out to be an



answer from Petersburg containing an order from His Majesty to refuse five of the Japanese conditions, viz.: concerning the ceding of Sakhalin, paying an indemnity, giving up the South Manchurian branch line, handing over the battleships and granting fishery rights on the coast.

It seemed queer to read instructions on questions that were settled here by Witte the day before yesterday. It is incomprehensible why the ceding of the South-Manchurian railway and the granting of fishery rights should be mentioned among the terms that are inadmissible. Evidently in Petersburg they suppose either that Japan is very anxious for peace, and is ready to make any concessions, or else they have decided to put Witte and Rosen into an awkward position. However this may be, if they count on the latter they will find themselves very much mistaken. As far as I could judge, the want of compliancy in Petersburg made no serious impression on Witte, who, after his return to the Navy Yard, immediately composed a telegram in reply stating that our answer had already been given in to the Japanese. He words his telegrams with much ease, writing most of them in our presence during the pauses of the Conference, and it is only occasionally that he asks us to leave him alone and not to speak loudly.

To-day we lunched with the Japanese Secretaries. The meal passed in silence, the Japanese sitting at one end of the table and we at the other. Witte, Rosen, and Peirce lunched in the same room, but at a separate table. When we had finished Witte sent me to the Wentworth to fetch his instructions. "While you are there," he added, "you might as well find out when the next steamers are leaving; we shall probably sail in a few days time." He evidently thinks that the Japanese will not even want to discuss our answer, and that there will be a rupture. Baron Rosen is satisfied by the turn the negotiations have taken. When talking to me to-day he remarked: "As soon as I heard of Witte's appointment I rejoiced for Russia, for I was convinced that he would not consent to sign an ignominious peace. He has been accused of being a 'peace at any price' man, now everybody will see that he looks at the situation as a true Russian should. According to my opinion we ought not to agree to the Japanese terms on any account. Russia is not beaten, and when the world learns Japan's conditions everybody will be on Witte's side."

Altogether the Baron is in a warlike mood and even seems to wish for a rupture. I have more than once discussed the chances for peace with Nabokoff and we both think the Japanese will continue negotiations. Surely Roosevelt would not have risked his popularity, made preparations, and let all the world know what he was doing, if he had not known that there were serious chances of coming to terms. Colonel Samoiloff is evidently of the same opinion. He is for peace, which he considers necessary for Russia. General Yermoloff is rather reserved in his utterances, but I think he is also in favour of peace. Of Martens I have already spoken, he is a great scholar in International Law, but a theorist. His attitude towards our Conference is a decidedly negative one; this arises, it seems to me, from wounded self-love. He once said that our negotiations were being carried on against all diplomatic traditions, that he had attended many conferences, but never had he seen anything like this one. He seems to have expected to direct the debates, acting as guide to Witte's inexperience. Shipoff, as usual, does not speak his mind very freely, but he also places a negative value on the results of the Conference. He laid a wager with me that peace would not be concluded and, that if it were, we should be taking a heavy responsibility on ourselves as regards Russia. Pokotiloff and Batcheff are most decidedly for peace. The latter is a most patriotic and witty man.

I set off to fetch Witte's instructions, and on my return to the Navy Yard I found that the consultation had reopened, and all were in their places. It was evident that the Japanese had decided to continue the negotiations. The point under discussion was the first clause of our answer, that which referred to leaving to Japan the predominance in Korea.

Witte looked nervous and tired. The Japanese kept hammering on one and the same thing. There was a moment when the dispute became acute and it seemed as if the Japanese wanted to break off negotiations. While insisting on predominance of influence and freedom of action being granted to Japan in Korea, Baron Komura demanded such a version of this clause as would not admit of any double meanings or misunderstandings. The greatest disputes were called forth by the ticklish question of the suzerainty of Korea, on which Witte insisted, saying that this was a question of international principle and concerned all the Powers. Komura replied

that there already existed an agreement between Japan and Korea, limiting her exterior relations, and that, therefore, her suzerainty had already been infringed on. Then Witte proposed that it should be mentioned that the Japanese Government would not undertake any measures without the consent of the Emperor of Korea. Komura answered that he could not agree to anything that might hinder the freedom of Japan's actions in Korea. After that Witte stated that as a matter of fact Russia had no interests in Korea and that she was even ready to uphold the Japanese claims there. In wording the clause, the squabbling began again. Baron Komura insisted on its being clearly stated that Russia would have no political rights in Korea. Witte stood up for Russia's special rights there and would not agree to their diminution. In conclusion he again made mention of the necessity of Japan and Russia acting in concert, and of Russia's readiness to uphold Japan. Then Komura said that Japan did not need Russia's support and that it would be quite sufficient for him if Witte upheld him here at the Conference and agreed to his version regarding leaving freedom of action in Korea to Japan. Thus Komura repeated just what Rosen had foretold during our Russian consultation.\*

To-day's sitting finished very late. On returning to the hotel I gave the journalists a short and hazy statement of what had passed. They were all dissatisfied, although they already knew that the Japanese insist on complete secrecy being observed. Some of the journalists tried to worm out particulars, Cortesi and Thomson arguing that silence was profitable for the Japanese but not for us. Although I agree with them, still I must abstain from speaking for the time being. Besides, I

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\* THE TEXT OF THE CLAUSE AS PROPOSED BY THE JAPANESE.

"The Imperial Russian Government, recognising that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economic interests, is ready to engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan will consider necessary to take in Korea. It is a matter of course that, subject to the above engagement, Russia and Russian subjects will enjoy all rights that belong or will belong to any other Powers and their subjects or citizens. It is further understood that, in order to remove all causes of misunderstanding, Japan and Russia will mutually abstain from taking measures on the Russo-Korean frontier which might menace the security of Russian and Korean territory."

have to see what Witte does, and to act accordingly. Sato, the Japanese spokesman, evidently suspects me of giving private information to the correspondents.

JULY 31—AUGUST 13.

To-day Witte and most of our Delegation attended morning service at Christ Church. The Rector, the Reverend Brine, had forwarded us a persuasive invitation and Witte told us to be present at the service: "It will produce a good impression," he said. Witte, Rosen and myself drove in a motor, the rest following in a large omnibus.

We came to a small, ivy-covered, Gothic church. The Rector met us at the entrance, attended by several photographers, who produced their cameras. I think we stirred the congregation, who forgot for a moment all pious thoughts and watched our every movement with great attention. The service, including the organ accompaniment, was beautiful and solemn. A psalm, I forget exactly which, speaking of victory over the heathen, was sung to the tune of our National Anthem. The Reverend Brine was evidently doing his best to make a favourable impression on his visitors. As we were coming out of church, his wife expressed the hope that we would attend a garden party they were getting up in aid of the church funds, the parish being a very poor one.

Before lunch, Sato informed me that Mr. Peirce would like to dispense with to-day's sitting, so as to avoid grating on the feelings of the Portsmouth inhabitants by meeting on a Sunday. It seems that both Witte and Baron Komura have been told of this and have given their consent. We then and there made up a short statement to that effect for the press. After lunch, or rather dinner (there is no lunch on Sundays, but early dinner at one and supper at seven) the Envoys went for a sail on the bay in a steam cutter. The rest of us made calls on American friends.

I busied myself reading the papers. In America, the Sunday papers are of special interest. First of all they are of considerable bulk, extending to as many as fifty pages of print and coloured illustrations. The paper contains a comic story in the American style, and portraits of celebrities, champion jockeys, boxers, golf, cricket, base-ball and tennis players, swimmers, and so forth. Advertisement, of course, plays a great part in this. In all to-day's issues there are sensational articles



on the negotiations and on interviews with the members of the Russian Delegation.

We had a cable from Petersburg to the effect that the answer given to the Japanese met with His Majesty's approval, but that in case of a cessation of negotiations Witte was not to leave, as it might be possible to find grounds for their renewal. This telegram confirms the opinion of Witte about Petersburg views—absence of plan, the wish to shift the responsibility, combined with arrogance and fear. The idea of leaving Witte in America for a time, even should negotiations fail, is not, however, without interest, and has been suggested I think by Vilenkin. The latter had mentioned that it would be a good thing if, after the negotiations were finished, Witte would visit the important industrial and trading centres and make the acquaintance of American capitalists and men of business. He inferred that in so doing we would disperse the distrust of Russia and Russian statesmen, which had increased of late years under the influence of our unrest at home, the agitation of the Jews and the anti-American policy of Count Cassini. This idea of Witte taking a trip after the negotiations are over meets with the approval of both Shipoff and Baron Rosen. Vilenkin, of course, would like it, as he would have to play the part of guide, owing to his knowledge of the country and his popularity in financial circles (his wife is a Miss Seligman). I have just learned that Takahira and one of the Japanese Secretaries or Military Agents attended evening service at one of the Portsmouth churches. The journalists say that this is doubtless in answer to our morning visit to church, and that the Japanese want to show that not all of them are heathen, and that they respect the religion of their American friends.

The newspapers have inserted a telegram from Japan to the effect that Admiral Kataoka has sent the fleet to the Kamtchatka and Okhotsk: that on the Russo-Japanese front at Lidziapudze the firing continues, and at the approach of a Russian patrol the Japanese greeted them with shouts of "Peace!" to which the Russians responded by shots. The "New York Herald" says that Japan will demand the cession of Sakhalin, the restitution of the Chinese railway, the South of Manchuria and the protectorate over Korea. The satisfaction of these claims will raise Japan to the status of a Con-

tinental Power. They are supported by the Japanese army of 560,000 men with 2,000 guns. Further, the Japanese are stated to have made a descent on Sakhalin and on the coasts of the Amur. Evidently all this news is intended to influence us to make concessions. This is the more probable as Japan has refused President Roosevelt's proposal of an armistice. The "Boston Herald" inserts an interesting interview with Witte about the Conference. Witte is supposed to have said that he could not say how long the Conference would go on but that if a basis for an agreement could be found, the latter would continue till a definite result was reached. He again repeated that the negotiations were difficult because the Representatives of Russia and Japan had met without previous conditions as regards the basis of agreement. His credentials are certainly very extensive, but till now he appears only as the Tzar's courier, who has been authorised merely to hear and report the terms offered by the Japanese. The same paper gives the following facetious comments on Russian and Japanese characteristics: "The cheery 'Nichevo' with which the Russians refresh themselves after victory and console themselves in defeat, as well as the eternal 'zavtra' by which they postpone till to-morrow the business that reaches them to-day, are both now heard in diverse tones at the headquarters of the Tzar's Plenipotentiaries, meanwhile the generous Japanese have the 'shikata ganas!' the 'it cannot be helped' perpetually on their lips and are already preparing to say their orientally polite 'Sayonara,' when the moment for parting finally arrives."

#### AUGUST 1—14.

This morning nearly all the Secretaries went to the Navy Yard by boat. We found it more convenient. There are usually two cutters at our disposal and two for the Japanese. They are commanded by midshipmen from the battleships "Missouri," "Kentucky" and "Alabama." The cutter goes past the cape which protects the entrance to the lagoon, where the yachts and boats ride at anchor, then rounding the cape near Newcastle and passing the old stone fort, enters the Piskatagwah. It is a short walk from the pier where the boats stop to the Navy Yard buildings.

Before the opening of the sitting Peirce asked permission to have us all photographed in the Conference Hall.

This being granted, the photographers made their appearance and took us from four different points. I wonder why the Americans wanted to take our picture. I suppose they think this will be the last sitting and wish to make sure of immortalising the Conference before the rupture.

The sitting begins with the discussion of the clause on evacuating Manchuria and handing it over to the Chinese administration, and on the question of the railway. The discussion is carried on quite calmly. Baron Komura speaks Japanese and Otchiai translates into French. Nabokoff translates for Witte, who sometimes also turns for assistance to Rosen. Komura speaks in clear-cut, studied sentences, stopping at the end of each one to allow of its being translated. Before him lie documents for reference. Witte's answers are likewise calm, but he speaks as if by inspiration, there is nothing measured or polished about his speech. He occasionally brings forward arguments which seem to perplex the Japanese. Baron Komura has evidently been carefully working up his subject, he is perhaps the less talented, but the more prepared of the two, probably owing to the help of his American adviser Denison. Witte has blank paper before him but no documents, except his instructions. He often interrupts Komura, or rather Otchiai by some objection or remark. The latter's slow monotonous tones evidently irritate our chief, and he then turns straight to Komura.

At one o'clock we had our usual interval for lunch. These meals, composed mostly of cold dishes, are provided by the Rockingham hotel at Portsmouth. To make up for the monotony of the bill of fare we get plenty of good wine and champagne. Mr. Peirce tries to do his best and has even provided Russian cigarettes and vodka.

In to-day's statement to the press we declare that clauses one, two and three were decided on. I doubt whether such a statement will satisfy my friends the journalists and I shall have to complete this meagre information. The moment chosen by them for such additional questions is at the end of our dinner. To-day some of the correspondents were waiting at the dining-room door and surrounded me when I came out. They wanted to know the contents of the clauses that had been discussed, which side was making concessions, and were there any hopes of a continuance of negotiations. I



G. PLANCON. J. KOROSTOVETZ. M. ADATCI. TAKAHIRA.  
 C. NABOKOFF. K. OTCHIAI. A. SATO.  
 S. WITTE. BARON KOMURA.  
 BARON ROSEN.





answered that the contents of the clauses were already known from the statement that had been given in the papers, and that we Russians were making all the concessions; as regarded the probability of peace being concluded, I advised them to apply to the Japanese as the success of the negotiations depended altogether on them. The journalists appeared rather disappointed and wanted to sound Witte, taking their stand outside the door, where his servants were on duty. These two men have also to grant hourly interviews in the corridor, inventing different explanations of why Witte can see no one. They know all the correspondents by sight and by name and are aware which of them Witte receives willingly.

Just before dinner a lady came to me, introducing herself as Mrs. Devis, the correspondent of the "New York Tribune," and asking to be allowed to see Mr. Witte. The interview was a short one. Among other things Mrs. Devis asked my chief what impression had been produced on him by America and American women, what had struck him most, did he like New York or Boston best, which towns were better, Russian or American? Witte answered that both America and the Americans were after his own heart, that the American women were beautiful and charming, but that he knew them too little to have formed any definite opinion of them. What struck him most was the feverish activity, the movement, the large scale of everything and the order that prevailed. He thought that New York was more an American town than Boston, which is just like any European city. The towns of America are undoubtedly wealthier, cleaner, and better regulated than Russian ones. In conclusion, Mrs. Devis asked Witte what his opinion was of the Tzar. Witte thought for a moment and then said: "I cannot answer this somewhat delicate question, and you will yourself understand why. If I began to praise the Tzar and say that he is the most powerful, talented and greatest of Monarchs, you may suspect my sincerity and think that my words are mere flattery. If I criticise His Majesty, you will be quite right to reproach me for ingratitude and want of tact." Mrs. Devis was evidently puzzled by this reply and after that took leave. Thanking me for having given her the opportunity of seeing the great man, she asked me if Witte was married, who was his wife, did he love her, how many children had he, who was master in the house, what was his attitude towards his subordinates. "I am told," added she, "that he is very

severe with them, but that still they become attached to him." I answered the first question as well as I could; as regards the last, I told her that Witte was kind but exacting with his subordinates. The fact is that when in a bad temper Witte becomes very disagreeable and gruff in his manners and speech, and treats us rather rudely.

After dinner Vilenkin presented to Witte a deputation of Hebrew bankers from New York, consisting of Messrs. Oscar Strauss, Isaac Seligmann, Adolph Lewissohn, and Jacob Schiff. Witte received them in his room and spoke with them in the presence of Rosen and Vilenkin for about an hour. Judging by what Vilenkin said, the conversation was on the subject of the Jewish question in Russia. Witte expounded in full the history of the development of this question and the position of the Jews. The deputation asked for his intercession and collaboration for ameliorating the position of Russian Jews and for the repeal of the exceptional laws and limitations regarding them. Witte replied that he had not the power to do this, but that he fully acknowledged the abnormal state of affairs and if he could, would have done what was possible. The deputies departed very well pleased with their conversation. It appears there was no talk about a loan or money matters in general. The deputation only confirmed what we knew—the existence of a vast and extensive propaganda in favour of Jews in Russia. Vilenkin told me that the bankers were very well satisfied with the reception and that Witte impressed them by his frankness and his progressive spirit.

To-day, in addition to requests for autographs, there is a letter from a Portsmouth citizen, whose signature I could not make out; this letter is marked "confidential." The writer warns Witte of Komura's intention not to present his ultimatum at once, as Marshal Oyama wants to attack General Linevitch and defeat him, and then the Russians will be obliged to agree to any terms that Japan may dictate. Another unknown correspondent from Franktown brings forward instances from history to prove that in a war the nation which is unprepared is always defeated by the one that is prepared. He advises us to conclude peace and then in ten or fifteen years time to take back from Japan all that she has now acquired, and for this purpose he proposes to re-educate the Russian people. A certain James Weber from Boston

writes that Russia does not know the Americans. The enemies of Russia are the English, the Jews and the Americans. America stands behind England. When the English starved 20,000 Boers to death, the American press was silent; there was also nothing said of English abuses in India and Ireland, but Russia is blamed for her behaviour to the Jews. Further on, the writer advises us to deport all the Jews to the United States. Here they are loved in the same way as the negroes are, that is to say, at a distance, but no one will stay in the same hotel with them. Russia must not look for sympathy in the States, she must depend on her own powers. The letter concludes with the following counsel: "Now, Mr. Witte, don't humiliate Russia by looking for sympathy in those U.S. Let Russia rely on her own strength and she will come out victorious, but when you see His Majesty the Tzar, tell him to use his boots and kick a hole in those wooden headed stiffes who represented him in Japan and Manchuria and allowed themselves to be fooled by Japan."

A somewhat curious letter came from T. Geo. Johnston of Brooklyn. He wants to know if it is true that, when Baron Komura gave in the Japanese terms to Witte, the latter remarked that they were not complete, and that Baron Komura had forgotten to mention the ceding to Japan of Moscow, St. Petersburg and other European capitals. To which Komura is supposed to have replied that London was already theirs, and they would think of the other capitals after receiving indemnity. I do not know who set this fable going, but I have heard something similar from an American correspondent.

The Antiseptic Supply Company of Kingston, Ny., has sent a box containing sticks to be used for fumigation purposes against mosquitoes. The senders say they fear the American mosquitoes may prevent the conclusion of peace.

I learned to-day that Witte, in a private conversation with Komura, tried to convince the latter of the necessity of a general agreement with Russia, pointing out how profitable it would be to Japan to have Russia's help not only in the Korean question but also from the point of view of ordinary security. Komura agreed, but answered evasively. Witte sent a telegram to this effect to Count Lamsdorff. The Count replied that, in view of the continued want of trust on Japan's part, he did not see the possibility of a general agreement. In another telegram



Witte once more returned to this question, upon which Lamsdorff asked to have the draft of the agreement submitted to him. All further attempts on Witte's part in this direction failed on account of negotiations which were then going on as to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

AUGUST 2—15.

A dull, rainy day but much fresher. We got to the Navy Yard rather early and waited a long time for the Japanese, who seemed to be dawdling. To-day it will be seen whether the negotiations are to be continued or not, as the fourth and fifth clauses (those on Sakhalin) are to be discussed. As regards clause 4, concerning the obligations of Russia and Japan not to interfere with the development of trade and industry in Manchuria, Komura remarked that, when negotiations were going on between Japan and China about concluding a commercial treaty, Russia had objected to places for foreign trade being opened up in Manchuria. To avoid similar misunderstandings in future Japan would like to know Russia's intentions in this respect. Witte replied, that the facts quoted referred to a time when there was unrest in Manchuria, but that in future Russia was ready to open all Manchurian ports for foreign trade, if Japan would bind herself by a like obligation to include the Peninsula of Liaotung. To this Komura agreed.

Then clause 5, on the ceding of Sakhalin, was taken up. Baron Komura said that he did not agree with the Russian point of view on this question and that he had stated his opinions in a separate memorandum. Having read the memorandum, Witte replied that we did not share the opinions of the Japanese and looked on the occupation of Sakhalin as a question of fact and not of right. Then Komura asked Witte to bring forward some arguments in confirmation of this opinion. Witte stated that Russia was ready to make concessions in so far as they did not touch her honour or dignity; the ceding of territory which belonged to Russia by treaty, and which she had owned for thirty years was, in the present state of affairs, inadmissible. Komura made a long speech in reply, pointing out the justice and lawfulness of the Japanese claims. Among other things he said that the possession of Sakhalin was a vital question for Japan and also a question of national security, while for Russia it

was only a case of interests. As long ago as two hundred and fifty years Japanese authority existed in some parts of the island. The first Japanese officials had appeared on Sakhalin in 1624 and the Russians did not visit it till 1803, the Amur being occupied by them in 1850. Japanese national feeling had never acknowledged the lawfulness of Russia's occupation of Sakhalin, it was looked on as an act of aggression. Geographically Karafuto (Sakhalin) is a continuation of the Japanese archipelago and strategically the island is indispensable to Japan's security.

Witte, in his turn, gave a historical sketch of Sakhalin: "By the Treaty of 1875 Japan acknowledged Russia's rights to Sakhalin in exchange for the Kurile Islands. I acknowledge, said he, the great importance the island has for Japan from the economic point of view, and this, in my opinion, is the chief reason of the claims made by the Japanese nation. We are willing to make such concessions in this respect as are possible." He then proceeded to give an outline of the political and strategical value of Sakhalin, the possession of which is indispensable for the security of the Amur province. "Sakhalin," said Witte, "is a watchman at our gates and Japan would like to be this watchman at her neighbour's door. In short, peace will be much better provided for if Sakhalin remains in the hands of Russia, as the wresting away of territory has always created grounds for dissatisfaction. As you are aware, the annexation of Alsace Lorraine by Germany in 1871 is even now the chief reason of mutual hostility between the two neighbours. On the other hand, in 1866 Germany, following the advice of Bismarck, abstained from annexing Austrian territory, and the result of such a policy led to the conclusion of an alliance which exists at the present date. And now the Russian national feeling will not reconcile itself to the loss of territory, which has been in Russia's lawful possession for a long time."

In answer to the arguments brought forward by Witte, Komura cited several more historical evidences in favour of Japan's rights. "As regards the remarks of Mr. Witte," said he, "that Russia does not intend to make Sakhalin a base for the purpose of attack, I declare that if the seat of war had been not Manchuria, but the Primorsk province, Sakhalin would have formed such a base. At present Russia has only to acknowledge an accom-

plished fact, Japan on her part is willing to give all possible guarantees regarding the security of the Amur province."

Witte again brought forward new objections to the Japanese claims, saying that, in his opinion, Japan had attached no importance to the possession of Sakhalin till it was occupied by Muravioff. "The national feeling in Japan proceeds from a sentiment of regret that the island was not taken when it was easy to do so. For this reason the national feeling in Russia is much more serious, and cannot be ignored if we want to conclude peace."

After a laborious debate which lasted for two hours, it became quite obvious that neither we nor the Japanese could yield, and that an agreement on this point was not to be reached. In view of the irreconcilable divergencies, Komura proposed passing on to the discussion of the next point. Witte agreed to this and suggested making a break till three o'clock.

Lunch was served as usual. Witte took nothing, but just walked about the room. He is not well, and has been dieting himself for several days. After this morning's sitting he asked Takahira and Komura if they were well and how they stood the food. They replied that, notwithstanding the lack of variety, they had got used to it, and even tried to enjoy it.

Both yesterday and to-day a band played in the park. Altogether the Americans are doing their best to give us a good time.

I have already mentioned the contrast between Witte's method of arguing, which is more emotional and based on inspiration, and that of Komura's more studied manner, backed by solid arguments. I must confess that Witte's improvisations are not always successful when he gets excited and says more than is needed. For instance, in the discussion concerning the question of the island of Sakhalin, when Komura began to insist upon the vital importance of the island to Japan, Witte remarked that in the main Russia could do without Sakhalin, but as a matter of principle she could not make territorial concessions. The Japanese took advantage of this "*lapsus linguae*" and requested its insertion in the protocol. We refused, pointing out that this had been said unofficially and that the Japanese had also expressed similar private opinions which were not to be entered in the protocol. For instance, on this

same question of Sakhalin, Baron Komura once remarked that Russia, having owned Sakhalin for 30 years, could not decide what to do with the island. It had come to his knowledge that between three of our Government Departments disputes had arisen about the use of Sakhalin. The Ministry of the Interior stood for retaining the island for colonisation purposes; the War Department attached only strategical importance to it; and the Ministry of Justice wanted to make it a penitentiary colony. Now the annexation by Japan might solve our doubts.

At the reopening of the sitting, clause 6, on the ceding of the Kwantung territory was discussed. The tone of the conversation was calm. After a short discussion, Witte's version was accepted. Before leaving the hall, Witte asked Komura on which floor he was staying and whether he was satisfied. This exchange of amiabilities called forth a smile from the rest of the impassive Japanese. Altogether they are not so stiff and formal now, and our relations have become much friendlier.

After our return to the Wentworth, I had to bear the brunt of an onslaught from the journalists, who wished to know the Japanese proposals. I, of course, expressed regret for not being able to satisfy their request and advised them to apply for what they wanted to our opponents. The journalists are growing more importunate with every day that passes. The first few days after the Conference was opened several of them kept going to Kitterey in the hopes of getting into the Navy Yard or of intercepting us on the way. However, they soon became convinced of the difficulty and futility of any such attempts, as the Americans kept a strict watch.

To-day's papers discuss the above-mentioned reception by Witte of the Hebrew bankers. These articles ascribe to Witte a prominent part in solving the Jewish problem in Russia and they put him forward as the defender of equality of rights and of religious liberty for the Jews (his defence of the sectarian Old Believers and Stundists prove it). In reference to the reception of the Hebrew deputation, Witte had sent the following telegram to Count Lamsdorff:—

“I spent the whole of yesterday evening talking with the chief leaders of the local Jews, who have a material



influence on American public opinion, enormous capital at their disposal and who help the Japanese in their financial operations. From this conversation, which I carried on in the presence of the Ambassador, I was convinced that they are acquainted with the Jewish question only from exceedingly partial information, drawn from sources hostile to us and from the tales of a number of emigrants, who arrive here daily, therefore the actual state in which our Jews live they represent to themselves in such a form and in such dimensions as can only turn every man into an enemy of Russia. I made clear to them the actual state of affairs and the present phase of the discussion of this question by the Russian Government; while so doing, I proved as a matter of fact that in the reign of His Imperial Majesty, only such measures have been taken as tend to the amelioration of the lot of the Jews, this they have themselves acknowledged. According to Baron Rosen's opinion, my conversation may have serious influence on American public opinion, and in any case cannot but cause anxiety to the Japanese, as the persons who visited me are Japan's bankers. Favour me by acquainting the Minister of Finance with the contents of this telegram."

We daily receive cuttings from the American newspapers containing praise of Witte and expressions of sympathy for him. As a rule these extracts are accompanied by all sorts of commentaries. For instance, to-day we have articles from the "Evening Post" and the "New York Sun," the writer of the accompanying letter, signing himself "a friend," points out that both of the above papers have changed their front and have now become Russia's friends instead of her enemies.

Mr. T. Whiley, of Sandborn, Indiana, has sent a piece of poetry: "Shall we soon forget," where Russia's friendly behaviour during the Civil War is spoken of. In general, one often hears such reminiscences of the former friendship between Russia and America, as make it evident that the Americans have not forgotten the interest expressed by us at the time. There is a queer letter from one Mr. Morehead. Having spoken of the sympathy felt by the Americans towards the Russians the writer continues: "But who am I even to address you! The Yellow Fever panic has caused me to lose my position and I have hardly the money to buy a stamp to forward the letter in which, as others of my country-

men have done, I may express my love for Russia." An American business man has sent a very long letter on the Jewish Question in Russia where, as he says, the Jews are an evil owing to their great defects, their dislike of Christians and their exclusiveness. If there is as yet no Jewish Question in America, it will, according to the writer, soon arise, as the Jews do not get assimilated but keep themselves apart and act like exploiters. As a counterpoise to this letter there are two others in which the Jews are defended; one is from the editor of the "American Hebrew," the other from Bebro's Mercantile Agency, containing sharp attacks on Russia and reproaches for the Jewish pogroms. A certain Roberts of New York has sent a letter in which he abuses the Jews and compares them to the negroes, saying however that the latter are the better of the two. "The negroes have their virtues, the Jews only a love of gain. Just give the Jews power and they will be cruel tyrants. In America the Jews are treated in a liberal manner, let Russia take warning by this mistaken system as regards the Jews. The New York University College may serve as an example. It is open to all; so many Jews availed themselves of this right that other nationalities have refused to enter and do not want to accept the Jews as comrades. As a result, the College is swamped by Jews and there is no place for anyone else."

#### AUGUST 3—16.

A cold and rainy day. We set off as usual in the cutter and got to the Navy Yard at half-past nine. The sitting opened with the discussion of the seventh clause on the giving up to Japan of the South-Manchurian line as far as Harbin, leaving the latter in our hands. Witte replied that, while having nothing against the ceding of the Southern branch line, he considered it would be just to hand over only those parts which were actually taken by the Japanese, up to that point where the opposing armies were now standing, viz.: Gunjoolin. Komura then proposed the river Sungari as a more natural boundary; Witte did not agree with such a decision, and suggested drawing the line of demarcation near the town of Tchangchun (Kwangchenty). The Japanese made several objections, but were not very much set on having their own way, trying only to get

their right of eventually building a railway line to the town of Kirin acknowledged. Finally it was decided to draw the line of demarcation through Kwangchenty.

The next points in Japan's terms are inadmissible, it will, therefore, soon be clear in what way the Portsmouth Conference will end. Up till now, as I have said before, our meetings have been of a peaceful and even friendly character. The most serene are Takahira and Baron Rosen. The former smokes one cigarette after another, and only speaks when asked to do so by Komura. Baron Rosen also waits to be addressed by Witte, and steps in at critical moments, when it is necessary to make peace or to clear up some point, and this he does with great tact. When Witte is nervous, he begins to fidget on his chair, crosses his legs and twists his foot about. Baron Komura is cooler, his displeasure is expressed by the force with which he knocks the ash off his cigarette, hitting the table and speaking more shortly and abruptly.<sup>1</sup> At the second or third sitting, Witte asked for tea, and next day his example was followed by the Japanese. Now the Envoys have tea every day. We Secretaries have to do without, worse luck.

To-day when it became dark, Witte made up his mind to turn on the electric light. This is generally done by the servant standing on footstools. It is a little difficult to do so as the lamps are high up and Witte had to stand up and stretch out as far as he could to grasp the cord. Komura and the rest of the Japanese watched the proceedings with great interest, evidently envying our chief his superior height.

In to-day's issue of the "World," Witte is represented standing behind a high screen called Portsmouth, handing out articles of his clothing to little Baron Komura. The latter is already holding his tie (Korea), collar (Kwantung) and hat (Sakhalin); Witte is handing him his shirt (Manchuria). Under this caricature are the words: "Taking him by degrees."

There is a piquant letter from a Mr. Wells, of Staten Island: "Dear Sir," writes the author, "this talk about dignity and honour, about Sakhalin from the Russian point of view, is radically absurd. It is grossly disrespectful to the people of the United States, who are sufficiently informed on the subject to understand that it never belonged legitimately to Russia. Russia

stole the island by cunning and force. She had never had the ghost of a right there. Morally and legally, it belongs to its present possessors. A burglar might as well lay claim to a house he had invaded. The world laughs at the Russian claim. It is bold, brazen but as empty as the wind." Witte smiled in reading this.

In reference to another letter about the general situation, written in French and signed A. E. Barthe, St. Louis, M. Witte remarked: "This has been written by a clever and observing man, all he says about Russia and about public opinion in Europe and America is quite true. Tell him that I read his letter with the greatest interest, and put your reply in the most amiable form." I also found Mr. Barthe's letter very interesting, though rather off-hand; the writer's comments chiefly have reference to the newspaper article "Russia and World-Opinion," where Russian policy and diplomacy are drawn in the blackest colours.

Someone gives us advice how to get rid of mosquitoes: "Dear sir, if mosquitoes annoy you, take a fresh piece of meat, lay it by the side of you, they will take to the meat."

James Chrystal of Jersey City, N.Y., writes, that the Committee which was presented to Witte and discussed the Jewish Question with him, had no right to speak in the name of all the Americans. The Jews, in the writer's opinion, formed a harmful element and he thought it would be best to send them all off to Palestine.

Mr. Scheffer, of Boston, explains why the Americans are on the side of Japan: Firstly, because Russia is powerful, and they are on the side of the weak; Secondly, Japan is fighting for her existence; Thirdly, Russia has deprived Japan of her victories over China; Fourthly, the Japanese are brave and patriotic; Fifthly, Japan is considered a liberal country, and, Sixthly, many Japanese statesmen have studied in America.

To-day's newspapers are pessimistic to judge by their headlines. They state that the end of the Conference is near because the Plenipotentiaries differ on the question of Sakhalin. The "New York Herald" reproduces a telegram from the French paper, "Le Temps," to the effect that Witte has been instructed to break off the negotiations. There is a communication from London stating that Japanese torpedo boats have bombarded Port Lazareff in Korea, and have made an



attempt at landing but have been repelled. It is said the occupation of Kamtchatka is imminent.

AUGUST 4—17.

A fine warm day. The morning sitting opened a little earlier than usual in consequence of Witte's continual pleading for punctuality. The ninth clause, concerning military compensation, was discussed. Baron Komura brought forward a number of arguments in favour of the legitimacy of the Japanese demands and of the necessity of paying indemnity. Witte refused, saying he did not admit the possibility of discussing this question. His chief arguments were as follows: Russia has suffered defeat, but she is not conquered and indemnity is paid only by such countries as cannot continue a war. Only if the Japanese had taken Moscow it would have been possible to raise such a question.

After lunch, Witte gave the Japanese a note on the indemnity question, composed by Martens. It is intended to serve as an answer to their note. Then clause 10, concerning the giving up to Japan of our disarmed ships was begun on. On this point, likewise, the Japanese handed in a note that had been previously prepared, giving the motives for their demands. During the discussion, it became clear that the Japanese were unwilling to look at the matter from any point of view except their own. Not wishing to bring acrimony into the debate Witte suggested a cessation of the discussion, with the proviso that the differences of opinion should be written down in the protocols of the meeting.

Clause 11, on the limitation of Russia's naval power in the Far East was discussed next. As might have been foreseen, there arose divergencies on this point as well. Komura stated that he was not satisfied by the promise given in our answer, namely, not to maintain any considerable naval forces; he wanted a more exact definition of the dimensions of those forces and also of the period of their limitation. In view of this objection, Witte suggested that Komura should present a new version of the clause.

Among the correspondents a rumour has gained ground that the negotiations are going to be stopped threatening a rupture. Some of them came to see me, desirous to know the truth. I answered that everything depended now on the Japanese.

Late in the evening, I was called on by a Mr. Pinkerton, who had come from Boston in a motor car with his wife, expressly to shake hands with Mr. Witte, and who told me that he must return immediately. He wanted to see, as he said, the greatest man of our age. I explained that Witte was in consultation at the moment and suggested that Mr. Pinkerton should wait until to-morrow. My visitor seemed disgusted not to have been received at once.

Among to-day's letters there is one from William Marrin, Councillor at Law in New York. This is what he advises in regard to the manner of conducting negotiations: "Après avoir éclairci les sujets qui admettent l'accord, lorsque vous vous trouverez sur certains autres en vis à vis immuables, vous proposerez alors de soumettre ces autres questions à l'arbitrage du Tribunal de la Haye ou bien du Président des Etats Unis. S'ils refusent, vous les désarçonnez du fait devant l'opinion publique du monde entier et surtout de la nôtre. S'ils y agrément, il ne peut y avoir de deshonneur à la Russie pas plus qu'au Japon, de déférer à l'arbitrage et il est moralement certain que les Japonais n'y trouveront pas leur compte."

There is a letter from the Southern Pacific Company, of Houston, Texas, inviting us to come to Texas in Old Mexico, when the negotiations are finished. It appears that some thirty capitalists are taking part in this excursion and that they will amuse themselves "fishing, hunting, sight-seeing, and having a good time." That is the way Americans take life; affairs of State do not exclude sport and amusement.

AUGUST 5—18.

When we got to the Navy Yard the Japanese were already there. At the start Komura stated that our version of the clause concerning the limitation of Russia's naval forces was not acceptable to the Japanese Government. As, on the other hand, the Japanese proposal had been refused by us, it seemed to him it would be best to put off the discussion of this clause and to go on to the discussion of clause 12. Saying this, he handed Witte a paper. On reading it, our chief expressed the desire to have a private talk with Baron Komura, and told us to leave. This consultation went on through the day, finishing by the adoption of clause 12 as the Russians

wanted it, that is, allowing the Japanese to fish off the coasts but not in rivers and bays. As regarded clause 11, we could not come to an agreement. Then Witte proposed to begin the revisal of all the clauses, and to sign the protocols of the meetings.

I afterwards learned from Rosen that at the private consultation the Japanese offered a new compromise as regarded Sakhalin and compensation, viz., the division of Sakhalin in such a way that Russia should have the northern half of the island and Japan the southern; Russia to pay compensation or purchase money for her half of the island. In case of our consent to such a combination, the Japanese would probably not insist on those conditions, which were so valueless to them and so humiliating to us, as to the curtailment of our naval forces and the giving up to them of our disarmed ships.

When we returned to the hotel there was great excitement among the journalists, who were making all sorts of conjectures. I was at once surrounded and questioned, but advised them to apply straight to Witte. In comparing American and European journalists one marks the difference between them. The Americans are undoubtedly sharper, quicker in grasping facts, and more capable in worming out information; the Europeans on the other hand are better educated, and look in a broader way at things in general and at the world's political situation in particular. I have already mentioned that the European correspondents were jealous of their American colleagues, to whom, so they say, we give the preference. The Germans, I heard, were complaining that we gave the preference to the Americans, in consequence of which all news appeared much earlier in America, especially in view of the six hours difference in time. The complaints of the European correspondents were quite comprehensible, but I considered it of the greatest importance to bring the American papers over to our side, and by all means to draw them away from the Japanese; this has already been partly attained. The counter balance to our influence is worked, I think, not so much by Komura as by Baron Kaneko, the Financial Agent of Japan in New York. He is in touch with bankers and statesmen, and to judge by what the newspapers say, he often is at President Roosevelt's house. However, it is also said that he is not on good terms with Takahira, who resents his interference.

Witte is not well, and dined in his room. Altogether our dining room has grown very empty of late, many preferring to take their meals at the *table d'hôte*, where it is livelier and the food more enjoyable. In our rooms we nearly always get the same things, the same old clams, everlasting boiled fish, and I am deadly tired of roast mutton and boiled greens. The cook here is far from being a *cordon bleu*. However, we must not forget that we are the guests of the State Department, and have our meals at the expense of the Federal Government.

In the evening I got a visit from a Mr. Minton, from New York. He brought letters of introduction to Witte from Augustus Belmont, the great banker, and from Judge Parker, a former candidate for the Presidency. On coming in Minton asked to have the door shut, and behaved in a mysterious manner, being afraid he would be seen by the journalists, who were hovering in the corridor. He explained the part played by the press in the United States, why the papers had of late years been hostile to us and friendly to Japan, and offered to revolutionise American public opinion in our favour. His whole plan of action was laid down in a letter which I handed to Witte. The execution of this scheme required two million dollars, one million to be paid at the beginning of operations, and the other at the end of a year. On reading the letter Witte declined to see the man, and told me to give him a civil refusal. "He is simply fishing for money, he and I have nothing to say to each other," remarked Witte.

After Minton's departure, a young man came to me with drawings and plans of a flying machine which he had invented. He also wanted to be introduced to Witte, to show him the model, and to help him with the expenses. This would cost five hundred thousand dollars. I stopped him at once, advising him to apply to our Naval or Military Attaché. Witte refused to receive him, pleading his incompetence as an excuse. What fools we Russians are still thought to be!

Later on, Cortesi, whom I met in the drawing room, congratulated me on the introduction of a Constitutional Government into Russia. It was reported that an Ukase calling together a Duma, or Parliament, had been published. This is a rather optimistical anticipation, we are far yet from a Constitution, and perhaps not even ready for it. Both Cortesi and Thomson think that the appearance of this Ukase at the present moment will act un-



favourably on the course of negotiations, as the Government by promising a Duma, has become popular, and can continue the war.

In to-day's papers there is the account of an attempt on the lives of the Jewish bankers who were received by Witte the other day. Bombs were sent to them, but nobody was hurt by the explosion.

Among the last letters to Witte there is one from a Mr. Hopkins, of Washington, who has written a dissertation on the historical fate of Russia and America. The letter begins with the words: "Russia, our only Peer and Friend"; the writer advises the Russian Government to act in a more liberal spirit, and to grant freedom and education; then he points out that Japan's victory over Russia is accidental, and that the Russians, as the White Race, must take the upper hand. "The fox to dispute the right of way with the bear successfully is impossible. Japan may annoy Russia for years, but the greater nation will follow its destiny, it is the iron law of Nature. . . . To see a Mongolian race dominate or retard the Caucasian would be against Modern History. . . ." Altogether, in the opinion of the writer, Japan has undertaken too big a task, and will in the end be punished. Mr. Hopkins evidently believes most sincerely in the might and superiority of Russia, placing her side by side with America, and considering that the supremacy of the whole world should belong to these two nations.

Professor Lawrence Brickenstein, of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, has sent a programme of the negotiations to be carried on with Japan. He advises us to give Japan the indemnity she asks for, on condition that it should be used for the building of roads and for improvements in Manchuria, which should be under the joint control of Russia, Japan, and China, the Hague Tribunal to settle all doubtful questions. It would also give decisions on the question of arming and disarming the fleets of Japan, Russia, and China in the Pacific, with a regard to the dimensions of the merchant fleet of each Power. The writer winds up by praising the idea of peace, the Hague Conference, and its promoter, the Tzar.

A specially enthusiastic epistle has been written by Florence Brooks, of New York. She is delighted with Russia and the Russians, and among other things she says: "Your country, your music, your literature, dramatic art, and painting and sculpture, and delightful

dances, we Americans have perhaps too few opportunities, so far, to know thoroughly. But if the taste for things Russian becomes a real enthusiasm it is not impossible to gratify it even in New York. . . . Apart from the public interest which your cause excites just now, I hope I may express this other interest. Not only the art of Russia, but its basis in a deep-hearted, deep-souled people is splendid. Its antiquity, its richness of types, its firm roots in the soil, make this art superb and sincere. We Americans admire also the personal liberality and large ideas by which you have been guided, and your strength and simplicity."

AUGUST 6—19.

The weather is sunny and cool. When leaving my room I was stopped by journalists, who asked me if it were true that Baron Rosen had been sent for during the night to the President's house at Oyster Bay, and that he had gone there with Prince Kudasheff. I replied that I knew nothing. Eventually I heard that Witte was going to meet Rosen at his house in Magnolia, probably after the interview with the President. This sudden departure has, of course, seriously upset the journalists, and has called forth many more or less clever hypotheses.

Taking advantage of my chief's absence, I allowed myself a holiday, and suggested to Captain Roussin to come with me to Boston. In the train we found Thomson and Brianchaninoff, who were also going sight-seeing. The latter is very capable, and a connoisseur of European politics, though perhaps a little presumptuous and too loquacious in his demonstrations. He represents the liberal Moscow newspapers, "*Rousskoie Slovo*."

Boston is interesting as one of the few American cities with a history. The new part of the town is built on a definite plan—the streets are straight and broad, planted about with trees. To make up for this, the old part, where business is carried on, reminds one of those ancient European cities which have not yet been rebuilt in the new fashion. It is picturesque, and has the tint of time and history. I saw no very high houses such as there are in New York. The shops are fairly good. By the way, I had to buy some pocket handkerchiefs; our linen disappears after every wash, and if the Conference goes on much longer, the Delegates will have to renew their wardrobes.

We all had lunch at the hotel Touraine, including Thomson's friend, Swan. Then we went for a drive round the town, and had a look at Harvard University, a cluster of fine buildings scattered about in a large park. On leaving Harvard, we crossed the river Charles, and found ourselves in Cambridge. From there we flew along the high road to Magnolia, passing through several small towns on our way, among them was Lynn, famous for its boot factories. Though the road was not very good, we bowled along swiftly, getting to Magnolia about four o'clock. The last ten miles we drove through a beautiful forest, quite wild in places, in other parts there were villas and gardens. The summer residence of Baron Rosen's family is a large three storey house, standing in an old park on the sea-shore. In the neighbourhood are the palatial summer abodes of several wealthy New York people. When we drove up, Witte, Samoiloff, and our Consul, Baron Schlippenbach, were standing at the door ready to return to the Wentworth hotel. They had dined at the Rosens'. The Baroness was persuading Witte to take a rug and an overcoat, as it was decidedly cold. After some discussion he consented to be wrapped up snugly, and off they went. The Baroness was most amiable, and invited us all to tea. We sat conversing about Russia's chances of getting an honourable peace. Brianchaninoff's eloquence helped us to pass a very pleasant hour. We left Magnolia about seven. I suggested motoring straight to Portsmouth, but was told that the roads were very bad, and that we would not get there till midnight. We decided to go to Beverley, and catch the down train from Boston. The lamps were lit, and we started at full speed, but at the first turning struck the wall, and were obliged to slow down. Having missed the train at Beverley, we went straight to Boston, where we arrived after a rather reckless drive. We supped at the Parker hotel, and returned to Portsmouth late at night. It had been a real holiday for me ; we tried not to talk about the Conference, and did succeed fairly well.

By the way, I just mentioned the town of Lynn, celebrated for its boots. In to-day's Boston papers I read the following story: "Witte's shoes in Lynn window." It was stated that Witte's corns were troubling him, and he had asked to have his boots sent to the bootmaker. The work was entrusted to a shoemaker of Lynn, who, for the sake of advertisement, put Witte's shoes in the window with an

appropriate inscription, attracting the passers by. Among to-day's correspondence, there is a letter signed "William McDowell," who writes from some Peace Society in New York. This Society calls itself, "The Executive Office of an Electoral College, composed of the International Leaders of the World, bringing into existence the United Nations of the World." A rather elaborate title! The letter is addressed to the Russian and Japanese Plenipotentiaries. The writer puts the question: "How can this great war between Russia and Japan be so concluded as to be the last great war in history?" and asks the Plenipotentiaries to refer to Roosevelt's arbitration if they cannot come to an agreement by themselves.

#### AUGUST 7—20.

The result of Rosen's visit to Oyster Bay was the following telegram to Petersburg, to the effect that the President had offered his co-operation in settling the disputed points:

"Yesterday Rosen visited the President. The invitation was evidently the result of an interview which the President had with Kaneko on Friday. Judging by what was said to Rosen by the President, he was not yet fully informed of the proposal made to us by Komura on Friday concerning clause 5. The President expressed the following idea: If out of the four clauses on which we could not come to an agreement three were excluded, viz., 10 and 11 by the Japanese withdrawing, and 5 by our yielding Sakhalin to the Japanese, it being already as a matter of fact in their possession, and which, in his opinion, we, having no fleet, cannot hope to regain, then only clause 9 as to compensation would remain. If then both sides could agree to give this question over for a preliminary decision to two persons belonging, one to a nationality friendly to Russia, and the other friendly to Japan, so that these two persons should present jointly to both Parties a decision with motives for such, the decision, of course, not to be in any way binding on the Parties, such a proceeding would unavoidably take up no little time, during which passions would calm down, and at the end of which Japan would hardly decide to continue the war as a question of money alone. This idea, the President asked to have put before the Imperial Government for consideration, wishing it to be kept in view that he does not want it to be regarded in any way as a proposal



coming from the President of the United States, but only as an idea expressed in private conversation with the Ambassador, in the hopes of rendering such personal assistance as is in his power."

It seems that Roosevelt is willing to bring pressure to bear on the Japanese so as to induce them to withdraw clause 10 (the giving up of our ships) and 11 (the limitation of our naval forces), and in return for this we are to give up Sakhalin. As concerns military compensation, the Americans suggest giving over the question to be decided by such arbitrators as are most in favour of the belligerents, viz.: President Loubet and King Edward. By the way, Rosen said that he found Roosevelt playing tennis in white flannels. Though he only spoke with Rosen in the intervals of the game, the Baron thinks he has taken the hitch in the negotiations to heart, and would like to be of use. I told Rosen that I am besieged by journalists, who want to know the reason of his trip to Oyster Bay, and the subject of the conversation. "Tell them," replied the Baron, "that the President and I talked about the different sorts of Slavonic literature in which we are both interested."

This morning Rojdestvensky's wife, a charming and elegant American, arrived from Peking carrying a small Pomeranian dog. Our company was likewise reinforced by the arrival of Baron Staal, Attaché to our Legation in China. He will help us with secretarial work.

After luncheon Rosen set off for Magnolia, having refused to talk with the journalists. The most contradictory reports, all turning on the intervention of Roosevelt, are rife among them. They keep constantly coming to me to find out the truth. I take a somewhat enigmatic air as if I knew what is going on—in fact, I am as ignorant as they. Witte being absent at dinner, Martens took his place. He is as gloomy as ever, and criticises the Plenipotentiaries, especially Rosen, disapproving the choice of members of the Conference, and the procedure of the debates. By the way the Delegates have been left in the shade, one does not find them in the Conference group, even on the post cards for sale in all the shops. Martens has announced his intention to leave shortly, as there is nothing to be done. There even have been telegrams in London and Paris papers concerning his being set aside from taking part in the Conference.

To-day the York Harbour Club, a summer resort with a splendid beach 10 miles from our hotel, invited us to a

picnic on the "May Flower," including a sail to the Isles of Shoals. Some of us agreed to go, thus avoiding the Sunday service, in spite of repeated invitations from both the Rectors of Portsmouth and Kitterey. Regarding this the journalists remarked rather sarcastically that now church could be left out of the programme, as the requisite impression of piety had been produced by our first attendance, when the papers praised us up to the skies, and compared us with the heathen Japanese.

AUGUST 8—21.

The morning passed in feverish expectation of an answer from Petersburg to the Japanese terms and the intervention of Roosevelt. The reporters ran in constantly and tried to get at Witte, but his faithful valets would not admit them. The general feeling was strained and pessimistic. The papers gave a telegram from London, stating that there had been a State Council in Peterhof, presided over by the Tzar, and in the presence of the Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaevitch, and that it was decided to refuse the Japanese terms. Having no official confirmation of this statement, Witte denied the correctness of the news. Meanwhile the Associated Press has spread a report that the President offered to act as mediator. Everybody was interested to know how Russia would look on this intervention.

Witte felt better to-day; he went for a walk, and about two o'clock prepared to drive to York Beach, not far from the Wentworth. I was offered a place in the motor. The road was rather bad, but to make up for this we drove all the way through fields and forests. York Beach is much more picturesque than our Wentworth hotel. There are many exquisite villas, pretty residential hotels, and a beautiful sheltered beach, covered with fine gravel. We sat for half an hour under the awning near the bathing place, watching the ladies bathing. I also went for a swim. When returning Witte and Rosen discussed the situation. Both seemed pessimistic about the result of the Conference. They seem to have become great friends, which is a very good thing at the present moment.

At the hotel we found a telegram from Count Lamsdorff confirming the London news of the decision in Petersburg to consider the Japanese proposals as inadmissible. Thus things are evidently tending towards the break of the

Conference. Before dinner, Mr. Walter Rushforth called as deputy from the Jews of the town of St. Lawrence, and presented an address to the Envoys containing greetings and wishes for success. There are about 600 signatures of Russian Jews appended. In the evening some correspondents looked in to find out if our protocols would be ready, and if we did not intend to put off our sitting till another day. Williams, of the "New York Times," says that the Japanese have returned the safe they had hired from the hotel, and that this is a significant fact. The journalists make the strangest conclusions. For instance, the linen having been sent to the wash they apprehend our departure.

#### AUGUST 9—22.

The papers prophesy the failure of the Conference, and comment in various ways on Rosen's visit to the President. The journalists keep coming to my room, from the early morning, some are already waiting in the corridor. I have just learned that it was decided to postpone the sitting till to-morrow on the plea that the protocols are not yet ready. Later on Sato came, and we composed our communication for the Press. At half-past ten Witte and Rosen set off for the Navy Yard to meet the President's messenger. Taking advantage of this leisure time, I went to Portsmouth to see the dentist, as after yesterday's bathing I have a bad toothache, and my face is beginning to swell.

In returning I learned that Roosevelt had sent the following telegram to the Tzar, entreating him to agree to the proposed settlement of the question:

"Pray allow me to give to your Majesty my advice as if I were a Russian statesman and patriot. The Japanese are willing to forego two of their demands, the limitation of naval forces and the giving up of your ships. But I have learned that they are willing to make another concession, which I did not expect viz., to return the northern half of Sakhalin. In return for this Russia will pay a certain compensation, also for prisoners of war. The amount of this compensation, might be fixed on later by further negotiations. Such a settlement of the question I consider as very advantageous for Russia. Although Japan's financial position is a difficult one, still she can continue the war, and in such a case, the Primorsk province, which has been acquired with the blood of Russia's





# Souvenir de Portsmouth

avril 1905

Gaston Ch. Richard  
Géral Parisien

Evening Notice  
N.Y. World

Will Rogers  
The Sun  
J.R. Hastings  
The N.Y. Globe

Prof. G. G. G.

Prof. G. G. G.

W. Blythe  
New York World  
Henry S. Brown  
New York Times

D. W. Williams  
N.Y. Times  
Thomas J. Feeney  
Boston Herald

Walter C. Cameron  
New York Herald

Howard S. Thompson  
Associated Press  
R. C. Clay  
New York American

Irvin S. Cobb  
New York Evening Sun  
William Foster  
N.Y. American

Edmund Noble  
Boston Herald

Henry E. Cloud  
Publishers' Press  
Association

Harry M. Cress  
Brooklyn Eagle

W. K. K.  
Moscow N.Y.



Vilkinson

Kalozoff Plangon Potokiloff

E. J. Dillon  
Daily Telegraph  
Mr. Witte  
La Confor

Les Délégués Russes

A. Maurice Fox

London Morning Post

Julius Hedeman & Jean Korostovitz

James Williams, Jr.  
The Associated Press

John Callahan Laughlin  
The Chicago Tribune

J. Frank Davis  
The Boston American

W. F. Miller  
Publishers Price  
Scraper McRae

Thurs 21st Sunday  
ny Herald

Julius Hedeman - Editor  
The Evening Sun  
New York  
Danillo's Informer  
New York 24th Street



Prime  
Korostovitz  
General  
Korostovitz  
Roushine

22 Oct 1905  
Portsmouth

Correspondents & Journalists

Morrison  
Parker  
Curtis  
Waller  
Waller

Waller Wellman  
Chicago Herald-Examiner



sons, will probably fall into the hands of Japan. As far as Sakhalin is concerned, the retaining by Russia of the northern part fully secures, according to Russian military authorities, the position of Vladivostock."

The telegram closes with an appeal on the necessity of concluding peace, which is quite compatible with our dignity. In a letter to Witte, the arguments concerning Sakhalin are repeated, and Roosevelt says that, were he a Russian statesman, he would consider the Japanese terms admissible. Witte at once composed a reply to the President on the impossibility of agreeing to the proposed combination.

To-day our Delegation, together with the journalists, were photographed. The question of taking this group was raised some days ago, the journalists wanting the Russians and the Japanese on the same picture. Witte refused being photographed with the Japanese. After this, the latter were photographed separately with the representatives of the Press. To-day it is our turn. While we were being placed, jokes and witticisms flew about as to where each of us was to stand. Witte and Rosen occupied the middle, the Delegates and Secretaries the first row, and the journalists were behind. They are quite delighted with Witte's simplicity and naturalness. This ceremony attracted the whole crowd from the hotel.

The growing sympathy towards us is shown in the papers. Many of them, for instance, the "Evening Post" and the "New York Sun," which were considered pro-Japanese, have quite come over to our side, and all this in a most natural way. In Witte's character and manner there is much that must be attractive to the Americans. He behaves simply, and at the same time with assurance; he takes an interest, or pretends to do so, in all that surrounds him. He receives everybody, listens to what they have to say, answers all their questions, and altogether impresses people by his intelligence and manners.

#### AUGUST 10—23.

To-day's sitting began by a private consultation of the Plenipotentiaries. It was very short, and after that the Secretaries verified the protocols of the sittings.

At mid-day, without waiting for the end, Witte proposed to Komura to postpone the meeting till two o'clock. The Japanese agreed to this. Witte and Rosen



went off to lunch at the Wentworth, while we took ours at the Navy Yard with the Japanese Envoys and Mr. Peirce. During the meal Komura told of happy times passed in Peking, when both of us were much younger. Peirce wanted to know whether we were satisfied with the arrangement of the Conference, and with Portsmouth as a place. He mentioned that all the furniture had been specially ordered for the occasion. He also asked if we liked the fare, and were pleased to have Russian vodka. Komura said they had brought their own Japanese saké (brandy) with them.

Before the sitting Witte remarked that he would like to ask the Japanese a question; he wondered if this could be managed. In case of success the Japanese would be cornered. Then he composed a telegram to Count Lamsdorff, drawing his attention to the fact that a complete refusal of the compromise offered by the Japanese would set public opinion of both Europe and America against us. While writing he turned to Rosen and the rest of us, as if undecided. Opinions were divided—Nabokoff and I were for sending it, but the Baron disagreed. Finally the telegram was sent.

When the sitting opened, Komura handed in the last concession of the Japanese—the return of half of Sakhalin for a payment in money, the guarantee of the freedom of sailing in the Laperuse and Tartary Straits, and Japan's renunciation of clauses 10 and 11\*. After a lively debate, when it became clear that the Japanese did not intend to yield, Witte asked, how would Japan look on the following combination. Supposing we were willing to give up the whole of Sakhalin, on condition that Japan withdrew her demand for reimbursement. Komura replied

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*\*Note of the Plenipotentiaries of Japan.*

- (1) The Island of Sakhalin to be divided into two parts, the territory lying north of the 50th degree, north latitude, to be restored to Russia, and the territory lying to the south of that parallel to belong to Japan.
- (2) Japan and Russia to engage respectively not to take any measures which may impede free navigation of the Laperuse and Tartary straits.
- (3) Russia to pay to Japan Yen 1,200,000,000 as compensation for the restoration of the portion of Sakhalin Island to the north of the 50th parallel north latitude.
- (4) Upon the conclusion of an arrangement in the above sense Japan to withdraw her demand concerning reimbursement of war expenses, but such withdrawal is not to apply to the expenses incurred by Japan for the care and maintenance of Russian prisoners of war.

that both compensation and Sakhalin entered into the Japanese plan, but that in any case, reimbursement was indispensable. Witte had evidently purposely brought Komura to such an acknowledgment, as to make it clear that the Japanese carried on the war for the sake of money. Such an acknowledgment, according to him, would draw public opinion still more to our side.

As we had again not come to any positive agreement it was decided by mutual consent to put off the next sitting till the 13—26 instant. Witte dined in his room, and came down afterwards to listen to Hansen playing the piano. By the way, the Secretary to the Russian Embassy at Washington is a clever musician. As there were only Russians in the room, the Americans contented themselves by staring through the windows.

#### AUGUST 11—24.

To-day we had no sitting with the Japanese. Instead of that our chiefs had a conference with Peirce, who was invited to Witte's rooms. The reason for this private conference was a telegram received last night from Roosevelt, with a request to forward it to the Tzar. The President returned in energetic expressions to the combination proposed by him as to the division of Sakhalin, pointing out that a payment of money for half the island cannot be looked on as military indemnity, and saying that, if we did not accept this proposal, we might have harder terms offered us in the future.

The morning papers report that the Tzar received the American Ambassador, Meyer, and talked with him during three hours. In this way the President evidently means to take decisive steps in two directions for the greater security of his plan. In the American papers the compromise proposed by Japan and upheld by Roosevelt is discussed in detail, the majority considering such a solving of the question quite admissible for Russia and not in any way lowering to our dignity.

The journalists asked me, whether we had received information of the mediation of the Powers, and was it a fact that Roosevelt had applied to them for co-operation. I answered that I had heard nothing. Side by side with rumours of peace and of our accepting the Japanese combination, there are reports of inevitable rupture and the end of the Conference. Of course, everyone prophesies what suits him best.

On the whole, we are all sick of Portsmouth, or rather of the Wentworth hotel, with its monotony and isolation from the rest of the world. Besides which, there are too many journalists, they simply get in each other's way, each trying to find out something sensational before the others. Yesterday the Governor of New Hampshire, who is staying at the hotel with his family, offered to our Envoys to take a trip to the picturesque White Mountains. It is hardly likely that we shall avail ourselves of his kind offer. We are not in the mood for excursions just now; our nerves are strained, each of us is awaiting the issue of the diplomatic struggle, and watching the others. The Americans somehow cannot understand this, or else they consider it possible to look after the interests of one's country while not denying oneself amusement. To this trait of the American character we may ascribe the choice of the Navy Yard buildings for our Conference and our being lodged in this uncomfortable place. Talking about this with an American journalist, he gave me the following explanation. According to American ideas, all business should finish at three or four in the afternoon; after this comes rest and recreation. It appears that the State Department fitted up the Navy Yard for our sessions, with the idea that after work we should follow their example, i.e., romp about and stretch our limbs. "Instead of which," said the journalist, "you brood over your work, which you continue even at night. It is comprehensible that a summer hotel is not an adaptable place for serious occupations. However, the Japanese have also disappointed the Americans; they, too, sit in their rooms, only Sato and the Naval Agents show themselves. Besides an office, they have also a special news bureau in one of the hotel rooms.

In the evening I saw Cortesi, who told me that the Associated Press had received news of an announcement, said to have been made by Count Lamsdorff to the Press, that Russia will not accept Japan's proposals touching indemnity. This news has again caused everybody to feel low-spirited, and this shows itself in their questions. Hedeman, O'Laughlin, Brianchaninoff, Oulahan, and Thomson wished to verify the truth of this news. Hedeman wanted to know what we thought of the attitude of the German Emperor towards our negotiations, did we not think he was trying to prevent an agreement, and what news had we of the renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance.

AUGUST 12—25.

To-day I saw Rosen, who had just arrived from Magnolia ; he is not particularly pleased with Roosevelt's interference, fearing that it will be unfavourably received in Petersburg. Now everybody is interested to know in what manner to-morrow's sitting will end, by the rupture of negotiations, or by their continuation under some plausible excuse. The news reported by the papers is various, but the majority express hopes of a peaceable issue. They say that Roosevelt will see the matter to the end ; the combination concerning Sakhalin is discussed. One of the leading journalists, Mr. Maurice Law, affirms most positively that there will be peace, and has even published the terms of it. According to telegrams from Petersburg negotiations are being carried on directly between the Tzar and Roosevelt, through the Ambassador, Meyer. We have evidently given up our former irreconcilability, and are ready to give up the southern half of Sakhalin. The Associated Press gives the news of the renewing of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement on a broader scale. Japan undertakes to help England in case of aggression from two Powers in the Pacific and in India. This settles our doubts about a rapprochement with Japan.

To-day the Japanese Envoys and suite went to visit a large cotton-spinning mill in Manchester, near Boston. It seems they have more than six million spindles. Witte and Rosen also received an invitation from the manager and from the municipal authorities of Manchester. They had to refuse on the plea of no time. The other members of our Delegation evidently take no interest in things of this kind. At night I had such a toothache that I could not get to sleep. I dressed and went down to the office to see about a conveyance to take me to the dentist's at Portsmouth. I was told, rather curtly, that this was quite impossible. In the meantime journalists, who were at work on the night telegrams, surrounded me. These gentlemen expressed their sympathy, and took a lively interest in my dilemma, suggesting all sorts of remedies to ease my pain. Mr. Williams, of the "New York Times," made special efforts to get me some sort of conveyance. Fortunately, governor MacLane's son undertook to drive me to Portsmouth in his father's motor. We got there and woke the dentist, who lanced my gum ; this relieved me very much, and by three o'clock a.m. we were back at the hotel.



Among to-day's letters there was a rather curious one from an anonymous correspondent. "Excellency," he wrote, "before you leave this country, you will please give a 5 cents to Mr. Theodore Roosevelt to hang himself for his interpretation. Also, you will please, before leaving this country, let us know how much costs in Russia a pound of human flesh."

#### AUGUST 13—26.

In the morning I was called by Witte, who told me to obtain our bill, as to-day's meeting would probably finish by a rupture, and we would leave on Sunday. One of our Secretaries has already been commissioned to go to New York and take rooms at an hotel beforehand, so that we might sail for Europe on the 23rd of August. Till then we shall take a trip to Niagara, Chicago, and Buffalo.

We went to the Navy Yard at two. A few minutes before the sitting opened, Takahira proposed a private consultation. It lasted about an hour. When we returned to the hall Witte looked gloomy. The Japanese, on their part, seemed pleased, and as if they were trying to ingratiate themselves with us. The Envoys then proceeded to the signing of the protocols of the last meeting. While this was going on, Witte asked on what paper the protocols were written. He was told that we used American paper, while the Japanese had their own. Rosen said the best paper was Japanese, as it was untearable, to which Komura replied with a smile, that to make up for that, one could make no erasures on it. The whole process of signing occupied not more than ten minutes, after which the Japanese bade us good-bye and departed.

Witte walked about a little, as he always does after a sitting, then sat down to write a telegram, which he gave to Rosen to read. It was a telegram for Petersburg, saying that when the Japanese asked what reply we could give to their last proposal he had answered that we refuse to pay indemnity, but are willing to give up the southern half of Sakhalin and to pay for the maintenance of our prisoners. The Japanese had then asked to delay their answer, waiting for instructions from Tokyo, and he (Witte) had agreed to this. On reading the telegram Witte remarked: "I felt sure we should leave for New York to-morrow, and now we shall have to stay for two

days more. All the same, on Monday we all are going our separate ways, though they will probably bring down their claims to 600 millions instead of the milliard they wanted at first."

Thus for the time being, contrary to all expectations, there has been no rupture. In the evening I talked with Thomson, who told me that he had been sounding Takahira, and that the Japanese absolutely want to come to an agreement, and are ready to bring down military compensation to the minimum. The President, through Baron Kaneko, has impressed on the Japanese the necessity of being more open and friendly with the Press, and altogether not to be so secretive, pointing to the Russians as an example of what he meant. It seems that one of the Japanese correspondents, getting no answer to a question he had put to Sato, said that he could never get anything from his countrymen and preferred to apply directly to Mr. Witte." On the whole our chief's popularity has increased; one cannot say the same of Baron Komura.

In to-day's "Boston Herald" there is a funny cartoon, with the inscription, "Signs that Russia prefers war to go on." A bear (Russia) is rushing towards the edge of a precipice, beyond which is an abyss, bearing the inscription "War," and dragging Roosevelt after him. The latter is trying to hold him back by a strap fastened to the animal's muzzle. In another caricature Witte and Komura are represented playing cards. The stakes are: Sakhalin, indemnity, war ships, etc. On Komura's cards the words "irreducible minimum" are written; on Witte's "maximum concessions." Each is trying to get a glimpse of the other's cards. Drops of sweat are pouring down Witte's face. The words underneath are: "If I could only see what he's got!" There are also some very malicious caricatures. For instance, there is one of the Mikado holding our Emperor and beating him: the Mikado is saying: "What'll you give me to stop?"

The correspondent of the "Boston Herald" at Petersburg states that the impression is that Roosevelt's efforts have not succeeded. Influential persons in high places, including Count Lamsdorff, are averse to the payment of an indemnity. In spite of the financial crisis, the general discontent, the threat of starvation and disorders in the army, the Government is disposed to continue the war, as the majority desires victory. The military party considers that Russia can continue the war for five months. It is foreseen that in the event of the continuation of war

the Government will have to make concessions and grant serious political reforms. The same newspaper relates an interview with Baron Kaneko, the substance of which is that Japan has made her extreme concessions, that she desires a just peace, and that he hopes that both parties will come to an agreement.

The reports of the Japanese correspondents are very pessimistic. Their opinion is that Japan has made the greatest concessions, and that Russia shows an unwilling obstinacy in the question of compensation. The Japanese attribute this intractability to the advice of Kaiser Wilhelm, who, it is said, at their last meeting in the Gulf of Finland, persuaded the Tzar not to make any concessions. The second cause of Russia's obstinacy is General Linevitch's assertion of the superiority of the Russian army, and his influence on our Monarch. The tenacity of the Russians can be explained by the prospective calling of the "Duma," and the hope of the financial exhaustion of Japan. Meanwhile Japan is ready to continue the war even for two more years. But if Harbin should be taken Russia will have to make great sacrifices.

#### AUGUST 14—27.

A telegram has been received from Petersburg saying that the Tzar does not wish any more concessions to be made. In the hotel the report has already spread of my having asked for the bill and of my giving tips. The correspondents are greatly excited and make enquiries as to the close of the Conference and Witte's departure for New York. I explained that this was only gossip. Evidently Professor Martens really wanted to leave, but was detained by Witte. I think people have ceased to believe in the success of our negotiations. This is spread on our side as well, though I cannot make out by whom. In the evening there will be another consultation between Witte and Takahira.

During the day I went out walking and had a chat with Thomson. He told me that the Japanese were uneasy at the course the negotiations had taken. They were alarmed at sympathy going over to our side, as they had shown their cards by letting it be seen that their real aim in continuing the campaign was not the independence of China and Korea, but selfish designs. Thomson added, that in his opinion, the Japanese were ready to come to any agreement concerning Sakhalin as long as

they receive money, without which Japan cannot get on. He considers that Russia's position is an enviable one just now, as in case of a rupture, everybody will see that Japan is continuing the war only for the sake of money, and not at all from the high-flown motives she brought forward at first. "It is wonderful," said he, "how in three weeks time Mr. Witte has managed to change the whole state of affairs. Now the Japanese try to ingratiate themselves with you, that is evident, but it was not so at first. Even the public opinion in the States is coming over to the side of Russia."

In the evening Takahira and Otchiai came to Witte ; Pokotiloff being already there as interpreter. The Japanese stayed for about an hour. On leaving the room Takahira informed the journalists who had assembled at the door that the next sitting had been put off till Tuesday. Pokotiloff said that Takahira had given as a reason for his request the fourteen hours difference in time between Portsmouth and Tokyo, and had pointed out that in consequence of this no answer had been received up till now. Witte announced that we would make no further concessions, adding that he considered it undignified to put off the decision, when all the world was awaiting the results of the negotiations with such impatience.

AUGUST 15—28.

To-day's papers say that the Japanese have asked to put off the meeting, so as to receive instructions from Tokyo, and that a council of Ministers has been called in the Japanese capital for the purpose of discussing the situation. There is also a rumour of another application of Roosevelt to Tokyo. Thomson says that the papers have been instructed to write to the effect that Russia will be acting unwisely if she declines Japan's last terms. Roosevelt is making his final attempts to ward off a rupture. The report of this has flown round America, and every man vies with his neighbour in making suggestions.

After lunch I went to see Rosen ; he is in a very good temper, and is pleased with the turn the negotiations have taken. He finds that Witte has placed the Japanese in an awkward position, in forcing an acknowledgment from them that they are carrying on the war for the sake of money. I said, that in the event of a rupture Rosen's own position in Washington would become unbearable, as



Roosevelt's *amour propre* would be hurt and his displeasure would, of course, be primarily visited on the Russian Representative, the more so as it is well known that the Baron is against all concessions. Rosen thought for a moment ; he had evidently had the same idea in his mind. "What is to be done?" said he. "Why did Roosevelt interfere in our negotiations? Let him bear the consequences, whatever they may be."

The correspondents of the "Sun" and the "Tribune" both called and made enquiries about the correctness of the information of the Associated Press as to Japan's intentions to make a new offer, concerning the withdrawal of their claim for indemnity, and the purchase of Sakhalin for a sum to be named by arbitrators. I had also the visit of a Japanese correspondent, whose name I have forgotten. He talked for a long time in a monotonous drone on the desirability of peace, on the moderation of the terms offered by Japan, and of the fact that the continuation of the war would only make our position worse, and induce Japan to increase her demands. The Japanese Government, so he said, could make no further concessions, as it ran the risk of going against public opinion, because the people considered the acquisition of Sakhalin and the payment of indemnity as only fair and just. Altogether Japanese journalists have become much more talkative. One of them Fukutomi, confessed that the Japanese had distrusted Witte's sincerity when he said that Russia would not pay an indemnity or cede territory. Now they see that Witte was sincere, and only wanted to know the Japanese terms.

Before dinner Witte and Rosen went for a motor drive, to York Beach, I think it was. This has become a favourite end to Witte's drives, he hides himself there from the journalists, and, it seems to me, even from his own Secretaries.

In the evening we went to the theatre at Portsmouth to see a troupe of negro minstrels. Our expedition was organised by the local Postmaster, a Member of Congress, and by Secretary Solloway, the manager of the Manchester cotton-spinning mill. These gentlemen tried in every way to give us a good time. The performance consisted of the usual nigger buffoonery, together with dancing and singing, with a plentiful sprinkling of American witticisms. Women took no part in the per-

formance, and this made it somewhat tedious in character.

When we returned to the hotel it was fairly late, but everybody was still up. The state of mind of the journalists is most pessimistic ; a rupture is anticipated. We are already being blamed for want of compliance, in consequence of news we are supposed to have received from General Linevitch. Is not a new change of front in favour of Japan setting in? Brianchaninoff says that if the Japanese give up their demands for compensation, and if, in spite of this, we stop the negotiations, we shall rouse public opinion against us. Late in the evening a telegram from Count Lamsdorff was received, containing the following resolution of the Tzar: "Send Witte orders to break off negotiations in any case. I do not wish to await Japan's gracious concessions." This was evidently an answer to Takahira's request to put off the meeting.

In to-day's "Boston Herald" there is another cartoon at our expense. Russia, as usual, is represented as a furious bear, to whose tail a little Jap is hanging on. The inscription reads:—"The Bear: 'Oh! if I could only break away with honour!' The Jap: 'My! if I could only let go with profit!'" The same paper gives the conversation of their correspondent with an important Japanese personage (evidently one of the members of the Conference). When the correspondent asked why Komura had proposed putting off the meeting till Monday, the Japanese gave an indefinite answer, but added that the Russians were evidently dreamers, and it was difficult to negotiate with such. To the correspondent's question as to what the Russians were dreaming of, he answered that they were dreaming of Linevitch winning the next battle, dreaming that if this Conference came to nothing they would be able to conclude peace in some other way and on better terms, dreaming that everybody was on their side or that public opinion had veered round in their favour in the course of the last three weeks, thanks to their campaign in the Press. In Peterhoff the dreams were that public opinion was in favour of war, while Russian public opinion did not exist at all, unless one counted the opinion of the minority. The Tzar, his Counsellors and Plenipotentiaries, believed in the information they got concerning our army. Their bribed agents gave such news as they thought would produce a good impression.

If they could rid themselves of illusions the Conference could conclude a peace—but they could not!

The American papers, at least some of them, view the situation in another light and do not see the necessity for Russia to submit to Japan. They express apprehension that the establishing of Japan's predominance in the Pacific will threaten all the naval Powers, especially the United States. The Americans are interested in the trade of the Far East and in the freedom of navigation in the Pacific. To that effect they acquired Alaska, Havanna, Huam, and the Philippines, established sea ports in the South Pacific, and interfered in Russian policy in Manchuria. Evidently the Americans begin to doubt the expediency of an anti-Russian policy in the Far East. A communication from Tokyo informs us of the convocation of a special council of the "genro" or Elder Statesmen, to deliberate on the Portsmouth conditions. The Japanese army continues to reinforce itself and prepares to recommence war operations. Public opinion is against the division of Sakhalin and demands the annexation of this island to Japan.

AUGUST 16—29.

Witte has already sent an answer to yesterday's telegram on breaking off the negotiations. In his telegram he says that if we break off negotiations in spite of new proposals from the Japanese we shall be accused of a desire to continue the war at all costs; that his duty to his country demands of him to give the new proposals a hearing. Altogether Witte continues to think that peace is more profitable for Russia than war. This belief, it seems to me, has grown still stronger since his conversations with Captain Roussin, who, as it has been mentioned, came from the war and brought anything but reassuring news about our army. The enquiry sent to General Linevitch has also given no positive results. I have not seen Linevitch's telegrams but they evidently contain the customary refrain of "the troops being eager for battle," and that given one more month, and some small reinforcements, the Japanese will be defeated.

When leaving for the Navy Yard I was asked by the journalists about the chances of an agreement. I replied that I was almost sure there would be a rupture.

On our arrival we found the Japanese already awaiting us. Proceedings began with a secret consultation of the Envoys, the Secretaries remained in the adjoining room discussing the situation. Just before this Witte had prepared a telegram announcing the rupture, in full assurance that it was unavoidable. We all felt nervous. Nabokoff, in particular, was low-spirited; he is the most passionate partisan of peace, seeing the complete ruin of our army in a continuation of the war. He keeps on hoping that good sense will take the upper hand and grumbles at the Government.

At about eleven o'clock Witte came out of the Conference Hall. He was flushed and smiling. Standing in the centre of the room he said in an agitated voice: "Well, gentlemen, it is peace! I congratulate you. The Japanese have given in on all points." Unable to restrain my feelings, I went up to him and embraced him. Everybody began to talk at once, congratulating each other. Witte then handed over a telegram for Count Lamsdorff communicating what had taken place. For about ten minutes great excitement prevailed, after which we went into the hall for a general meeting.

The Japanese sat in their places absolutely expressionless as if nothing had happened. Komura opened the meeting with the announcement that as yet they had not received an answer to the proposal they had made on August 23rd. Then Witte read a responsive note, containing a refusal to buy back the northern half of Sakhalin:—

*Communication made by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia in the Sitting of 29th August, 1905.*

La notice présentée par les Plénipotentiaires du Japon à la Séance du 23 Août et formulant en quatre points la proposition de restaurer à la Russie la partie nord de Sakhaline moyennant une somme de 1,200,000,000 yens—a fait l'objet de la plus sérieuse considération de la part du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

En réponse à cette notice les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont l'honneur d'informer les Plénipotentiaires du Japon que le versement de toute somme excepté celle pour l'entretien des prisonniers de guerre étant contraire à l'une des principales bases exposées par la Russie lors de l'ouverture des négociations, le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie se voit dans l'impossibilité de consentir à la proposition précitée.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont également présenté à la Conférence des raisons très sérieuses pour démontrer l'importance pour la Russie de la possession de toute l'île de Sakhaline.

Toutefois Sa Majesté l'Empereur, afin de donner un nouveau témoignage de son sincère désir de contribuer au rétablissement



de la paix en Extrême Orient, consent à céder au Japon la partie sud de l'île de Sakhaline, à condition que la partie nord reste en la possession de la Russie, sans aucune compensation. Il est bien entendu que la Japon devra dans ce cas garantir la liberté de navigation dans le détroit de Lapérouse et s'engager à ne prendre aucune mesure militaire dans la partie de Sakhaline occupée par lui.

En présentant ce projet à la considération des Plénipotentiaires du Japon, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont l'honneur de déclarer, sur l'ordre de leur Auguste Maître, que ce projet forme la dernière concession que la Russie puisse faire dans le but unique d'arriver à une entente.

Absolute silence reigned for a few seconds. Witte, as usual, kept tearing up the paper that was lying beside him. Rosen smoked his cigarette. The Japanese continued to be enigmatic. At last Komura, in a well-controlled voice, said that the Japanese Government, having for its aim the restoration of peace and the bringing of the negotiations to a successful conclusion, expressed its consent to Russia's proposal to divide Sakhalin in two, without indemnity being paid. Witte calmly replied that the Japanese proposal was accepted and that the line of demarcation on Sakhalin would be reckoned the fiftieth degree.

This was the decisive moment of the negotiations. Although I had been told the day before of the intention of our opponents to forego compensation, still there were few who believed in it, and evidently the yielding of the Japanese was unexpected by all. The least astonished seemed to be Baron Rosen, because he considered that the Japanese would have to give in. Anyhow, after this announcement had been made, one experienced a feeling of relief. We began to discuss secondary questions, concerning the armistice, the evacuation of prisoners, the concluding of a commercial treaty, and so forth. Witte proposed that in future, when these questions were being worked out further, our Delegates, who had been excluded until now, should take part in the session. Komura agreed to this, evidently with reluctance, announcing that he, too, would summon his Delegates. At the same time he handed to Witte the draft of the protocol for the evacuation of Russian and Japanese troops, evidently prepared in advance.\* This

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\*The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, in execution of the provisions of article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, signed this day, have agreed upon the following additional article: Japan and Russia mutually engage completely and

memorable sitting closed about noon. The Japanese withdrew and we remained brooding over the result.

Then Witte cabled the following message to the Tzar: "I have the honour to report to Your Majesty that Japan has accepted Your demands concerning the conditions of peace. Consequently peace will be restored thanks to Your wise and firm decisions and in strict conformity with the instructions of Your Majesty. Russia will remain in the Far East a great Power as she hitherto has been, and will remain for ever. To accomplish your orders we have applied all our intelligence and our Russian hearts. We beg Your Majesty mercifully to forgive us if we have not succeeded in accomplishing more. Witte, Rosen." Finishing up the telegram, and trying to find a suitable ending, he turned to Rosen, who was standing by him, and to us all with the words: "A courtier would compose this better. I don't know how to do it. Look and see how it reads, Baron!" Rosen read it and approved.

In the interval Witte gave me a telegram to be sent immediately. The telegram was addressed: "Ernst Berlin." Only much later, during our visit to Germany,

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simultaneously to withdraw their military forces from Manchuria and its neighbourhood in three periods, as follows:—

1st period.—The withdrawals shall begin within ten days after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and be completed within four months.

The Japanese forces in Manchuria are to be withdrawn within a line connecting Hsinmintin, Moukden, Fushun, Hseng-King, Hwai-jen and Chosan, and the Japanese forces on the Russo-Korean frontier are to be withdrawn to the right bank of the river Tumen.

The Russian forces in Manchuria are to be withdrawn within a line connecting Petuna, Taolaichao, Shanhotun, Omoso and Hunchun, and the Russian forces on the Russo-Korean frontier are to be withdrawn to the left bank of the river Tumen.

2nd period.—The withdrawals shall be completed within four months from the expiration of the first period.

The Japanese forces are to be withdrawn within a line connecting Niu-cha-tun, Ta-shih-kiao, Hsin-yen, Feng-hwang-cheng and the mouth of the Anping river (Anping-ho).

The Russian forces are to be withdrawn within a line connecting Hu-lar-chi, Tsi-tsi-kar, Mergen and Aihun.

3rd period.—The withdrawals shall be completed within two months from the expiration of the second period.

The Japanese forces are to be withdrawn within the leased territory of Liaotung and the frontier of Korea. The Russian forces are to be withdrawn within Russian territory.

The foregoing additional article shall be considered as ratified with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

I discovered that Ernst was the name of the well-known German banker, Mendelsohn.

After the departure of our chiefs I communicated to the press by telephone the news of the agreement. The person at the telephone did not hear my words distinctly, or did not take them in, as he asked me to repeat them. Then I shouted: "Peace!" and in answer heard a confused roar of voices. It seems my communication made a tremendous impression among the people in the hall and the drawing room, who accepted the news with shouts and enthusiastic cheers.

When Witte and Rosen drove up to the hotel they were met at the door by all the visitors and the journalists. Everybody rushed forward trying to shake Witte's hands and to congratulate him. He stopped for a moment, and in answer to all the questions said: "It is peace; we have come to an agreement. The demand for contribution has been withdrawn by Japan. Sakhalin is to be divided." After which, not staying any longer, he escaped upstairs.

All of us who remained at the Navy Yard sat down to lunch as usual, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries and Peirce occupying a small table by themselves. The chief topic of conversation was naturally the forthcoming peace and how this would be received in Petersburg. I thought that it would not meet with a favourable reception. The Court and Government do not like Witte, and the Russian public does not appreciate the real political situation, and therefore is unable to value the success which he has attained. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, will take the news indifferently, and more likely still, not very kindly, partly because Witte is not a diplomat by profession.

While we were still at table I was rung up on the telephone from the hotel. Batcheff, who was speaking, delivered an instruction from Witte to add to the telegram to His Majesty after the signature "Serge Witte" the words: "Your Majesty's faithful subject and servant." I found it a very piquant afterthought, and naturally made the required addenda. Witte apparently thinks that if these words are omitted His Majesty will think him disrespectful.

There was also an exchange of telegrams with Roosevelt. Our telegram to the President was worded thus: "We have the honour to inform you that we have reached

an agreement with the Plenipotentiaries of Japan. To you History will award the glory of having taken the generous initiative in bringing about this Conference, whose labours will now probably result in establishing a peace honourable to both sides. Witte, Rosen." The President answered as follows: "I cannot too strongly express my congratulations to you and to the civilised world upon the agreement reached between you and the Plenipotentiaries of Japan, and upon the fact that hereby a peace has been secured just and honourable to both sides. Theodore Roosevelt."

After lunch I took a walk with Prince Kudasheff about the Navy Yard and the surrounding park. We watched the soldiers and sailors playing base-ball on a large green. They behave like gentlemen, despite the excitement of the game, we heard not one rude word or swearing. Yes, this race is evidently different from ours.

The sitting reopened in the presence of all our Delegates. The Japanese remained as they were before. Komura presented a project of agreement on the exchange of prisoners, and proposed the conclusion of a new commercial treaty. The Japanese insisted on a Consulate being established in Vladivostock instead of the Commercial Agent who had been there hitherto. The ratification of the future treaty and the manner of exchange of ratifications were also discussed, and it was determined to lay this task on the American Representative in Petersburg and the French in Tokyo. It was further decided at Witte's suggestion, to commit the working out and editing of the articles to Martens and Denison. The debate was carried on mostly by Komura, Witte, and Rosen; Martens also took a part in the discussion. We separated late, very tired, but for all that, satisfied.

To-day, I dined at the Peirce's, together with some of my colleagues, and some charming Portsmouth ladies. On my return from Peirce's I found all the journalists in the lower drawing room, where they had assembled to congratulate Witte and to thank him for being on such kindly terms with them. When Witte and Rosen appeared, they were met with applause. The Baron stepped forward and announced that as Mr. Witte did not speak English, he wished to say a few words for him. In a speech of considerable length which the Baron delivered (composed doubtless with the assistance of our constant collaborator, Dr. Dillon), he thanked the journalists for their co-operation in securing peace, and asked to be



excused if in the hurry of his work he had not always accorded them due attention. The speech was met with genuine enthusiasm and loud cheers. Witte went the round of all the journalists, shaking hands and talking with some of them.

To celebrate peace the hotel people have arranged a dance and a cinema show with scenes from the Portsmouth Conference. Witte appeared for a few minutes in the ballroom, and received a great ovation. The Russians are treated as the heroes of the day; we are no more an object of pity. Our American friends explain that they had from the beginning preferred us to the Japs, that it was simply a question of decorum. What could they have in common with the yellow race? All their sympathies were with the Russians!

Many of us assembled at the bar, where some friends were drinking toasts to the welfare of Russia and of the United States. Governor MacLane, who was, perhaps, a little too lively, treated us to champagne, and talked of his love for Russia. A party of correspondents were toasting Brianchaninoff and Suvorin; these two are specially popular among the young men, thanks to their knowledge of English and their love of sport. There were speeches, singing, and all sorts of fun, and "He's a jolly good fellow" for everybody. The Japanese were not to be seen—they had discreetly vanished from the battlefield, allowing us to have the honour of the day.

The evening papers give headlines about peace, printed in large type; portraits of Roosevelt, and of all the other members of the Conference. Witte is praised for the great diplomatic success he has achieved, one altogether exceptional under the circumstances, which were highly unfavourable for Russia. They say that the news of peace was a totally unexpected event for all. The "Sun" gives the following account of how the news was received at the Wentworth. "The inhabitants of the hotel and a crowd of journalists were awaiting news, assembled in the lower hall of the hotel. The telephone boy came up to one of the correspondents, and told him that Mr. Korostovetz was telephoning from the Navy Yard. There was a rush of correspondents from every direction; they piled up arms over shoulders around the telephone. 'Hallo!' said the man at the telephone. 'Yes, this is peace. Yes, the other correspondents are here, Mr. Korostovetz. I will repeat to them, let her go.' We had waited so often for an important statement and

heard so often a formal parry that there was no excitement in the crowd, only an anxiety to hear and get it straight. 'Yes, we're ready,' said the man at the telephone. 'In the session of Aug. 29th, the Conference—What?' The question came as sharp and sudden as the crack of a whip. His tone sent a thrill through seconds of absolute silence, before he went on repeating, in a voice that shook a little: 'The Conference arrived at a complete accord on all questions. It has been decided to proceed to an elaboration of the treaty of peace. The Conference adjourned until three o'clock this afternoon.' The telephone receiver dropped from his hand, the thud brought the group of correspondents back to their senses. There arose a murmur—many voices saying over and over almost under their breaths: 'Peace! Peace!' and for fully ten seconds no one moved."

The papers give a telegram from Peking stating that China is sending abroad a special mission to study the political organisation of Foreign States with a view of proclaiming a constitution in twelve years, that is in 1917. That is a momentous result of our war.

#### AUGUST 17—30.

The papers are full of descriptions of our last meeting. Most of them praise the President, the genius of Witte, and the magnanimity of the Japanese. It is said that Komura was forced to agree by an order from Tokyo, the chief mover being Baron Kaneko, acting as agent of Marquis Ito. Komura, Takahira, and, in fact, all the members of the Japanese mission are supposed to have stood out for breaking off the negotiations.

According to some papers a decisive role in bringing the agreement to a close has been played by Baron Kaneko, who at the last moment applied through Prince Ito to the Mikado advising to forego the indemnity. I have already said that Kaneko influenced negotiations though remaining aloof. This is, by the way, what he said to the journalists: "Japan has achieved a victory far greater than war. For this victory credit is due to the President of the United States and to the Representatives of the Mikado, who worked so hard at Portsmouth. I, myself, do not claim any credit nor do I want any, for I have taken no active part in the negotiations. We decided to waive the indemnity, and I will endeavour to explain the reason of this. The Japanese race is imbued

with the spirit of Bushido and the honour of the Samurai. The honour of our country, individual and national, is far greater to us than money. In the minds of the Sons of Nippon, nurtured on the spirit of Samurai, money is an indifferent matter. Honour is of far greater importance, and the fact that by this struggle with Russia my country has been able to take its seat in the college of the nations of the world is something that is beyond the purchasing power of money. In our strategy and tactics, in the equipment of our army and navy, we have won fruit of our victory. Russia has asked for peace with honour. We have contested for peace with justice. Both have been obtained, and we regard humanity, civilization and the peace of the world as of far greater value than money."

To-day's number of the "New York Herald" is dedicated to the war, peace, Russia and Japan. On the first page is the Angel of Peace with a laurel branch, portraits of the Tzar, the Mikado, the Plenipotentiaries and the picture of the Conference Hall. There are also the portraits of our Grand Dukes and of the Japanese Statesmen, Prince Ito, Counts Inuye and Matsukata and Marquis Yamagata. Then come portraits of the Generals and Admirals, both Russian and Japanese: Linevitch, Kuropatkin, Kaulbars, Mishchenko, Grippenbergh, Rennenkampf, Stackelberg, Admirals Rojdestvensky, Makaroff, Wietgeft, Felkersam, Enkwist, Marshal Oyama, Generals Nogi, Kuroki, Kodama, Kavamura, Oku, Nodsu, Admirals Togo, Kamimura, Kataoka, Uriu and Deva. The newspapers discuss the question of where and how the treaty will be signed, whether at Oyster Bay, at the President's estate Sagamore Hill, or at Washington.

There came a telegram from Petersburg, saying that the Tzar will not ratify the treaty till he knows the amount of reimbursement to be paid for the maintenance of the prisoners of war. But there is no word of congratulation. Witte is nervous and evidently troubled by the question of how the news of peace has been received in Russia.

In the morning I was asked to see some gentlemen who said they wanted to be presented to Witte. They were members of the Municipal Council of Manchester, Messrs. Jones, Clarke, Floyd and Felton. Witte received them very amiably, made enquiries about the cotton-spinning mill, the turnover, and the number of hands employed. The delegates explained that there were 16,000 hands at

work, that this was the biggest cotton-spinning mill, and pressed Witte to visit Manchester. They said that they greatly admired Witte's conduct of the negotiations and his statesmanship, and that if he had been a citizen of the United States they would probably have elected him President.

After luncheon some of our Delegates went off to the Navy Yard for a consultation with Denison and the Japanese concerning the treaty. Pokotiloff, whom I saw after the meeting, told me that they had looked through, and worded the four first articles, that the Japanese were very unyielding and formal and admitted of no change in the wording of the protocols of the meetings. The latter, in Pokotiloff's opinion, were worded not quite favourably for us. He likewise complained of Martens paying most attention to form, in consequence of which much time was lost through empty disputes. He added that the Japanese acted very systematically and with great foresight and were altogether well prepared for their task. With us, it is done in a more lenient manner.

To-day some of our party invited Postmaster Bartlett, his friend Topping, and their wives to dinner, as a return civility for their invitation to the theatre. It was a very gay congregation, and our guests seemed much pleased by the attention we had shown them. After dinner, I introduced the Postmaster to Witte, and the usual exchange of trivial civilities followed. Topping also told Witte, that if he were to stay in the United States, he would certainly be chosen as President. Altogether the Americans were delighted with their reception. The affair did not end here, however. Hardly had I got down stairs into the drawing-room when my old acquaintance the Rector Brine of Christ Church came and reminded me of his wish to see Witte. When introduced he began offering his church for the service of thanksgiving on the conclusion of peace, saying that he was willing to communicate on this subject with Khotovitsky, the Head Priest of our church in New York. Witte explained it would be better to put it off for several days.

After my talk with Brine I went into the hall to have a look at the dancing. No sooner had I entered the ball-room when one of the girls, as it turned out a Miss Selma Pilsen, came to me and said she wanted to shake hands with Witte because she had been the first to cheer when the news of peace came to the hotel. "You must arrange this, as I return to Washington to-morrow," she re-



marked. I admitted that the grounds for such an introduction were really very serious, and took her upstairs. Coming into Witte's room, I found him in anything but a good temper, probably after his conversation with the Postmaster and the Rector. Hearing that a young lady was waiting at the door he cheered up and agreed to receive her. Miss Pilsen announced that she regretted very much not being able to speak French, that she was immeasurably glad to see Witte and speak to him, it had been her wish from the time she came to the hotel. Then she congratulated him on the conclusion of peace. Witte asked her where her parents lived and how many there were of the family. She replied that they were natives of Richmond (Virginia), that they lived in Washington and were spending the summer at Portsmouth. She added that she enjoyed herself playing tennis, dancing, boating, and riding. She was to go to Europe next year and was learning French. On Witte's enquiring whether she was afraid of sea-sickness she said that she was ready to suffer to see Paris. The conversation was carried on in a jesting tone and visibly restored Witte's good temper. And this was not all. In coming downstairs many fair young ladies assailed me, and I had to escort two more to Witte's stronghold.

#### AUGUST 18—31.

Up till now there has been no communication received either from the Tzar or from Lamsdorff, although almost three days have passed since our agreement. The journalists keep coming every minute to enquire if a telegram has been received from the Tzar, and if he can refuse to confirm the pact and continue the war. They likewise tell me that, according to information, the news of peace has been met with indifference and even with disapproval in the higher spheres in Petersburg. To make up for this, Witte has received many letters from European Statesmen. There are telegrams from the Grand Dukes Paul and Michael Alexandrovitch and Nicholai Mikhailovitch, from the Empress Marie Feodorovna, from Count Solsky, Durnovo, and Nelidoff. The papers are full of praise of Roosevelt and say that he has received telegrams of congratulation from King Edward, and a number of European and American Statesmen, but none from either the Tzar or the Mikado. Attention is also drawn to the fact that as yet nothing

has been heard of an armistice and that the Commanders of the armies have received no instructions.

At last a telegram came from Lamsdorff. He said that the suddenness of the news struck everybody dumb, but that he hoped that later on all will understand and value the importance of the event. This telegram, in spite of its stiffness, has restored Witte's equanimity. The evening papers give the Tzar's telegram to the President, in which he thanks him for his co-operation in bringing about peace.

The people are leaving the hotel. Half of the American journalists left to-day. Some of them came to bid me good-bye, and to thank me for my amiability and the good terms I had been on with them. There is a renewed eagerness for Witte's and Rosen's autographs. In the corridors one keeps meeting ladies and gentlemen, holding groups of the Conference and fountain pens. Everybody begs for Witte's signature, even the waiters and the chambermaids.

Before dinner I saw Maurice Low, the correspondent of the London "Morning Post," whose name I mentioned among those who had foretold peace. He asked whether it was possible for the treaty not to be ratified, and why had Witte up till now received no news from the Tzar, although the latter had telegraphed to Roosevelt. He said this fact astonished the Americans very much; they considered that Witte's services to Russia had been great and deserved acknowledgment on the part of the Monarch and of Russian society.

In the evening we went to Portsmouth to a garden party at Dr. Heffinger's, an old resident of this place. The young people danced, some of them sat about the garden and flirted, everywhere there was genuine gaiety and simplicity. I especially liked the terms that existed between the young men and the girls—much freedom of manner and familiarity, perhaps even too much. Our host is a native of Virginia, but has lived long in New Hampshire. He praises Portsmouth, the patriarchal state of things here, and the simplicity of the local society. "Here in New England live the old well-born descendants of the first English settlers," said he. "We have no upstart millionaires who have made their money by speculation and gambling, such as they have in Chicago, New York, and Buffalo, but for that, we have people with traditions here, all of good descent."

In to-day's "Boston Herald" there is a caricature of Witte signing the Portsmouth Treaty with these words: "No Indemnity." Behind him stands a little Komura looking confused. A lean Yankee is standing before Witte and pointing to the Treaty. Underneath is the inscription: "Uncle Sam: 'The pen's mightier than the sword, Serge—eh?'"

In the "Boston Herald" Roosevelt is represented hiding armour away in a closet. At his feet is the dove of peace.

The papers speak of the President's intention to convene a second Hague Conference. Altogether Roosevelt's popularity has increased owing to the peace. The satisfaction with which the Americans publish the telegrams of congratulation sent to the President by the European Monarchs, on peace being concluded, is evident. The first place is given to the telegram from the King of England, sent from Marienbad. Then follow the telegrams from the German Emperor, Emile Loubet and a whole list of Ambassadors, Bishops, Cardinals, and eminent persons. For some reason or other the vanity of the Americans is specially flattered by Kaiser Wilhelm's telegram, which is worded in exceptionally enthusiastic terms. The only ones wanting are those from the Tzar and the Mikado.

The Petersburg correspondent of "The Sun" informs us that official circles are displeased with the peace. In Russia they did not expect that the Japanese would yield and the military party reckoned on the continuation of war. The reactionaries speak of revenge and of the necessity to divert the nation from revolution, even with a new war. But the majority is glad and will welcome the peace, comparatively easily obtained. Just before the reception of the news of peace our Foreign Office made a communication about the impossibility of an agreement on the question of Sakhalin by means of arbitration. The Russian newspapers do not display special enthusiasm, and even blame President Roosevelt and the American people, who have offended Russian feelings, not having appreciated our strength and not trusting in Russia's victory. The newspaper "Rouss" expresses satisfaction that we avoided a diplomatic defeat. In the evening we received the consent of the Russian and Japanese Governments to an armistice.

## AUGUST 19—SEPTEMBER 1.

To-day the Plenipotentiaries have signed the Protocol for the Armistice. The Japanese insisted on the armistice only coming into force after the final signing of the Treaty. The journalists look on it as a disquieting omen, because it seems as if the Japanese expect a rupture on our side on account of Sakhalin. Telegrams have been sent to Roosevelt and to Count Lamsdorff concerning the Japanese wish.

Peirce discussed with Witte and Rosen the details of the final sitting for the signature of the Treaty. That will be followed by a visit to the President. They expect to sign on Tuesday, at the Navy Yard, if there is no hitch.

In the evening our Delegates assembled in Witte's room to discuss the question of Sakhalin and the evacuation of Manchuria. It was decided to stand out for our rights to have the northern part of the island fortified. A little later Komura, Takahira and Adatci made their appearance. The discussion went on until midnight, the Japanese being rather unyielding. A mutual guarantee was accepted not to have armed forces on the island and to leave the Laperouse and Tartary Straits free for navigation.

According to telegrams from Tokyo the Japanese papers are against the division of Sakhalin. The "Hoshi" goes even farther and says that the continuation of the Conference is contrary to the honour and interests of the country. The "Asahi" also advises the breaking off of the negotiations on account of Russia's unwise stubbornness. The "Nishi Nishi" says that an unsatisfactory peace will create a menace to Japanese interests in the future and insists on an indemnity, and in case of refusal, prefers a rupture and the continuation of the war. A telegram from Petersburg reports a successful encounter between a Russian and a Japanese detachment near Lidziapudze. Our War Department is dissatisfied with the peace, as they are sure that future military operations would be successful for us.

## AUGUST 20—SEPTEMBER 2.

A rainy day. There were several consultations between the Japanese and us in the hotel, always about Sakhalin, disarmament, the rights of subjects and so



forth. Witte is very gloomy, in spite of the telegram of thanks which he received from the Tzar yesterday.

A warmly-worded telegram has been received from the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovitch. I think he is one of the few of our higher authorities who understands Witte's work. A message of congratulation has likewise been received from General Batianoff from Manchuria, and one from Lamsdorff, explaining that he had not expressed dissatisfaction with the Treaty to anybody at all, as the papers said he had. The American newspapers continue to make guesses on the course the negotiations are taking, they say the Tzar is displeased and does not acknowledge Witte's services.

In the evening a wire came from the Minister of the Navy, with the proposal of a fresh political combination; in fact, with the draft of a new Treaty. Admiral Birileff finds that it is absolutely necessary to get the Japanese to give up Port Shestakoff in Korea, in exchange for our having given up half of Sakhalin. It seems to me that it is rather late in the day to bring forward such an important proposal. It should have been done earlier. Witte answered at once that, though this condition seemed tempting, he considered it now impossible of attainment by means of an understanding. A message was also received from the Minister of War, who does not agree to the conditions of evacuation proposed by the Japanese. It is too late for this also. The conditions have been accepted by both sides. It is evident that in Petersburg they are only now beginning to understand and weigh the terms of the forthcoming pact. What would it have been if Witte, instead of taking on himself the responsibility of deciding the question of admissible terms, had applied for instructions to Petersburg. However, I think that our Government cannot put any spokes in the wheel now, the Treaty is already worded, to-morrow, the 21st of August, is appointed for collation of the texts, and then it must be signed.

Some of the journalists asked me to show them the draft of the Treaty. They think it would be desirable to publish it, because that would bind down both Governments and a rupture would become impossible. The most insistent were Low, Thomson and Cortesi, who stated that they already had the text, but would like to verify the order of the clauses. I told them jestingly

that I was not to be bribed, and asked them why they did not go for what they wanted to the Japanese. They have evidently already tried that.

The papers continue to discuss the Russo-Japanese negotiations. In to-day's "New York Times" there are some good cartoons. One of them represents Roosevelt, who holds on his outstretched palms the Tzar and the Mikado, who embrace each other. At both sides Linevitch and Oyama are sheathing their swords and going away in disgust.

#### AUGUST 21—SEPTEMBER 3.

It has been pouring since early morning and it is decidedly cool. To-day's papers revert to the former reports concerning the possibility of the Treaty not being confirmed. These were called forth by an announcement said to have been made by Lamsdorff on the inadmissibility of the terms and on the mutual dissatisfaction both sides.

Our Delegates and the Japanese assembled in Marten's room to read over and verify the text. By about seven o'clock all was finished. The original text of the Treaty is in French.

My colleague, Shipoff, has made up his mind to go to the Niagara Falls and then to New York, so as not to be present at the signing of the Treaty, because he says it is a disgrace to Russia. He thought that we were taking a too great responsibility on ourselves. Altogether, he wants to show that he disagrees with the peace terms. From the very beginning of the negotiations he said we would not come to an understanding.

The Secretaries on both sides are in a hurry to finish the copies of the Treaty; they work feverishly, as if afraid that difficulties may arise. This thought is kept up owing to a wire from Petersburg, stating that in view of possible incidents mentioned in Witte's own telegram it is desirable "not to hurry with the signing." We suspect that in Petersburg they have not yet come to an understanding, and that some people (as is also asserted by the papers) are against the agreement. It seems that in Japan they are also dissatisfied with the Treaty and that there have even been riots in Tokyo.

Now that the Peace Treaty has to be signed, the Americans, at least the papers, begin to express less satisfaction about the victory of Japan and the downfall

of Russia. They prophesy the excessive growth of the military and economic power of Japan, who can threaten in the future the interests of the United States in the Pacific. Japan, according to their opinion, will direct all her efforts to the conquest of new markets. Special attention is given to the future of the Hawaii Islands, where the native population is dying out, while the immigration of the Japanese, who are gradually acquiring agricultural and industrial interests, is rapidly increasing.

AUGUST 22--SEPTEMBER 4.

It continues raining. The number of visitors at the hotel keeps diminishing. In the morning we received news from Petersburg about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We knew it already. The papers publish a telegram from the Mikado to Roosevelt, which had been detained.

In the afternoon we had the visit of Mr. Young, the Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Chelsea near Boston, who came to the hotel with his curate and asked to see Witte. He had a letter of introduction from our Consul Lodizhensky. The latter is a great student in religious questions. I acted as interpreter during Witte's conversation with these gentlemen. Mr. Young expressed his satisfaction in making the acquaintance of such a prominent Statesman, adding that he had long taken an interest in Orthodoxy, which he looked on as akin to Anglicanism in its essence. He said that he hoped Witte could by his personal influence help to bring together these two Churches, which are so close to each other spiritually. Witte replied that many sensible people in Russia had long dreamed of such a union, that the question had been taken up as long ago as the 'fifties by the noted Slavist, Khomiakoff, and had been worked out fundamentally in literature. In his opinion, the necessity for such drawing together must arise in the consciousness of the people themselves; it was not to be attained by official means. The centre of Anglicanism is England, and it is well known that the English are not fond of the Russians. Politically, also, the two nations are divided, and political separation influences religious beliefs. The Bishop agreed with these arguments, but insisted on the fact that the feeling of Americans was different and that they were on quite other terms with the Russians.

Just before dinner, the Head Priest of our Church, the Reverend Khotovitsky, arrived from New York, by the invitation of pastor Brine of Christ Church. A deacon and seven Russian priests had come with him, summoned from different towns, one coming from Cleveland 600 miles from Portsmouth. To-morrow's Peace service was arranged after a talk with Witte. Besides, Baroness Rosen and her daughter likewise arrived, together with a friend of theirs, Mr. Charles Crane, who were going to attend the ceremony. A deputation of newspaper men applied to me with a request to be admitted into the Navy Yard for the signing of the Treaty. I took them to Rosen, who flatly refused, explaining that he, as well as the Japanese, found it impossible to grant such a request. "It is not a show," said the Baron, "but a most important State function, and we have decided to let no one into the hall."

#### AUGUST 23—SEPTEMBER 5.

To-day has been arranged for signing the Treaty, but will it take place or not? We are all in a state of nervous expectation. The rain poured down all night and is continuing to do so now. Contrary to all surmises of orders from Russia not to sign the Treaty or to put it off, we got a telegram from Count Lamsdorff showing that in Petersburg they are mostly bent on formalities. The Count expresses regret that in the article on Sakhalin it is said that the southern part is given up "*à perpétuité et en pleine souveraineté*," i.e. in perpetual cession and in full sovereignty, and says that such a wording will produce an unfavourable impression in Russia. Witte answered that he had objected to this wording, but that the Japanese had not wanted to give in, pleading that it was the form used in other analogous treaties.

About 10 a.m. I called on Witte to ask his instructions for the coming event. He seemed calmer than during the last days. A little later I introduced the midshipmen who were in command of the cutters that took us to the Navy Yard. Witte asked them some trivial questions concerning their service and thanked them for their amiability. They belong to the battleships "Alabama," "Kentucky," and "Missouri."

About, noon, after the signature of the Protocols of



the last meeting, for which purpose all assembled in Komura's room, we made our last preparations to go to the Navy Yard. I was entrusted with a leather portfolio, which was to hold the Treaty, which had been provided by the State Department. A similar portfolio was given to the Japanese.

About two o'clock the rain stopped and the weather began to clear up. Almost all the inhabitants of the hotel had turned up to see the Delegates depart. Among the few official personages admitted into the Conference hall were Admiral Meade, Chief of the Navy Yard, the Commander of the "May Flower," Winslow, and John Gibbons, Commander of the Cruiser "Dolphin." Our friend Peirce, Governor MacLane and his Secretary were also present. A group of journalists assembled before the building with their cameras. The Embassy people, viz., Hansen, Kudasheff, Butakoff, and Raspopoff, were also there, with Captain Borovsky, who had arrived from Port Arthur. He was in command of the torpedo boat "Statny" which broke through the enemy's lines at Chefoo before the fortress surrendered. Professor Martens did not go, feeling huffy.

A detachment of marines in full uniform were standing at the entrance in the Navy Yard. When Witte and Rosen drove up, the soldiers presented arms and there was a flourish of trumpets. At the door they were met by Peirce and Admiral Meade. The Japanese were late, so that some of us began to wonder if anything had happened, and if there had been some fresh instructions received from Tokyo. When their motor cars appeared, everybody breathed a sigh of relief. They were met with the same honours as our Envoys.

Meanwhile we had assembled in the Conference hall. Several dozen penholders, boxes of pens and sealing-wax were on the table. All this stationery had been given by different firms desirous of advertising their goods. Peirce told us that the furniture and fittings of the place were already disposed of at a high price to different private collectioners. The two armchairs used by Witte and Rosen had been bought by the President.

The people crowded into the Conference hall. Witte nervously walked from the hall into the Secretaries' room and back again, urging the Secretaries to hasten with the collation of the texts of the Treaty. He seemed impatient to finish the whole thing. Finally, the docu-

ments were read, and at a quarter to four the Japanese entered the hall.

After an exchange of greetings, Takahira and Komura took their customary places, inviting Denison and the Chief of the Political Department, Yamaza, to sit next them. The Military and Naval Attachés, the Secretaries and others on the staff, remained standing behind. Witte took a seat and invited us to sit near him. Some did so, but the greater part remained on their feet. Witte was the first to sign; he used a pen belonging to Doctor Dillon, Rosen followed, then Komura, who took one of the pens lying on the table. He took a new pen every time he signed his name; Takahira took a pen out of his own pocket. Sato presented the Japanese copies of the Treaty for signature. There were four copies altogether, in French and English. Each of the Plenipotentiaries signed his name twelve times: four times on the Treaty, four on the supplementary articles, and four on the last Protocol.

At the beginning of the signatures the guns boomed. At the same time the whistles went off at the factories, and the church bells were rung at Kitterey. Then Baron Rosen got up and pronounced the following words:—

“On behalf of the first Plenipotentiary of Russia and of myself I beg to say a few words. We have just now signed an Act, which will for ever have a place in the annals of history. It is not for us, active participants in the conclusion of this Treaty, to pass judgment on its importance and significance. As negotiators both on behalf of the Empire of Russia and of the Empire of Japan, we may say with a tranquil conscience that we have done all that was in our power in order to bring about the peace for which the whole civilised world was longing. As Plenipotentiaries of Russia we fulfil a most agreeable duty in acknowledging that in negotiating with our hitherto adversaries, and from this hour, friends, we have been dealing with true and thorough gentlemen, to whom we are happy to express our high esteem and personal regard. We earnestly hope that henceforth friendly relations between both Empires will be firmly established, and we trust that His Excellency Baron Komura, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the leading Statesmen of his country, will apply to the strengthening of these relations the wide experience and wise statesmanship, which he has

so conspicuously displayed during these negotiations, which have now been so auspiciously concluded."

The Baron made this speech in a firm, distinct voice; then he stretched out his hand across the table to Baron Komura and to Takahira, and added: "I shake the hand of an old friend." Komura smiled and bowed. His example was followed by Witte.

Then Komura rose, and in rather a dull voice, spoke as follows:—

"I entirely share the views of Baron Rosen. The Treaty of Peace just signed is in the interest of humanity and civilisation, and I am happy to believe that it will bring about a firm, lasting peace between two neighbouring Empires. I must add that it will always be pleasant for me to recall that, throughout the long and serious negotiations which we have now left behind, my colleagues and myself have invariably received from the Russian Plenipotentiaries the highest courtesy and consideration. I beg to assure their Excellencies, the Russian Plenipotentiaries, that it would be my duty as well as my pleasure to do everything in my power to make the Treaty in fact what it professes to be in word—a Treaty of Peace and Amity." Having come to the end, Komura also shook hands with our Envoys.

This finished the official part of the ceremony, and Witte asked Komura in French whether he meant to stay in Portsmouth much longer. The latter replied that he was starting for Boston the same evening and would stay the day there; he is a Harvard man, and wants to visit his Alma Mater, and then spend a few days in New York. Having exchanged a few words without the help of an interpreter, this time to our utter amazement Komura addressed him in French, both the Plenipotentiaries retired into the adjoining room. Those who remained in the hall broke up into groups, the majority crowding round the table where the Secretaries were affixing the seals. The Russians and Japanese divided amongst themselves all the writing materials that had been in use, penholders, sealing-wax, pencils—everything there was, in memory of the signing of the Treaty. One of the Japanese Attachés took the large inkstand, causing a general uproar of laughter.

After some minutes' conversation Witte and Komura returned to the Conference room and then, at Peirce's invitation, we all went to partake of a cold collation that

had been served. Champagne was handed round, and an official toast was drunk to the President and the Monarchs. During all the proceedings the Japanese wore a concentrated and bland air. Our party was far more at ease and more expansive. I went up to Baron Komura and congratulated him on peace being concluded. "I am convinced," said he, "that I shall be blamed by many people in Japan, but one cannot please every one; you, too, will have many discontented people in Russia. But the psychology of the masses does not count with the difficulties of the situation. Our task was an ungrateful one. However, we have done our duty."

From the Navy Yard, all of us, with the exception of the Japanese, went off to Portsmouth to Christ Church. The weather had become quite fine by now. We drove swiftly along the streets of Kitterey and Portsmouth. The houses were decorated with flags and everybody greeted us. But how different from the day of our arrival. We were then morally depressed, and felt the brunt of a great responsibility, and were almost without hope for a favourable result. Now this weight has been relieved, and this owing to the talents and patriotism of one man. Near the church a gaily dressed crowd met Witte with applause and fluttering of handkerchiefs. When we came into church everybody got up from their places and we were taken up to the front rows. The church, adorned with flowers, was packed. There were the Roman Catholic Bishop Potter, who had come specially from New York, Bishop Niles, and the Anglican and Russian priests. There were altogether thirty of the clergy present, all dressed in festal robes. Witte and Rosen sat in the front pew, next to them sat Baroness Rosen and her daughter.

The unusual character of the service, coming just after an event of such exceptional importance, and the solemnity of the surroundings, all had a visible effect on everybody.

Divine service began by strains from the organ. Then a procession of all the clergy came from the altar and walked round the church led by the Rector, accompanied by curates and choristers carrying censers, banners and crosses, then our Russian priests, and last of all the Catholic clergy.

After the Protestant service, at which a psalm was sung to the tune of our National Anthem, the Anglican and Catholic clergy took their stand at both sides of the altar and our Russian memorial service for the dead began,



followed by the *Te Deum*. Khotovitsky conducted the service, and as we had no choir, the priests chanted; they did this well, to a sad and melodious tune.

It could be seen that the congregation was struck by a feeling of reverence for our prayers, even though they could not understand the words. Special emotion was called forth by the prayer for eternal memory of those who fell in the war. After the service was over, Khotovitsky stepped forward and gave a short and touching address in English on the significance of the peace which had just been concluded. Witte and Rosen left their places and stood before the altar. Khotovitsky spoke heartily and warmly, and when Witte went up to kiss the Cross, he had tears in his eyes. The service finished at six o'clock. There were special seats reserved for the Japanese, but they did not put in an appearance. After the service was over, Witte and Rosen went into the vestry to thank the clergy.

Bishop Potter, by the way, asked Rosen whether Witte was not of Dutch origin, as the name is to be met with in Holland. When Witte replied that his ancestors were Dutchmen, who had settled in Russia in Peter the Great's time, Potter remarked: "I thought you were not of Russian extraction—a Russian would probably not have managed to do what you have done for the good of your country." What a strange compliment! And not too flattering for our national feeling.

It was late when we got back to the hotel. We dined by ourselves. The journalists had all vanished, and Witte announced that, for the first time since the day of his arrival, he felt at ease. In the evening we all dispersed to our rooms and busied ourselves with packing.

#### AUGUST 24—SEPTEMBER 6.

We left the Wentworth early in the morning. There were few to see us off, the greater number of the people having left last night.

When we arrived at Portsmouth Station we found a special train put at our disposal by Mr. Pierpont Morgan. We were met by Mr. Hand, Secretary to Perkins (Morgan's partner), who was going with us as far as New York, likewise the two detectives who were told off by the State Department to accompany Witte. The train consisted of two Pullman cars and a luggage van. In spite of rain and mud a considerable crowd had gathered on the open platform, who cheered Witte as the train

moved off. Baroness Rosen and her daughter accompanied us as far as Beverley, from whence they went on to Magnolia. Khotovitsky had been invited to come with us. In Boston, where the train stopped for five minutes, we were met by cheers from the crowd on the platform. At one o'clock we had a luxurious luncheon, with champagne, this also at Morgan's expense.

At New York we again stopped at the Hotel St. Regis. This time I was up on the fourteenth storey, with a splendid view over Central Park.

The evening papers speak of serious riots in Tokyo, called forth by the universal dissatisfaction with our Treaty. When, on first arriving at the hotel, I went to the office to make arrangements about my room, the reporters of several papers came to me for information as to our further intentions, our impressions of the Conference and so forth. I got rid of them all by telling them that Witte was tired and could receive no one, but of course, they will come again to-morrow.

#### AUGUST 25—SEPTEMBER 7.

In the morning Witte received a good many people, mostly representatives of the press. However, still more met with a refusal. On the whole, I notice that since the Treaty was signed Witte takes less interest in the journalists than he did before. This is probably because his aim is attained and it is no longer necessary to ingratiate oneself with the press. Mr. Miner, of the "New York Herald," asked persistently to be taken in to Witte. He had a letter of introduction and I found it awkward to refuse him. Witte received him, and Miner began by asking some trivial questions concerning the negotiations, and then touched upon the state of home affairs in Russia. Witte answered evasively and curtly and then said, addressing me: "Tell him that America has produced an excellent impression on me and that I am leaving it with regret." This was the end of the interview.

At to-day's breakfast we had Khotovitsky, and some Russian friends, whom Witte had found in New York. Our chief was in very good spirits, and kept up an animated conversation with his guests, and finally addressed a short speech to Khotovitsky. The substance of his speech was that in spite of all the misfortunes and material loss Russia was bearing, there was no reason to despair as long as Christian faith was strong in the

people, the faith which could overcome all hindrances and misfortunes. He also expressed his pleasure at the work our clergy were doing in America, saying that they had attained enormous results in the way of keeping up our national feeling and in spreading their influence, and all this thanks to their own energy and almost without any official support. Khotovitsky answered with great warmth, alluding to Witte's work, the extraordinary success he had attained in all spheres of action, and thanked him for his kind treatment. In conclusion, he expressed his sorrow that our Church, instead of being free, was a bureaucratic institution, and not in a condition to develop independently and thus to work corresponding good.

This evening a grand banquet in honour of Witte and Rosen was given in the Metropolitan Club, one of the largest and most luxurious in New York, by Colonel Harvey, the senior partner of the well-known publishing firm of Harper. I think there were more than 100 people present. Of the more prominent Americans there were: The Secretary of State, Mr. Elihu Root; the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis; Mr. Pierpont Morgan and his partner, Mr. W. Perkins; Charles H. Mackay, W. K. Vanderbilt, the American Ambassador, General Horace Porter; George Westinghouse, Colonel Jacob Astor, Booth Tarkington, Melville Stone, Charles Flint, a friend of Russia's and a well-known business man; Paul Dana, Secretary of the Exchequer; Albert Shaw, John McCall, William Merrill, Brisbane, McAdoo and several prominent authors and journalists. Owing to lack of space the guests were seated in two different rooms. The host, Colonel Harvey, sat between Witte and Mr. Elihu Root, to the right of the latter was Rosen, P. Morgan sat to Witte's right. I will not try to describe the splendour of the banquet, which was served in a gorgeous American style, the profusion of flags and flowers, the number of courses, the high quality of the wines—it is enough to say that it lasted several hours and was rather trying owing to the throng and the excessive heat. The interesting part were the speeches, especially from a Russian point of view. Colonel Harvey, who began, recalled the time of the American struggle for independence, when Great Britain, not counting her own forces sufficient to quell the rebellious States, turned for help to Russia. The Empress Catherine answered by a refusal, saying that it was against the dignity of two nations to unite for the purpose of putting down the just demands of the

people. Somewhat later, in 1813, when danger threatened the freedom of the Young Republic, the Russian Monarch had not feared to reach out a helping hand. Finally, in our time, many of those present could remember the dark days of the Civil War, when Russian ships appeared in American waters as heralds of friendship and goodwill, and, if necessary, of help. "Can we ever hope to repay them for their support at that time? Probably not. But there come times when we can at least make an estimate and this is just such a time. We are honoured to-day by the presence of Representatives of the Great Empire, whose loyalty to our interests has never wavered and, God grant, may be unending."

Then Colonel Harvey, pointing to Witte, said: "I present to you a leading Statesman, a worker of the civilised world, who will propose a toast for a leading Peacemaker of the civilised world." Witte rose, and said the following words in French: "Gentlemen, I beg to be excused for allowing myself to be the first to speak, but I trust that what I have to propose will serve as a justification in the eyes of the esteemed company. I have the honour of proposing a toast for your famous President, Theodore Roosevelt. At the same time, I consider it a pleasure and an honour to propose a toast for the great and wonderful American nation, the exponent of which is the President." There was applause, and the orchestra played the American national anthem, which we all listened to standing.

Rosen followed next. He began by speaking of the difficult position in which our Emperor found himself, the Sovereign Ruler of 135 million people (occupying one-sixth of the whole world) bearing the greatest responsibility which had ever been laid by God on one man, standing lonely as a mountain peak. "Think how much the responsibility of this man was increased, when the word 'Peace' was pronounced by your President. The noble task of concluding peace was laid by our Monarch on this great Statesman (pointing to Witte) to honour whom you have assembled here. I consider it the highest of honours, that in the latter years of my life I have been connected with him in this task. History will pass judgment on him and his mission. To this judgment we bow."

After a reference to the Civil War and the coming to Russia of America's delegate, Fox, who was met with full



sympathy, Rosen concluded his speech with the following words: "Of late years clouds have arisen on the horizon of our friendship, their presence may be explained by a misunderstanding of the reasons of our great struggle. We must trust that, though our friendship has wavered, the people of the United States will be sincere with us. I ask you to join with me in drinking to the undying friendship of the Russian and the American nations."

After this Colonel Harvey presented Mr. Elihu Root, warning us that he would only speak as a private individual. Praising Witte and Rosen for the result they had attained, Root said: "It wants more courage to make peace than to carry on a war. People who demand war and criticise peace are generally weak people, who have never fought. It is just the courage I spoke of that makes our President a suitable mediator in bringing about peace. Only he, who is ready to carry on a war, will be listened to when he proposes peace."

Then the orator said that the Americans would always count it a great honour that two great nations had chosen America as the place where to make peace. "We are not a military people. Warlike if necessary, but not wanting war, and it is a great honour for us that you have come here to perform the important work, thanks to which millions of people will return home and in the coming years there will be joy and plenty in millions of families instead of poverty and mourning."

After Mr. Root had finished, a short speech was made by Horace Porter, the former American Ambassador in France. Among other things he uttered the following: "Our esteemed Secretary of State said quite correctly that it is more difficult to make peace than to carry on a war. One is physical, the other moral. We are glad to honour the Ambassadors of Peace, who have had boldness to stay the red hand of the avenger."

Porter's words called for much applause. After him there were about a dozen more speeches made, among the number were those by McVeagh, the Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbot, and President Hadley, of Yale, the latter comparing the Portsmouth Conference to a game of poker in which Witte got round the Japanese by persuading them that he held all trumps in his hand. "I do not wish to speak to the discredit of the Japanese, but I think we are obliged for peace to the strong men whom Russia sent and who, meeting equally strong men, stood their ground."

Before going to bed I looked through Witte's correspondence, which had accumulated in a most threatening manner. Among others there was a letter from Bethlehem (New Hampshire) from M. H. Montague Donner (Auteur et professeur a l'ecole Supérieure Technique pour les Filles a New York). The letter being written in French, Witte was able to read it. Mr. Montague Donner expressed a hope that there would be some amelioration in the state of affairs in Finland, and asked to be informed what Witte thought of that country and of the introduction of a constitution there; he also wanted him to express his views on the power of the Governor General and the substitution of Russian governors for local ones. Witte told me to answer in a general way to the effect that he had always taken an interest in the fate of the Finns and trusted that the projects for reforms prepared by the Russian Government would have a favourable effect.

#### AUGUST 26—SEPTEMBER 8.

In the morning I was called to Witte's room, where I found Mr. Perkins, Mr. Pierpont Morgan's partner. He had come to arrange an interview between Morgan and Witte, and as he spoke nothing but English, I was sent for to translate. Having asked several questions concerning the Russian money market, the suitable time for a loan, and the state of affairs in Russia, Perkins asked when Witte could see Morgan privately. Witte answered that Morgan had invited him to come on board his yacht on Monday, but that this was not convenient as he was going to the Produce Exchange and to West Point, and besides, he would like to see Morgan at once, so as to be able to telegraph the results of the interview to Petersburg. Finally the appointment was fixed for to-day on board the yacht anchored in the river. To avoid publicity it was decided that Perkins should call for us at the hotel with his motor car.

We left the hotel about four, motoring down with Perkins to the landing-stage on the river. An electric cutter took us in a few minutes to Morgan's steam yacht, riding at anchor among a score of other big ships. Yachting is a favourite pastime in America, and Morgan's yacht, of about 4,000 tons, I believe, is no exception. It is called the "Corsair," and unlike the others, is painted black, the favourite colour of Mr. Morgan. At the top of the gang-ladder we were met by the captain in the uniform of a retired naval officer, and on deck by

Morgan himself, who invited us into the deck cabin. Everything seemed clean, neat and comfortable. Cigarettes and cocktails appeared and we took our seats. I thought I had been taken in the capacity of interpreter, but Morgan began to speak French in a very fluent and correct manner. Witte answered in the same language. Perkins and I kept silent. Only once or twice they turned to me to translate some words that Witte did not understand.

Morgan, who has already been mentioned previously, is a thick-set, dark man of a somewhat apoplectic temperament; he has a pleasant face, and piercing striking eyes. Unfortunately his nose spoils the general good impression.

The conversation began with Witte's statement that, in case the war had continued, the Russian Government, instead of making a loan, would have tried to meet the financial difficulties in another way, viz.: by recourse to its gold reserve and the establishing of a compulsory exchange. Now, peace being declared, it was necessary to think of negotiating a loan. He would like, therefore, to know what Morgan thought of the possibility of placing a loan, or part of one, in America. Morgan asked to what amount? About four hundred million dollars, answered Witte, adding that now he was returning to Russia he would probably stop in Paris and Berlin, and the bankers there would, of course, raise the question of a loan. He would, therefore, like to know whether he could count on America, as he knew he would find money in France. Morgan replied that the present moment was not a favourable one for floating a loan in view of the export of corn then going on and the operations in connection with it. January or February would be a much more suitable time. Money for a Russian loan was to be had in the United States, but in his opinion, this loan should have an international character, for instance, the United States, France and Germany might take part in it. It was necessary that the American public should become familiar with Russian securities, which were not known in America. When people got accustomed to them it would be possible to float a loan in America only.

Then Witte said it would be preferable for us to have the loan in October or November. Although in Russia also autumn was an unfavourable time, in France it was otherwise, therefore when he reached Paris they would be

sure to raise the question there. He asked if there were long term loans in America or only short. Morgan replied that there were some loans for a term of fifty years.

Witte: "If we, nevertheless, decide to make a loan in autumn, that is, in September or October, can I depend on you?"

Morgan: "Yes, of course, I shall do all I possibly can and shall try to take fifty or a hundred million dollars as my share. But I repeat that for a start it is better to make an international loan and to issue it not before next January."

Witte: "It is difficult to unite Germany and France, or rather, the German and French bankers. The French say, not without truth, that as money is cheaper in France, in placing a Russian loan in Berlin, the greater part of the shares pass over to France, the French bankers losing their commission, which remains as profit in the hands of the Germans. Altogether, I only know one thoroughly reliable banker in Germany, that is Ernst Mendelsohn, with whom I have done business and am on personally good terms. He is a splendid fellow and a man of business. But on the whole it is difficult to bring all the bankers together. We only succeeded in doing so once. So that floating a loan in France and Germany at the same time is an exceedingly difficult, if not an impossible thing."

Morgan: "And in England?"

Witte: "That would, of course, be desirable, but for political reasons it is hardly possible."

Morgan: "I am willing to undertake to carry on negotiations with the English bankers about this."

Witte: "That means I can count on your co-operation?"

Morgan: "Yes, you may tell them in Paris that I am a participator in the loan; I will of course only negotiate through the American bankers. I am, however, willing to send my representative to Paris or Petersburg, Mr. Perkins (motioning to him) will go there; in case of necessity, I shall go myself."

Witte: "Have you a representative in Paris?"

Morgan: "Yes. I, of course, do not expect you to negotiate the loan only through me. There are many other banking houses in New York."



Witte: "No, in Russia we consider the name and house of Morgan as the most important and reliable and wish to do business only with you."

Then the conversation continued for a few minutes longer on the possible conditions of the loan, on the American market, on mutual acquaintances, and of Morgan's life on board the yacht. His family lives in the country, where he goes now and then, but he spends the day between Wall Street and his yacht. The visit came to an end at about six o'clock, when Morgan wanted to accompany us as far as the shore and got into the cutter, which brought us up to the landing stage in a few minutes. Here Witte and Morgan parted, evidently pleased with each other.

On our way back to the hotel, Witte spoke to Perkins, saying that now he understood the reason of Morgan's success. Witte was struck by the latter's business mind, the clearness of his perception, and the soberness of his speech. Not any superfluous word, said he, only what was necessary and that to the point.

To-day Nabokoff went off to Virginia with one of the officers of the "May Flower," Lieutenant Nesbit. I dined with my colleagues at the Quatre Arts (a French restaurant) and spent a pleasant evening at the circus.

#### AUGUST 27—SEPTEMBER 9.

I have been feeling very unwell first thing in the morning—evidently the result of yesterday's too copious French dinner! Rosen is also unwell, he is suffering from rheumatism. To-day Witte, with Vilenkin, visited the Columbia University and the Police Office. They were received at the University by the members of the managing board, Messrs. Murray and Francis Bangs. Professor Van Amringe, head of the Arts Faculty, showed them the library of books on law. At the Police Office they were met by the Chief Commissioner, McAdoo, who introduced to Witte the police inspectors, in full uniform for the occasion. Witte shook hands with them all. After this followed the inspection of the Police Office, where, by the way, Witte was specially interested in the collection of criminals' portraits. He also made enquiries as to whether there were any political offenders among the prisoners. McAdoo explained that no one was arrested for political offences where there had been no

infringement of the law, but that since the assassination of President McKinley the anarchists were under supervision.

From the Police Office Witte returned to the hotel, and at half-past four went with Rosen to dine at Roosevelt's estate—Sagamore Hill. From what Rosen said the dinner was quite of a private character; it only consisted of the President's family. Roosevelt had received the Japanese the same day; Komura and Takahira had been invited for lunch and came to Sagamore Hill on the yacht "Sylph."

Later on Shipoff told me that I was to go with Witte to Washington and that we were to start that same evening. Our party left the hotel about ten o'clock, taking the ferry, which brought us in a short time to the railway station of the Washington line. A special carriage of Morgan's was hooked on to the ordinary train for us all. Mr. Hands, who had accompanied us to Portsmouth, came to see us off. Some minutes before the train started Dr. Dillon appeared as forerunner, then came Witte, Rosen, Plançon and the two detectives. Witte was in a good humour, and evidently pleased with his reception at the President's. This reception he described in a telegram to the Foreign Office, which was composed as soon as the train started. Shipoff showed us a New York journal containing an amusing description of Colonel Harvey's dinner and caricatures of the Russians and Americans. The article was written playfully, with a touch of humour; Witte's French pronunciation and his Socratic nose were laughed at among other things.

#### AUGUST 28—SEPTEMBER 10.

A warm, sunny day. The train reached Washington early in the morning. We were welcomed at the station by Mr. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State, a thin, dark man of about forty. With him came the President's A.D.C., Major Macaulay. They invited us to the Arlington Hotel, where a light breakfast with coffee was served. Dr. Dillon had brought a pile of local papers with him and began to translate the telegrams from Russia to Witte, who listened with brows contracted and interrupted occasionally with ironical remarks. Rosen in whining tones complained of his painful arm; the rest of us kept silent, seeing that Jupiter was in bad spirits and that a storm was imminent. I suppose the reason of

this was a bad night. Happily the motor cars arrived, and in the presence of our American friends Witte calmed down. We first drove to the Embassy. It is a small three-storeyed house of the ordinary Washington type and of modest appearance, far more so in any case than the fine English, French and German Embassies. Near the house is a small garden. The interior had a shabby, neglected air, there was hardly any furniture in it. The former Ambassador, Count Cassini, had taken away all that was worth anything. Witte and Rosen went through the rooms, the latter drawing Witte's attention to the poorness of the furniture and the lack of many things; he was in hopes that Witte would uphold his request in Petersburg for new furniture. In my mind it would be best of all to buy a house. This was at one time suggested to the Foreign Office. But now the prices are double what they were at that time.

From the Embassy we drove along a broad alley set about with trees, to the suburbs across the river Potomac. On the way something went wrong with the motors and there was a stoppage, after which we all had to squeeze into two motor cars. Witte sat with the driver, and the Baron and Loomis on the back seat. The rest of us crammed in the other car, protected by the detectives. We crossed over on to the picturesque opposite bank and drove into Arlington Park. Here among the avenues is a cemetery with the graves of the gallant soldiers who fell in battle during the Civil War. General Lee, the great Southern leader, is buried here and also many distinguished officers. A stone pavilion contains military relics of that time—in front of this pavilion is a terrace with a beautiful view over river and town. From here we proceeded to the White House, at the entrance of which some loiterers had collected. Recognising Witte, they greeted us boisterously. We were shown over the White House by the chief steward, who took us to the official rooms. In the drawing room we saw portraits of all the Presidents. Witte stopped before the paintings of Washington, Lincoln and MacKinley, and likewise in the room where the President receives the public after his election. This is a large hall, from the windows of which lawns and flower gardens are to be seen. The hall is lofty, and the furnishing very simple. In the dining room Witte pointed to the heads of deer, elk and wild boar that hung on the walls and wanted to know whether these were trophies of Roosevelt's hunting.

Thence we went on to the Capitol. A crowd of people was again waiting to see Witte. We passed through the Congress halls, listening to the explanations of the Superintendent of the building, stopping in the Senators' and Delegates' halls and in the President's room. We also admired the Library, with iron bookcases several storeys high, from which the books are sent down to the reader by a mechanical contrivance. The next visit was to the Reading Room, a dome-shaped hall, very light, with marble columns and walls of mosaic. In the middle, behind a railing, are the librarians, to whom the reader gives a written order for the book he wants. The order is placed in a leather cylinder, fitted into a special pneumatic tube, which sends it into whatever storey of the library is wanted, from where the book is sent back in the same manner. All this process takes about five minutes. Witte listened to the librarian's explanations with great attention and could not disguise his wonder at the usefulness of the arrangement. Unfortunately to-day being a Sunday—the library was closed and there were not enough people present to show us how all this is worked.

On leaving the Capitol, Witte stopped for a moment to acknowledge the crowd's greeting, and while so doing he stooped down and kissed a little girl who was standing near him—this met with the approval of the spectators and especially of the child's parents. We once more got into our motors which took us to the Navy Yard on the Potomac. Here a small warship, the "Siren," was anchored, waiting to take us for a trip to Washington's burial place, Mount Vernon. Several official personages, and their wives, were on board, having come to look at the Russians. Among them were the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the War and the Treasury. Witte first took a seat in the stern together with Rosen and then went on to the upper deck. In a short time tables were set out and lunch served. Major Macaulay and the naval officers sat at our table.

The Potomac is pretty wide about here—the banks are high and wooded, the southern bank forming the border of the State of Virginia. At about one the steamer stopped, before Mount Vernon. Witte landed first and, when we came on shore, he was already climbing the hill by a winding pathway between old oak, ash and maple trees. All our party, about twenty-five persons, followed him. We first went to Washington's tomb, where



behind a railing we could see the tombstone. Outside the railing there were two other stones. This is where the relatives of the famous founder of the Republic are buried. Witte asked to have the inscription on the stone translated, and then enquired if any of Washington's descendants were still living. He was told that there were descendants, but people of no importance. "The name of Washington is so famous that it requires nothing else to distinguish it," said Witte. One of the bystanders remarked that they were also very poor, and that did not honour America. Witte seemed to agree to that. Washington's house is a white two-storeyed building in what is called the colonial style. Next to the bungalow are the stables, the house for smoking hams and the wash-house. The rooms are low and the furnishing very simple; the whitewashed walls have several engravings hanging on them, in which Washington himself and his friend Lafayette are to be seen. The greater part of the furniture and other things there belong to the time of Washington, at least so our guide told us. Witte listened with great interest to the explanations given by the American. Dr. Dillon accompanied him as interpreter: we remained in the rear. Rosen kept rubbing his arm, which was aching. Stories were told of Washington's life, as he was at home with his family. The house and tomb are in the charge of a ladies' committee, "The Mount Vernon Regent's Association," who gave us special permission to visit the place on a Sunday. Having inspected the house, we assembled on the terrace looking out on to the river. Loomis asked us to wait a few minutes, saying that there would be a sapling brought, which he hoped Witte and Rosen would not refuse to plant—it was the custom for all distinguished visitors to plant a tree in memory of their visit. Macaulay, who was standing near me, muttered: Is it true that these saplings always perish, as they are planted at all times of the year, and nature does not adapt herself to the wishes of distinguished visitors. After some waiting, the gardeners brought a small ash tree and we all went across the lawn to the hillside. The hole was already dug out. Witte grasped the spade energetically and shovelled in the earth. Rosen also put a few spadefuls down the hole, but with much less zeal. The ceremony was now concluded and we all returned to the house. On passing a family party sitting on a bench Witte stopped and kissed one of the children—

this is the second time to-day that he has done it. He is evidently fishing for popularity.

We returned to town by the electric cars. There we got into our motors and were whirled off to Rock Creek Park, along the high road, through a big forest, with valleys, rivulets and villas. In a little over the hour we had driven all round the park, but several times I thought we would be over, as we drove at a tremendous rate all the time, not slackening speed at any of the turnings. Finally we arrived at the railway station and took our seats in the carriage. The public recognised the Russian Envoys and made them an ovation. Just before we started the Italian Ambassador, Mayor des Planques, came into the carriage. He spoke for a few minutes, asking Witte about the Conference and the political situation.

#### AUGUST 30—SEPTEMBER 11.

This morning Witte, Rosen and some of our party went for a trip to West Point in Morgan's yacht. I spent my time talking to the journalists, who do not trouble Witte any more but content themselves with minor personages. I lunched at Chery's restaurant with Baron Schlippenbach, our Consul in New York. There were many ladies lunching alone and in couples, most of them young, with their partners—it seems this is thought quite natural and not compromising in any way. But, on the other hand, you are not allowed to go into a private room with a lady—quite the opposite of the customs in our country! After lunch Schlippenbach and I went to buy a vase destined for Witte from the Principal of the Chicago University, Mr. Crane. The latter had asked Schlippenbach to choose some trifle to his own taste. We found a soufflé flambé of golden tint at the famous Tiffany's glass store.

Our party returned from West Point rather late. I was told that it had not been altogether a pleasant trip, and had chiefly been arranged to satisfy Morgan's vanity. Our Envoys were received by General Mills, Chief of the Military Academy, and his Staff, and shown over the whole place, a salute being fired from the neighbouring battery. They saw the dining hall, where the cadets were having their meal, after that the Memorial hall, the church, the gymnasium and the barracks. A review of the cadets was held, the orchestra

playing the Russian and American national anthems. It poured with rain all the time, which was most unpleasant as everybody had to be uncovered. During this visit they met the Japanese, who had also come to see the Academy; and exchange of smiles and handshakings took place.

In the afternoon Witte received a deputation from a Slavonic Society, with their President, Mr. Anthony Ambrose, who presented him with a diploma and the title of honorary member and pronounced an eloquent speech. Witte answered rather curtly, being tired of the whole show.

To-day some of our party went to a dinner given in honour of Witte by Melville Stone, the head of the Associated Press, at the Lotus Literary Club. About thirty people were present, mostly journalists and writers, including the humourist Brisbane, of the "New York Sun," Merrill, of the "New York Times," and Martin, of the "New York Tribune." Among the representatives of the foreign press were Sir Long Miller, of the "Dundee Advertiser," Hedeman of the "Matin," our Brianchaninoff and Souvorin. The dinner was of a more intimate character than the one given by Colonel Harvey at the Metropolitan Club. Witte sat between M. Stone and Brisbane, who both speak French. The epigram on a pretty menu was "The pen is mightier than the sword." The first toast was made by Witte, who in a few words proposed the health of the President. Mr. Stone responded by drinking the health of the Tzar, after which the orchestra played the national anthems. Then Mr. Stone announced that there would be no more speeches as Witte was leaving early and had no time to spare. In spite of these words, however, he himself immediately made one on the signing of the Treaty. After him we were addressed by the Scottish journalist Long Miller, who specially praised our Envoys; then followed speeches from Hedeman and Brianchaninoff, the latter saying a few words in praise of the Associated Press, as of the remarkable organisation uniting two thousand American journals and papers. At the last Witte rose once more and said in Russian that, as a former journalist, he proposed a toast for the wonderful American Press. His words were translated by Rosen and received with general approval.

AUGUST 30—SEPTEMBER 12.

This is the day of our departure from America. Before leaving the Envoys went off to the hotel Waldorff-Astoria to pay a farewell visit to the Japanese. The latter sail on Thursday. In the morning Witte received a deputation of Hebrew bankers, Messrs. Strauss, Seligman and others. The conversation ran on general topics. The question of a loan was not discussed. The bankers, by the way, asked Witte how they should behave in view of the situation in Russia and of the anti-Jewish agitation. Witte advised them to use their influence with their co-religionists to keep them from interfering with Russia's home affairs and from taking part in political propaganda which had Government reforms for its aim; this was the business of the Russians, said he, and any interference would only aggravate the situation of the Jews and lead to pogroms. He likewise anticipated that there would soon be some amelioration in the lot of the Jews.

Besides this deputation, Witte received one from the Armenian Colonial Council with Bishop Saradzhany at their head, who presented an address from the Armenians. The latter expressed their hopes for the amelioration of the lot of their compatriots in the Caucasus. Witte received them rather coolly, stating afterwards that he did not well perceive that the situation of Armenians in Russia was a bad one especially compared with that of Armenians in Turkey.

The last hours of our stay were made unpleasant by the persistent desire of a number of people to get to Witte, who persistently refused to receive any one. Besides the reporters, both men and women, there were several pretenders to a relationship with Witte. I must mention that since we came to America there were many letters from so-called relatives; some of these, by the way, bore the name of Witte and even enclosed a family tree. Among the most insistent were two gentlemen named Jackson who had come both on different errands, and a Mrs. Goodhope, an old lady who translates the Russian books of Divine Service into English. There was also a gentleman who wanted us to buy an edition of Roosevelt's works in an elegant binding, and an agent of the Clipping Bureau, who brought a collection of the cuttings from the papers about Witte. The majority's



aim was autographs. All these people insisted on having a last interview. I advised them to go down to the steamer and there lay their requests before Witte, and if they did not succeed, to sail with us to Europe. The journalists seem to enjoy this proposal.

When we got to the steamer, the passengers and the people seeing us off had taken up all the spare place. Everybody crowded on the quay, many holding Russian and American flags. Witte stood on deck, surrounded by a group of reporters trying to get a last information. In bidding good-bye, he said a few words to those who were standing nearest to him concerning the impression about America, dwelling on the fact that he was specially touched by the reverence which surrounded the memory of Washington. When the gangway was taken up, Witte went on to the upper deck and found a place among the ship's boats, where he remained until we sailed.

The members of the Embassy and the Consulate had also come to see us off. As the steamer moved, the orchestra struck up "God Save the Tzar," the people waving their hats and flags. The flag of the Ambassador Extraordinary was hoisted on the mainmast. Witte walked about on deck until first New York and then the statue of Liberty disappeared from view, and then sent a wireless to Rosen with "his hearty greetings." It is evident that the Conference had dissipated all his prejudices against Rosen, and he has appreciated the latter's help. Hedeman, Dillon, McCulloch, Richard and Sir Mackenzie Wallace are sailing with us.

Thus, in spite of all the pessimistic prophecies, in spite of the serious obstacles to an agreement, and notwithstanding the scepticism of the Envoys, we had concluded peace. History will show what this peace will be, and whether we had merited the gratitude or the reproaches of posterity. The authors of the Treaty themselves did not believe in its durability. Witte thought that at this particular moment peace was indispensable and that the Tzar came to a wise decision when he yielded to Roosevelt's persuasions, but at the same time he considered that peace would be shortlived, and that this was only a stage in the struggle of the races and peoples on the Pacific Coast. Rosen went still further. He called the Portsmouth Peace a truce and considered that we ought to have continued the war and made an end of the Japanese. Such was the opinion of men with

most knowledge of this complicated question. Men who, I am sure, were acting with a full realisation of their responsibility to their country. Their efforts to get the best possible conditions and to save the situation were so much the more worthy of recognition, for not being upheld by Russian public opinion and because they were performed at the moment of the complete overthrow of our military prestige and at a time of general confusion.

#### AUGUST 31—SEPTEMBER 13.

A dull day and some rolling. There are few people on board in comparison with our voyage out. The agent of the *Deutscher Lloyd*, "Pavlovsky," has arranged for each of us to have a separate cabin. Witte is in good spirits, walks about the deck, plays shuffle-board and "Old Maid" (a Russian card game) with his usual partners. Mr. Vilenkin and the Rojdestvenskys with their inseparable Pomeranian are also on board.

#### SEPTEMBER 1—14.

A dull rainy day, with fog in the morning. On this voyage we dine in the saloon, where we have a separate table. Lieutenant Borovsky, whom I have already mentioned, and Dr. Dillon also dine at our table. The latter has become Witte's faithful companion. Towards evening the fog thickened, the whistles and sirens sounded and we slackened speed. Going up on deck I found Witte walking on the bridge with the Captain. There were several men on watch. The captain told us that they were now for the first time making use of a new contrivance for submarine signalling, which gave notice of the proximity of ships or icebergs in a fog. This made Witte nervous.

#### SEPTEMBER 2—15.

The fog continued all night and only dispersed towards morning, but the ship began to roll considerably. I felt queer and did not come out to luncheon. Many of our party were also sick and did not appear at meals. In the evening there was much less motion and all of us came out. When I made my appearance Witte asked, with a touch of sarcasm, why I was such a bad sailor, having been round the world. He complains of the rolling, but seems to feel quite well.

SEPTEMBER 3—16.

A cold and cloudy day. The rolling continued. In the evening we had a concert in aid of the widows and orphans of the German seamen. The management of the concert was undertaken by one of the passengers, a Major Kovalsky, an American business man from the Western States. He issued printed programmes, under the patronage of Witte, and displayed much activity in the matter.

In the evening the passengers assembled in the saloon, where the orchestra was placed. Witte, who was greeted with applause, refused to take the chair and sat down a little apart, leaving the chairman's place for Kovalsky. The latter began with a flowery speech, in which he praised up Witte's services, saying that in regard to statesmanship and capabilities they might be compared to those of Bismarck, Washington, Lincoln and Grant. Then the national anthem was played. Witte replied in Russian, pointing out that at Portsmouth he had been only the executor of the Tzar's instructions, who was seconded by the noble efforts of President Roosevelt. He concluded with the following words: "I should like, however, to draw your attention to the fact that from the hospitable shores of the United States we have been sailing under the German flag, and, to all intents and purposes, living on a piece of floating German territory. I need not remind you that the August Ruler of that Empire is a warm friend of the Tzar and of President Roosevelt. I feel sure, therefore, ladies and gentlemen, that I am the exponent of your own wishes when I propose that we rise and do honour to His Majesty Kaiser Wilhelm II. and that the orchestra play the German national hymn." The orchestra struck up accordingly to the general approval.

It seemed strange that here on board a steamer with a cosmopolitan and rather mixed audience Witte made a speech, and yet seldom took the opportunity of speaking at any length on the different occasions that presented themselves during our sojourn in the States. It can be ascribed to his cautiousness or perhaps to his timidity on account of his ignorance of the language.

After this came the musical part of the programme, performed by the passengers. The singing and playing were interspersed with anecdotes and jokes from the Major. The latter was a cunning fellow. In coupling



ON THE DECK OF THE KAISER WILHELM II.





Witte's name with his own he evidently was trying to come into public eye. The effect of the concert was somewhat spoilt by McCulloch (he was war correspondent to our army) giving an account of General Tserpitsky's retreat from Mukden. The Americans understood how tactless such a story was and showed their disapproval.

SEPTEMBER 4—17.

A dull but calm day. Nabokoff and I have been discussing the results of our work with Witte; we decided that before parting we would thank him for his kindness to us. Nabokoff took the part of spokesman, and having discovered Witte in the Wiener Cafe said a few words of thanks and our regret at parting. Our Chief seemed to be touched, answering in the same words of appreciation he apologised for having sometimes been unjust and exacting. In the evening there was the usual German farewell dinner, with illuminations and a procession of the kellers. Witte treated everybody to champagne.

SEPTEMBER 5—18.

We got to Plymouth in the morning, and rode at anchor there for about two hours. Here we landed Plançon and Berg, who were commissioned to take the Peace Treaty and documents to Petersburg by the shortest route.

While we were in port, the reporters of the "Daily Mirror," "Daily Chronicle," and the "Wiener Tageblatt" came on board and wanted to have an interview with Witte. He refused absolutely and advised me to be cautious with them. "Do not forget that this is not America," he added. I, of course, confined myself to general remarks, leaving the reporters to make their own additions.

We got to Cherbourg at half-past six. As soon as we stopped Lloyd's steamer came alongside with Witte's family to meet him. The Cherbourg reporters and representatives of the "Information" agency likewise made their appearance. Witte said a few words to them and then turned them over to me. The gist of their questions amounted to the following: "Is it true that Russia has concluded a loan in America and will have nothing to do with the French money market in consequence of the cooling down of relations between Russia and France? What does Witte think of the ferment in Russia, and

what of the riots in Tokyo? Why did the Japanese give in at Portsmouth, on account of financial considerations or in consequence of pressure on Roosevelt's part? Would we start friendly relations with Japan? What does Witte think of the project for forming a Cabinet?"

None of the French authorities had come; we were met only by M. Raffalovitch, our Financial Agent. From the docks we all walked to the same casino where, five weeks before, we had waited for the steamer that was to take us to America. Witte postponed his departure for Paris, and invited us to dine with him. During dinner Witte spoke almost exclusively to his wife and paid little attention to the rest of us.

We left Cherbourg early in the morning and by nine o'clock arrived at the Gare St. Lazare. Witte's reception was quiet, to say the least. Only the representative of the Sleeping Car Company and an official from our Embassy were present. Of the Russians I noticed the manager of our State Bank, Timasheff. Witte and his wife went off to the Hotel Bristol in the Place Vendôme. We all dispersed to different hotels.

#### SEPTEMBER 6—19.

Strictly speaking, my duties as regards Witte came to an end when we arrived in France. While we were still on the boat I asked him whether he would want me in Paris and he replied in the negative. However, it turned out differently. The day of our arrival Shipoff invited all of us to dine at the Voisin restaurant. This was in payment of a wager we had had as to whether peace would be concluded. At dinner he told me that Witte wanted to see me and that I was to call on him. After dinner we drove to the Butte Montmartre, and enjoyed the witty French songs and jokes in different little theatres, or boites, as the French call them. We finished our evening at the Café de Paris, where we had supper. There I met General Wogack, our Military Attaché in London, at his solitary supper. I sat down at his table for a short time to tell him my impressions of our journey to America. He thought that Witte had achieved a great thing and succeeded in bringing Russia out of a difficult situation. In his opinion this Treaty will be the first step towards an alliance with Japan and England.

SEPTEMBER 7—20.

I was at Witte's hotel in the Place Vendôme in the morning. He told me that he intended to go to President Loubet's estate on the Paris-Lyon railroad and would like to take me with him. I naturally said that I would thoroughly enjoy such a trip.

To-day I was present at an official breakfast with Mr. Rouvier, President of the Council of Ministers, given in honour of Witte, which he attended with his wife. It was a big gathering of Ministers and members of our Embassy. In addition there were the French Ambassador at Washington and his wife, and M. Revoil, the Minister Resident in Tunis, appointed for negotiations with Morocco. The breakfast was very good, but, as all such official performances, very tedious.

At the appointed hour I was at the Lyon railway station, where I found Witte and his Russian servant. After a short exchange of civilities with the French officials we took our seats in the President's carriage, which was hooked on to the Marseilles express. The banker, Mr. Netzling, went with us as far as the first station. He stayed with Witte in the saloon, where, in tones loud enough for me to hear them, they spoke of Russian finances, and of the chances of a loan. Netzling left us at Laroche.

The President's carriage consists of a saloon with a couch and soft armchair, a bedroom with a bath, and two other compartments. I occupied one and Witte's man the other. The President's servant was attached to the car.

SEPTEMBER 8—21.

The express which usually passes Montélimart where we arrived in the early morning, this time was made to stop there for us to descend. At the station we were met by the President's A.D.C., a captain in the Navy, the stationmaster and the local authorities. Witte's man was left at the station, and we took our seats in an open carriage with the Adjutant, and started for La Bénude de Mazenc, such being the name of the President's estate. We first drove through the small town of Montélimart, where M. Loubet began his political career, and then along a splendid high road. The surrounding country is hilly, with tilled fields, vineyards, villas and old



chateaux. Witte admired the landscape, and now and again exchanged a few words with the A.D.C. Among other things he wanted to know why M. Loubet lived so far from Paris. Our companion explained that, firstly his mother lived at Montélimart, secondly, living at a distance kept importunate visitors from him.

After a ride of an hour and a half we drove through a vineyard, along an avenue and at length stopped at the door of a fairly large two-storeyed house with turrets at the corners. Monsieur Loubet came out to meet us, and after the first greetings, took us into the hall and then into the drawing-room, where we were met by Madame Loubet, her eldest son, a young man of about thirty, and a lady friend. A few words were exchanged about our journey and America, and then M. Loubet went with Witte to his study and I remained with Mme. Loubet and her son.

Coffee and bread and butter were brought. Mme. Loubet behaved in a very friendly and unceremonious way. She seemed to be a little timid, but very simple and unpretentious in her manner and ideas. She asked me about our journey to America and the impression produced by that country and by President Roosevelt himself. I noticed some large pictures representing the meeting of the Russian and French squadrons in Toulon and Cronstadt. "You are looking at these pictures," said Mme. Loubet, "don't you think they are very good? They immortalise the historical event of the beginning of the Franco-Russian friendship." We sat chatting for about half an hour, after which Mme. Loubet suggested that I should go for a walk about the garden with her son. The house stands in a large park. Loubet's son, who serves in the *Cour des Comptes* (corresponding to our Russian Board of Control), told me that the estate had been bought not long ago by his father, who is attached to the town of Montélimart, where he spent his youth and which is full of family reminiscences for him. Besides this, his brother's estate is not far from here. M. Loubet has a pretty large vineyard on his estate, and makes wine, part of which he sells. We went round the garden and had a look at a hydropathic establishment arranged by the former owner. We returned from our walk at about eleven and found everybody in the drawing-room. Then lunch was served. At this meal M. Loubet and Witte were the

principal talkers. The war and the Treaty of Portsmouth were touched on. In speaking of the negotiations Witte laid special stress on the possibility for us to continue the war, which fact had been pointed out to President Roosevelt when the latter was persuading him to come to an agreement with the Japanese. The condition that made this possible was, according to him, the introduction of a gold standard in Russia, and that, in spite of an exhausting war, the exchange of the rouble had hardly wavered. If it was not for that Russia would not have been able to resist. "Of all that I have done in my long years of service to Russia," continued Witte, "I am most of all proud of this reform, which I managed to carry through with the greatest trouble, owing to the difficulty of introducing innovations with us." Witte added that the French financiers had given their advice against introducing a gold currency in Russia, which could not, according to them, be maintained. Soon after that we took our leave of the President and his family and once more got into the carriage.

M. Loubet produces the impression of a very clear-headed, practical man, but perhaps rather too plain and lacking somewhat in deportment. Looking at him, one forgets one is in the presence of the highest Representative of a great and powerful country. He shows certainly a striking contrast to the ambitious, dominating American President, so fond of representation, and who carries so easily and with such assurance the weight of his responsible duties as Ruler. To an outsider M. Loubet looks much more democratic than Roosevelt.

At the station of Montélimart, the Mayor, the Commander of the regiment, and the railway authorities had assembled to see us off. Witte entered the station-master's office and spoke with a clerk, who was sitting there, asking him about his work, about the train service, the amount of freight that could be carried, the number of vans and the rate of movement. Our French attendants seemed rather upset by this conversation. M. Loubet's A.D.C. handed Witte a box of Nougat de Montélimart, a present from Mme. Loubet.

During our return journey Witte was, contrary to custom, in a talkative mood. He asked me about the Foreign Office and people he knew, speaking highly of Count Lamsdorff. I did not contradict him, but remarked that Lamsdorff's good qualities were counter-

balanced to a considerable degree by the influence of his friend the Vice-Minister Prince Obolensky, a narrow-minded bureaucrat. To my question as to whether Witte intended remaining a long time in Petersburg, he said no, he would present himself to the Tzar, then he would probably spend some time in the country at the Narishkins, and after that would go abroad. "I have nothing to do in Russia," he added, "and as I am not wanted I will give in my resignation." To this I rejoined that this would not be accepted and that they would probably insist on his staying because of the unsettled state of affairs. "Yes, the times are indeed troublesome ones," he replied, "but what good can I do and who will heed me? Drastic measures are required to alter the Government system. But the persons surrounding the Emperor are blind or exerting themselves in mutual rivalry and in fostering their personal interests. They persuade the Emperor of the necessity of keeping up autocracy and warn him against any concessions. Meanwhile, if we do not change our course we shall be involved in popular rising and economic ruin. We ought also to alter our foreign policy. I have initiated now a policy of understanding with Japan, that must be continued and developed by treaties—a commercial one and, if possible, a political one too, but not to the detriment of China, that we may enjoy security on our Eastern Front. First of all we must regain the confidence of the Chinese. It is possible that our relations with Great Britain ought also to be altered and that she may even come to an agreement with us. Now that Russia's military power is so much impaired she has become harmless for many years to come, and England's fears for India have become groundless. However, I do not know how it should be done, we have so many opposing interests and the English will never give up any of their schemes. Besides, in Europe and in the Balkans we need the support of Germany and we can never do without her. Altogether our statesmen must realise the necessity of a Central European block, consisting of Russia, Germany and France. That would be the bulwark of peace because nobody would be able to violate it. As to Russia, she cannot go to war without having previously reformed her internal status, and that will require many years. Even this colonial war has brought us to a critical state and to a great financial strain. How can we make war against a European Power? It would certainly lead

to disaster. I have submitted my arguments to the Emperor and warned him against political adventures in Persia and China, but it was of no avail. He is wavering and cannot stand objections, especially when they come from me. I have criticised his foreign policy and now I fear that my forecasts will prove correct in our home affairs."

Witte also noticed the difference between the two Presidents—Roosevelt and Loubet. He found the latter a personification of French bourgeoisie democracy, though perhaps a too narrow observer of the constitution, as a true Premier Magistrat de la Republique, as they call him. Roosevelt, he said, was of quite different stamina—a Republican with somewhat autocratic propensities. He made a step towards bringing his country into the sphere of world politics and made it successfully. Now European statesmen would have to count with America, who would probably find further opportunity to interfere in affairs of the old continent despite the Monroe doctrine.

After lunch we stood sometimes at the window looking at the passing landscape. "I realise," remarked Witte, "why the French are so fond of their country. Look what a beautiful picturesque scenery, almost a continuous garden, but still I like my own country better." After that he took up the newspapers, picking out the "Osvo-bojdenie" or Liberation—a Russian revolutionary paper published in Germany by the Russian emigrant P. Struve. "Yes," said he, "they write fine things, and some are true, but how can you argue abroad about the situation in Russia? Russian reality will always upset all the theories of our would-be liberators."

We arrived at Paris late at night. Witte gave me a lift to the Place Vendôme, where we parted.

#### SEPTEMBER 9—22.

I passed the morning with my wife, who had come from Geneva, where my family was staying. We went out shopping and had lunch at the hotel Ritz with Count Cassini, our former Ambassador in Washington. He is a man of great intelligence and full of wit, though perhaps a little too cynical in his appreciation of human nature. When at Washington he was unable to appraise the democratic spirit of the Americans and adapt himself to their psychology, associating chiefly with the chosen "four hundred" of society. That is perhaps why he never



enjoyed much popularity. Cassini was interested to know the tactics of Witte during the Conference and seemed astonished when I told him that Witte simply appealed to American good sense and public opinion. Cassini himself ascribed Witte's success to his knowledge of the questions set before him and to his not being hampered by diplomatic conventionalities and traditions, and above all, by the interference of the Foreign Office and of Petersburg red tape. A professional diplomat, he thought, would never have permitted publicity of negotiations, and especially in the face of Japanese opposition.

In the evening I parted with my wife, who returned to Switzerland, while I accompanied Witte to Berlin. We arrived in the German capital before mid-day. Witte did not want to drive to the hotel, and set off on foot, together with his family and some members of our Embassy, who had met him at the station. A large crowd had collected outside the hotel Bristol, overflowing the avenue of Unter den Linden. The Germans were evidently waiting for Witte. The latter, however, passed unnoticed, but as the crowd was inclined to remain outside the hotel, he had to come out on the balcony. The people seemed to be well pleased, and met him with shouts and cheers. We spent a quiet evening at the hotel with some of the members of our Embassy and Witte's friend, the banker, Ernst Mendelsohn. Our Ambassador, Count Osten-Sacken, was on leave, the councillor, Mr. Bulatzel, being in charge of the Embassy.

#### SEPTEMBER 11—14.

In the morning I was sent for by Witte, who told me that he was going to be presented to the German Emperor, who was staying in his hunting lodge, Gros Rominten, not far from the Russian frontier. He would not take me with him, he said, because the Kaiser wished to receive him in his family circle, and did not want anybody to accompany him. It was settled, therefore, that I should travel by myself and meet him at the frontier station.

During the day Witte called on the Secretary of State, Baron von Richthofen, and on the Chancellor, Prince von Bülow. As far as journalists were concerned, he declined to receive them, pleading business as an excuse.

SEPTEMBER 12—25.

We had lunch at Baron von Richthofen's house. Besides the Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, who had arrived from Baden Baden to meet Witte, there were several German officials—Count Possadowsky, von Röhner, von Löbel, Mendelsohn Bartoldi, etc. The lunch was a rather tedious affair, only official toasts being proposed. After lunch Witte, his wife, and some of the Embassy took a walk in Unter den Linden. The people recognised Witte and formed a sort of procession in his wake, obliging him to seek refuge in the hotel.

The next day, that is on the 26th of September, Witte set off to the hunting lodge of Rominten, taking with him only his servant. We met again two days later at the Russian frontier station of Eidkuhnen. He seemed much pleased with his visit and told us that the reception he met with in Rominten was more than flattering, the Kaiser treating him in a most amiable and even demonstrative manner, showing his great regard for our statesman. "You know," said Witte, "he is a great cajoler, and can be really very pleasant if he wishes. The Kaiser naturally asked for details of our journey, and wanted to know my impressions about America and President Roosevelt and the part he played in the negotiations. He praised my successful achievement of an ungrateful task, as he said, and then expressed the hope that I would be again in power and co-operate in the accomplishment of the great idea—the establishment of the States of "Mittel Europa," something similar to the United States. Such a scheme, the Kaiser thought, would promote peace and prevent further armaments, which were most burdensome to Germany."

"This idea," continued Witte, "had been previously developed by the Kaiser, and the only alteration was his intention to draw France into the combination."

"The Emperor inquired about the state of mind in Paris, and wished to know my impression of the French President, Mr. Rouvier, and some other political personages, and incidentally mentioned that he counted on my support to influence France's statesmen in favour of his scheme. The Kaiser was as usual very loquacious in exposing his plan, and I think was carried away by his impulsiveness, forgetting or neglecting the practical side of the question."

From what Witte said it was plain that the question of a closer drawing together of Russia and Germany was touched on, even if such a course should require certain concessions to France. The Kaiser mentioned his recent interview with our Emperor in the Gulf of Finland where this subject had evidently been discussed. Witte was, however, reticent, as he knew that in Russia the feeling was not favourable to such a *rapprochement* with Germany, and perhaps because he himself was not sure of his own position.

He added that the time in Rominten was spent in a very intimate circle, nobody outside the Imperial family being present. The Kaiser was lively and jocose and related funny anecdotes, making everyone, including Witte, do the same. In parting, Wilhelm gave Witte his portrait in a silver frame, expressing the hope that he would see him bring about those reforms which were so necessary to Russia. Witte spoke approvingly of the simple way in which the Imperial family lived and of his household, but thought that the Kaiser himself must be a difficult man to get on with, and that those dependent on him evidently stood in awe of his despotism and pretensions.

I stayed in Witte's carriage from Eidkuhnen to Petersburg. Madame Witte had joined us at the frontier. We talked about things in Russia, Witte mentioning again his wish to discard all politics and to go abroad, saying he was tired and that his advice was no longer wanted.

When we arrived at Petersburg the reception prepared at the station was rather meagre. It contrasted very much with that of Berlin. Here I parted with Witte. We met again when he was Prime Minister and Count, after the issue of the Manifesto of the 17th October, which established a new Constitutional Government for our country.

## *Appendix.*

The Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, signed at Portsmouth (New Hampshire) on the 23rd day of August, 1905.

The Emperor of Japan on the one part and the Emperor of All the Russias on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace to their countries, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have for this purpose named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutarō Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, His Minister to the United States, and for His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, His Excellency Serge Witte, His Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and His Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, His Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the following articles:

*Article I.*—There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and between their respective States and subjects.

*Article II.*—The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers, that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favoured nation. It is also agreed, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, that the two High Contracting Parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

*Article III.*—Japan and Russia mutually engage—

(1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the Additional Article One annexed to this treaty, and

(2) To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all the portions of Manchuria now in occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential, or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.



*Article IV.*—Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.

*Article V.*—The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien, and the adjacent territory and territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions and franchises connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and assign to Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease. The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the above stipulation. The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

*Article VI.*—The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to Japan without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government the railway between Kuanch'eng-tzu and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining to it in that region, as well as all the coal mines in that region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The Two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

*Article VII.*—Japan and Russia engage to retain and exploit their respective railway lines in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restriction does not relate to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

*Article VIII.*—The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as possible, conclude a separate Convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.

*Article IX.*—The Imperial Russian Government cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin, and all the islands adjacent thereto, and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Article Eleven annexed to this Treaty. Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Sakhalin, or the adjacent islands, any fortifications or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.

*Article X.*—It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property, and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property, on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from such territory any inhabitants who labour under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

*Article XI.*—Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possessions in the

Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas. It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

*Article XII.*—The Treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favoured nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit, and tonnage dues, and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects, and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.

*Article XIII.*—So soon as possible after the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special Commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and received by the Commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorised Representative in such convenient numbers and such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the Commissioner of the receiving State. The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoners from the date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay to Japan so soon as possible after the exchange of statements as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

*Article XIV.*—The present Treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little delay as possible and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the Treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokyo and the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg and from the date of the later of such announcements this Treaty shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington so soon as possible.

*Article XV.*—The present Treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of discrepancy in the interpretation of, the French text shall prevail.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles III. and IX. of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia of this date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have concluded the following Additional Articles.

*Sub Article to Article III.*—Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the Territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the Treaty of Peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria except from the leased territory of the Liao-tung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.

The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum

number the Commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements.

The Commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation so soon as possible and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

*Sub Article to Article IX.*—So soon as possible after the present Treaty comes into force, a Commission of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed respectively by the two High Contracting Parties which on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Sakhalin. The Commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and, in case any deflection from that line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said Commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the Commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the High Contracting Parties.

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to which they are annexed.

Portsmouth, the Fifth Day of the Ninth Month of the Thirty-eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third of August, 1905 (September 5, 1905).

(Signed)  
JUTARO KOMURA.  
K. TAKAHIRA.

(Signed)  
SERGE WITTE.  
ROSEN.







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